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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters. All chapters study di¤erent aspects of macroeconomic
policy.
The rst chapter studies discretionary monetary policy in an economy where economic
agents have quasi-hyperbolic discounting. It demonstrates that a benevolent central bank
is able to keep ination under control for a wide range of discount factors. If the central
bank, however, does not adopt the households time preferences and tries to discourage
early-consumption and delayed-saving, then a marginal increase in steady state output
is achieved at the cost of a much higher average ination rate. Indeed, it shows that
it is desirable from a welfare perspective for the central bank to quasi-hyperbolically
discount by more than households do. Welfare is improved because this discount structure
emphasizes the current-period cost of price changes and leads to lower average ination.
It contrasts the results with those obtained when policy is conducted according to a
Taylor-type rule.
The second chapter analyses the e¤ect of endogenous discounting on wealth inequality
in an endowment economy with heterogeneous agents, subject to occasionally binding
borrowing constraint. It demonstrates that introduction of Uzawa-type preferences may
launch a strong redistribution mechanism leading to high equilibrium real interest rate
and a more dispersed wealth distribution in comparison to the model with standard
preferences.
The third chapter studies macroprudential policy in a macro-model with a heteroge-
neous banking sector, prone to asymmetric information and moral hazard a la Boissay
et.al. (2016). This model is shown to generate nancial crises when a sequence of small
positive technology shocks can lead to an increase in lending, as well as to a reduction in
all market rates. This paper investigates a scope for a macropridential policy that would
reduce probability of a nancial crisis, but not lead to a too sharp reduction in a social
welfare. It demonstrates that the introduction of a direct proportional tax on interbank
lending can substantially reduce the amount of credit and reduce probability of a nancial
crisis.
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Extended Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters. All chapters study di¤erent aspects of macroeco-
nomic policy.
The rst chapter studies monetary policy in an economy where households have quasi-
geometric preferences. In such an economy consumers require instantaneous gratication
and will delay decisions that seem inferior from todays perspective. Although they value
saving for the future income, they cannot resist to keep consuming today and plan to
start saving adequately from tomorrow. This type of preferences has been extensively
studies in behavioral economics, but an investigation of its implications for the conduct
of monetary policy is novel.
This chapter examines quasi-geometric discounting in a New Keynesian business cycle
model. Although the model is standard in many respects, quasi-geometric discounting
introduces important complications because the households decision problem is no longer
time-consistent. Unlike previous studies that have focused largely on the e¤ect that quasi-
hyperbolic discounting has on consumption, saving, and labour supply, it focuses on its
implications for how the central bank should conduct monetary policy. In the absence of
an e¢ cient subsidy to o¤set the monopolistic distortion, discretionary monetary policy
gives rise to both an ination bias and a stabilization bias. It quanties the impact that
the households quasi-hyperbolic discounting has on how monetary policy is conducted
and quantify the magnitude of the discretionary ination bias. Next, it allows the central
bank to also have quasi-hyperbolic discounting and examine the implications the central
banks discounting has for monetary policy. Lastly, it asks whether it is desirable for
the central bank to be benevolent, i.e., whether it is desirable for the central bank to
quasi-hyperbolically discount the future by more, less, or at the same rate as households.
The chapter has three main results. First, it nds that quasi-hyperbolic households
over-consume and under-save in equilibrium, leading to a capital stock that is smaller
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than it would be if households discounted geometrically. Second, although discretionary
monetary policy continues to result in positive average ination, because the central bank
tries to use ination surprises to raise output (discretionary ination bias), the size of the
discretionary ination bias is somewhat smaller when households have quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. This result emerges because rms make their pricing and production deci-
sions to maximize their equity-value. Because it is costly to change prices and their equity-
holders have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, rms choose to make smaller price changes in
response to shocks and to spread price-changes out over time. Allowing the central bank
to have quasi-hyperbolic discounting operates in a qualitatively similar way, and also leads
to a smaller ination bias. Third, it shows that not only is it desirable for the central
bank to have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, but that it should discount by more than
households do. By doing so average ination is lowered and becomes closer to the Ram-
sey optimal rate of zero, raising household welfare. This result parallels Rogo¤ (1985),
who showed that discretionary outcomes could be improved by appointing an optimally
conservative central banker that cares more about stabilizing ination than society. With
quasi-hyperbolic discounting the central bank cares relatively more about costly prices
changes (ination) in the present, leading it to behave as if it cares more about stabilizing
ination than society does.
The second chapter studies a di¤erent type of unconventional household preferences
and their implications for dynamics of the economy and for a scal policy. The economic
environment is very di¤erent from the one in the rst chapter as this chapter considers a
model with heterogenous agents and studies distributional e¤ects. The household prefer-
ences are of Uzawa-type, they are characterized by the endogenous rate of time preference
that depends on the consumption path. These preferences imply that households with
relatively high income and so high consumption discount future by more than households
with less resources.
Higher discounting of relatively rich households should make them to consume more
and save less and should imply less unequal wealth distribution than would be observed
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in an economy with constant time-preferences of households. In contrast, this chapter
shows that Uzawa-type preferences with CRRA utility can generate a long-run wealth
distribution that is substantially more dispersed than the one in an economy with standard
preferences.
This chapter analyses a continuous-time economy with incomplete markets and sto-
chastic shocks to exogenous incomes following a two-state Markov process, as in Huggett
(1993) but with an exogenous constraint on borrowing. There is unique stationary distri-
bution of wealth, with individuals mobile across consumption, income, and wealth levels.
The chapter investigates the e¤ect of endogenous discounting on wealth inequality and
compares two models. In the rst model, the instantaneous discount rate is a locally
linear function of consumption, as in Wang (2007). It yields more concentrated wealth
distribution than the model with standard preferences. In the second model which is
the model of main interest the instantaneous discount rate is an S-shaped function of
consumption, meaning that the agents in the tails of the wealth distribution have di-
minishing marginal discount rate. This model is characterized by a substantially higher
equilibrium interest rate and a more dispersed wealth distribution, relative to the model
with locally-linear discount rate.
To get intuition for these results it is helpful to trace the di¤erences in the behavior
of the negative-wealth agents, who demand loans, and the positive-wealth agents, who
supply loans, across three economies: an economy with the standard, constant discount
rate (CDR), an economy with locally linear discount rate (LDR), and an economy with
S-shaped discount rate (SDR), when all three economies have the same average discount
rate.
In the LDR economy, the densely populated small-positive-wealth group has consump-
tion above the benchmark level and so discounts future by more than their CDR coun-
terpart. It therefore o¤ers a lower supply of loans and thus creates an upward pressure
on the equilibrium interest rate relative to the CDR. This e¤ect is substantially amplied
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by the behavior of wealthy agents. The negative-wealth LDR agents, however, become
more patient than their CDR counterparts and thus have a lower demand for loans, lead-
ing to a downward pressure on the equilibrium interest rate relative to the CDR. The
two opposite e¤ects on interest rate coming from the two tail groups nearly o¤set each
other, and the moderate increase in equilibrium interest rate is implied by the behavior of
central group of agents who have only slightly higher impatience than in the CDR econ-
omy. With equilibrium interest rate only slightly higher than under CDR, the demand
for loans is still higher, as the negative-wealth agents need to renance their loans, but
there is also an income e¤ect forcing them to reduce consumption. The opposite is true
for the high-positive-wealth agents and so the aggregate e¤ect is moderate.
The balance of these opposite pressures on interest rate changes signicantly if the
discount rate of the two tail groups changes only moderately, as in the case with the SDR,
despite the fact that the central group with small positive wealth behaves in the same way
as in the LDR economy. Given the same interest rate, smaller reduction in patience of the
negative-wealth agents implies less reduction in the loan demand and, therefore, weaker
downward pressure on the equilibrium interest rate. Similarly, the high-positive-wealth
group produces only moderate reduction in loan supply and less upward pressure on the
interest rate. However, the reduction in supply is greater than the reduction in demand.
Higher interest rate results in a substantially higher debt of the negative-wealth group,
and in a higher proportion of population in the left-hand tail. Self-reinforcing mechanism
of higher demand for loans to renance the existing debt and stronger upward pressure
on the interest rate produced by this group results in a higher equilibrium interest rate.
The central group with moderate positive wealth generates a moderate increase in
general equilibrium interest rate, while the interactions of the two tail groups limit interest
rate increase in the LDR economy, but amplify its increase substantially in the SDR
economy. The corresponding redistribution of population across wealth levels accompanies
the latter process and reinforces the equilibrium e¤ect. Thus, the UP can generate a
more dispersed wealth distribution, with fatter tails, than the standard preferences, under
14
a plausible assumption of declining marginal impatience above and below the average
discount rate.
The chapter demonstrates that a consumption tax reduces the welfare inequality. Cap-
ital income tax increases current consumption, reduces the current saving but does not
a¤ect future output. In this economy life-time welfare unambiguously rises because of
higher current consumption.
Finally, we demonstrate that in production economy the redistribution e¤ect of Uzawa-
type preferences is mitigated. In contrast to the endowment economy with zero total
wealth movements of population between borrower and lender positions generated and
skews population distribution towards its higher end. No large movements between bor-
rowers and savers are longer possible and the redistribution mechanism does not engage
with a shift in preferences. The mechanism discussed in this chapter may help to un-
derstand additional reasons leading to high observed income inequality in developing
countries with little production possibilities and binding borrowing constraints.
The third chapter studies macroprudential policy in a macro-model with heterogeneous
banking sector subject to asymmetric information and moral hazard a la Boissay et.al.
(2016). This model is shown to generate nancial crises when a sequence of small positive
technology shocks can lead to an increase in lending, but also to a reduction in all market
rates. Lower interest rates aggravate the agency problem of banks and the interbank
market shut. This leads to sharp reduction in lending, nancial crisis and a recession.
The model is non-linear, with an occasionally binding constraint, but it allows numerical
analysis of the implied probability of a nancial crisis.
This chapter investigates a scope for a macroprudential policy that would reduce
probability of a nancial crisis, while not resulting in too sharp reduction of a social
welfare. It demonstrates that an introduction of a direct proportional tax on interbank
lending can substantially reduce the amount of credit and result in smaller probability of a
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nancial crisis. The tax a¤ects this probability via two main channels. First, it shifts the
crisis threshold boundaryup - the interbank market will withstand greater overlending
so that economy would need to accumulate greater amount of assets to reduce interest
rate su¢ ciently low for the interbank market to freeze. Second, the level of steady state
overlendingwill reduce: the stochastic steady state level of assets is lower with higher
rate of the interbank lending tax. As a result, the distancebetween the state where the
economy spends most of the time to the boundary of a rare event unambiguously rises.
Although the speed at which the assets accumulate the interest rate rises, this e¤ect
is relatively small and the overall e¤ect of the macroprudential policy on the economy is
positive. Although one expects that a macroprudential policy may create higher costs for
nancial intermediation, the chapter nds that in our environment a moderate increase
in the tax rate results in higher social welfare in the stochastic steady state.
In this model, higher tax rate on interbank lending lowers both, supply and demand
for funds at the interbank market. More banks will leave the interbank market to lend
directly to rms, reducing supply of funds. In a model with asymmetric information
and moral hazard demand for loans may rise with higher interbank rate, as each bank is
able to borrow more due to incentive participation constraint. With higher taxes on the
interbank lending, however, the incentive participation constraint for lenders is tightened,
so the market funding ratio falls. This e¤ect dominates the overall e¤ect on demand,
and demand for funds falls with higher tax on lending. The equilibrium interbank rate
increases, and so all other interest rates. The e¢ ciency of the marginal bank rises as
more banks switch to nance rms directly. In stochastic steady state the total amount
of lending and capital falls, and so does output and labour. Consumption falls as well but
the social welfare rises as the disutility of labour dominates the e¤ect on period utility.
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Chapter 1
Monetary Policy when Preferences
are Quasi-Hyperbolic
Based on joined work with Richard Dennis
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Abstract
We study discretionary monetary policy in an economy where economic agents have
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We demonstrate that a benevolent central bank is able
to keep ination under control for a wide range of discount factors. If the central
bank, however, does not adopt the households time preferences and tries to discourage
early-consumption and delayed-saving, then a marginal increase in steady state output
is achieved at the cost of a much higher average ination rate. Indeed, we show that it
is desirable from a welfare perspective for the central bank to quasi-hyperbolically dis-
count by more than households do. Welfare is improved because this discount structure
emphasizes the current-period cost of price changes and leads to lower average ination.
We contrast our results with those obtained when policy is conducted according to a
Taylor-type rule.
Keywords: Monetary policy, zero lower bound.
JEL Reference Number: E52, E61, C62, C73
1.1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Strotz (1956) suggested that people discount short run and long run
with di¤erent discounts, they are more impatient in the short run than in the long run.
A common example to illustrate it is that someone may prefer £ 110 in 31 days over £ 100
in 30 days, but prefer £ 100 now over £ 110 tomorrow. Such preferences reversalshave
been extensively tested in experimental settings and well documented (de Villiers, P. A.,
& Herrnstein, R. J. (1976), Green et al., 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995, Ainslie, 1992,
2001).
18
The indirect evidence on preference reversals, or the present bias, has also been
presented. Fischer (1999) and ODonoghue and Rabin (1999c, 2001) describe the problem
of procrastination with these preferences. An important application of such preferences
is a problem of pension nance, when people do not save enough for their retirement
(ODonoghue and Rabin (1999d). Such behavior has been extensively documented in
surveys (Farkas and Johnson, 1997, Bernheim, 1995). Addiction and overconsumption of
harmful products is another problem that can be described well by a model with preference
reversals (ODonoghue and Rabin, 1999a, Gruber and Koszegi, 2000, Carillo, 1999).
These reversals are inconsistent with the standard discounted utilitymodel which
relies on exponential discounting with constant intertemporal discount rate. Both psy-
chologists and behavioral economists suggested that this evidence is consistent with the
rate of time preference which declines with time, or, in other words, it can be captured by
the notion that households have hyperbolic discounting. Consumers desire instant grati-
cation (Harris and Laibson, 2001) and they value mechanisms that enable them to better
exercise self-control and/or to constrain their future selves (Strotz 1956; Laibson 1997).
When they discount the future hyperbolically, households value savings for the future in-
come and insurance that they provide, yet cannot resist splurging a little on consumption
today while planning to save for the future tomorrow. If they recognize that this behav-
ior will repeat itself day after day, leading them to over-consume and under-save, then
todays household will have an incentive to purchase illiquid assets in order to constrain
themselves from over-consuming tomorrow. In principle, the same time-inconsistent be-
havior applies to other intertemporal decisions, such as the purchase of durable goods,
and it can be applied to price-setting, capital accumulation, and inventory management
decisions, where the rm is operating for the benet of its hyperbolic equity-holders.
Although hyperbolic discounting features importantly in behavioral economics (Wilkin-
son and Klaes, 2017), there are relatively few instances of hyperbolic discounting appear-
ing in general equilibrium macroeconomic contexts. Where hyperbolic discounting is
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considered it invariably appears in the form of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which com-
bines the usual geometric discounting with a separate factor that discounts all future
periods relative to today (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997). Studies that have
considered quasi-hyperbolic discounting in macroeconomic models have largely concen-
trated on the stochastic growth model and focused on the possibility of multiple equilibria
arising through strategic interaction between the household and its future self (Krusell
and Smith, 2003; Maliar and Maliar, 2005, 2006a). Applications of quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting include Krusell, Kurus¸çu, and Smith (2002), who show that the solution to the
planners problem delivers lower welfare than the competitive equilibrium when house-
holds have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and Graham and Snower (2013), who examine a
sticky-wage New Keynesian model and demonstrate that quasi-hyperbolic discounting can
overturn the Friedman rule. In Graham and Snowers model households prefer positive
ination because it erodes the real wage over time, leading them to work relatively less
today and relatively more in the (quasi-hyperbolically discounted) future. Maliar and
Maliar (2006b) build on Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001)
and study a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous households facing idiosyncratic
labor productivity shocks and a borrowing constraint. They nd that quasi-hyperbolic
discounting has a large impact on the income distribution. Maeda (2018) extends Krusell
and Smith (2002) to a monetary economy with a cash-in-advance constraint and shows
that this constraint on cash-holdings prevents households from over-consuming in equi-
librium and, when the government can only control money growth and not taxes, leads
to the Friedman rule holding.
In this paper we examine quasi-hyperbolic discounting in a New Keynesian business
cycle model and we explore the implications this form of discounting has for how the cen-
tral bank should conduct monetary policy. The model is one in which monopolistically
competitive rms employ capital and labor to produce goods and who set prices subject
to Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs. Households consume goods and supply labor
and they have a portfolio of bonds and equities in which to save. In our benchmark sce-
nario, the central bank conducts monetary policy optimally under discretion. Although
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the model is standard in many respects, quasi-hyperbolic discounting introduces impor-
tant complications because the households decision problem is no longer time-consistent.
These complications are compounded by the fact that monetary policy is conducted with
discretion. Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting must be solved numerically, which can be challenging because the strategic
interactions between households and their future-selves can give rise to multiple equilibria
(Krusell and Smith, 2003). We avoid the indeterminacy associated with log-linearization
(Maliar and Maliar, 2006a) by solving our nonlinear model using a global solution method
and we obtain a unique stable equilibrium by computing the interior solution to a system
of generalized Euler equations (as recommended in Maliar and Maliar, 2005). Although
the presence of sticky prices and optimal policymaking greatly complicates our model, we
obtain considerable simplication by imposing symmetry on household and rm behavior
in equilibrium, thereby precluding equilibria that exhibit heterogeneity.
Unlike previous studies that have focused largely on the e¤ect that quasi-hyperbolic
discounting has on consumption, saving, and labour supply, we focus on its implications
for how the central bank should conduct monetary policy. In the absence of an e¢ cient
subsidy to o¤set the monopolistic distortion, discretionary monetary policy gives rise
to both an ination bias and a stabilization bias. We quantify the impact that the
households quasi-hyperbolic discounting has on how monetary policy is conducted and
quantify the magnitude of the discretionary ination bias. Next, we allow the central
bank to also have quasi-hyperbolic discounting and examine the implications the central
banks discounting has for monetary policy. Lastly, we ask whether it is desirable for
the central bank to be benevolent, i.e., whether it is desirable for the central bank to
quasi-hyperbolically discount the future by more, less, or at the same rate as households.
We contrast our results for discretionary policymaking with those from a Taylor-type rule.
We obtain ve main results. First, consistent with previous studies, we nd that
quasi-hyperbolic households over-consume and under-save in equilibrium, leading to a
capital stock that is smaller than it would be if households discounted geometrically.
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Second, although discretionary monetary policy continues to result in positive average
ination, because the central bank tries to use ination surprises to raise output (dis-
cretionary ination bias), the size of the discretionary ination bias is somewhat smaller
when households have quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This result emerges because rms
make their pricing and production decisions to maximize their equity-value. Because it is
costly to change prices and their equity-holders have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, rms
choose to make smaller price changes in response to shocks and to spread price-changes
out over time. Allowing the central bank to have quasi-hyperbolic discounting operates
in a qualitatively similar way, and also leads to a smaller ination bias. Third, we show
that not only is it desirable for the central bank to have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, but
that it should discount by more than households do. By doing so average ination is low-
ered and becomes closer to the Ramsey optimal rate of zero, raising household welfare.
This result parallels Rogo¤ (1985), who showed that discretionary outcomes could be
improved by appointing an optimally conservative central banker that cares more about
stabilizing ination than society. With quasi-hyperbolic discounting the central bank
cares relatively more about costly prices changes (ination) in the present, leading it to
behave as if it cares more about stabilizing ination than society does. Fourth, with
quasi-hyperbolic discounting households receive a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary return
to owning stocks (or capital). For even small amounts of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
the non-pecuniary component can be big, leading to a large total return that spills over
to the return on bonds. Fifth, outcomes generated by the Taylor rule often di¤er greatly
from the optimal discretionary policy. From a welfare perspective, greater hyperbolic
discounting by households leads to greater ine¢ ciency of the Taylor rule.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we
present our model, outline the decision problems for households and rms and discuss
the rst-order conditions that emerge in a symmetric equilibrium. Section 1.3 describes
the central banks decision problem and presents the generalized Euler equations asso-
ciated with optimal discretionary policy. Section 4 focuses on interest rates and asset
prices, illustrating how these are determined when agents have quasi-hyperbolic discount-
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ing. Section 5 presents the models benchmark parameterization. Section 1.6 presents
our main simulation results. Section 7 looks at policy delegation, examining the re-
lationship between the households and the central banks discount rates. Section 1.7
concludes. Appendices contain derivations of the models equilibrium conditions under
di¤erent assumptions regarding capitals ownership, illustrate the solution strategy, and
present results on numerical accuracy.
1.2 The model
The economy is populated by households, rms, and a government. Households supply
labor and consume a bundle of di¤erentiated goods. Households can save through pur-
chasing (risk-free one-period nominal) bonds and stocks, earning income from their wealth
and from working. Unlike many business cycle models, the households in our model have
hyperbolic preferences (Laibson, 1997) applying di¤erent discount factors at di¤erent
points in time. Drawing on Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997), we approximate
hyperbolic discounting by the quasi-hyperbolic discounting sequence

1; ; 2; 3; :::
	
,
where  2 (0; 1) reects the usual geometric discounting and  allows short-term payo¤s
to be discounted more or less heavily relative to geometric discounting. If  2 (0; 1),
then the short-run discount rate is higher than the long-run discount rate; the opposite
is true if  > 1.
We assume that rms own the capital stock whose initial level was nanced through a
stock issuance and that rms nance capitals accumulation over time through retained
earnings. The labor market is perfectly competitive, however rms produce di¤erentiated
goods that are aggregated and sold to households. Constraining a rms pricing decision is
a Rotemberg-style (Rotemberg, 1982) quadratic cost to changing prices. The government
consists primarily of a central bank that is assumed to conduct policy under discretion by
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setting the nominal return on the bond in order to maximize household welfare. We also
consider the case where monetary policy is conducted according to a Taylor-type rule.
Although our main analysis is conducted on the basis that rms own the capital stock,
we could alternatively have assumed that households own the capital stock and that they
rent it to rms in a perfectly competitive rental market. We show in Appendices A and B
that both ownership structures are equivalent, even when households quasi-hyperbolically
discount the future.
1.2.1 Households
There is a unit-measure of identical innitely-lived households who derive utility from
consumption and leisure. The representative households expected discounted lifetime
utility from period t onward is given by
Ut = Et

ut + 
 
ut+1 + 
2ut+2 + 
3ut+3 + :::

; (1.1)
where ut represents the instantaneous, or momentary, utility obtained in period t, Et
denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon period-t information,
and the parameters satisfy  2 (0; 1) and  > 0. Equation (1.1) distinguishes between
the rate at which households discount the utility obtained in period t+1 relative to period
t, which is given by , from the rate at which they discount the utility obtained in period
t + k relative to period t + k   1 (k > 1), which is given by . Following (Krusell and
Smith, 2003), equation (1.1) represents a form of quasi-hyperbolic, or quasi-geometric,
discounting. Notice that when  = 1 the standard case of geometric discounting is
restored while when  6= 1 there is Strotz-style (Strotz, 1956) time inconsistency embedded
in household preferences. In the case that  < 1, households are more impatient today
than they are in the future and vice-versa when  > 1.
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We assume that momentary utility is described by the additively-separable function
ut = u (ct; ht) =
c1 t   1
1     
h1+t
1 + 
; (1.2)
where ht represents hours worked and ct is an aggregate good formed as a Dixit-Stiglitz
bundle (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) of di¤erentiated goods
ct =
Z 1
0
ct (j)
"t 1
"t dj
 "t
"t 1
; (1.3)
where ct (j) denotes goods purchased from the jth rm and the elasticity of substitution
between goods satises "t > 1, 8 t. In equation (1.2), the parameters are assumed to
satisfy  > 0,  > 0, and  > 0.
Expressed in terms of aggregate goods, the households real ow-budget-constraint is
ct +
bt+1
1 +Rt
+Qtst+1 = wtht +
bt
1 + t
+Qtst (1 + r
s
t ) ;
where Rt is the net nominal interest rate, wt is the real wage rate, t is the aggregate
goods ination rate, Qt is the relative price of stocks, bt is the real value of non-state-
contingent nominal bonds, st is the number of stocks, and rst is the dividend yield. With
the aggregate consumption good produced according to equation (1.3), the demand for
the jth rms good, j 2 [0; 1], is
ct (j) =

Pt (j)
Pt
 "t
ct;
with the price of the aggregate good given by
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (j)
1 "t dj
 1
1 "t
:
We assume that the representative household cannot precommit to future plans. With
the economys state vector summarized by the vector Zt, the state variables for the house-
holds problem are bt, st, and Zt. Adopting the apparatus of a recursive competitive equi-
librium, we formulate the households decision problem through the following Lagrangian,
25
which will be extremized with respect to fct; ht; bt+1; st+1; tg,
U (bt; st;Zt) =
264
c1 t  1
1    h
1+
t
1+
+ Et [U (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)]
+t
 
w (Zt)ht +
bt
1+(Zt)
+Q (Zt) st (1 + r
s (Zt))
 ct   bt+11+R(Zt)  Q (Zt) st+1
! 375 ; (1.4)
taking the equilibrium law-of-motion for Zt as given. In equation (1.4) the continuation
value U (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1) satises the recursion
U (bt; st;Zt) =
264
c1 t  1
1    h
1+
t
1+
+ Et [U (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)]
+t
 
w (Zt)ht +
bt
1+(Zt)
+Q (Zt) st (1 + r
s (Zt))
 ct   bt+11+R(Zt)  Q (Zt) st+1
! 375 :
We close our description of the households problem by noting that the elasticity of
substitution between goods is stochastic, with "t = "et and t obeying
t+1 = t + t+1;
with  2 (0; 1) and t  i:i:d: N
 
0; 2

. The elasticity shock, t, is common to all rms
and forms one element in the economys state vector, Zt.
1.2.2 Firms
There is a unit-continuum of monopolistically competitive rms. The jth rm, j 2 [0; 1],
owns capital, kt (j), and employs labour, ht (j), using both inputs to produce their output,
yt (j), according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
yt (j) = e
atkt (j)
 ht (j)
1  ; (1.5)
where  2 (0; 1) and at is an aggregate technology shock that obeys
at+1 = aat + at+1;
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with a 2 (0; 1) and at  i:i:d: N (0; 2a). The aggregate technology, at, is another
element in the economys state vector, Zt.
The rms capital evolves over time according to the law-of-motion
kt+1 (j) = (1  ) kt (j) + it (j) ;
where the depreciation rate,  2 [0; 1], is common to all rms. The aggregate capital
stock, Kt, is the nal element in the economys state vector, Zt.
Firms face a Rotemberg-style (Rotemberg, 1982) price adjustment cost, where the
adjustment-cost is governed by !  0. Each period every rm chooses how much la-
bor to employ, how much investment to undertake, and the price at which to sell their
good in order to maximize its equity-value. Prots are paid to the rms equity-holders
(households) in the form of a dividend.
After substituting the production function (equation 1.5) into the prot function (and
dropping the j-index for notational convenience), the decision problem for the represen-
tative rm can be written recursively in the form
W (kt; pt 1;Zt) = maxfpt;kt+1g
266664
p1 "tt Y (Zt)  w(Zt)

p
 "t
t Y (Zt)
eatkt
 1
1    (kt+1   (1  ) kt)
 !
2

pt
pt 1
(1 + (Zt))  1
2
Y (Zt)
+Et
h
C(Zt+1)
 
C(Zt)
  W (kt+1; pt;Zt+1)
i
377775 ;
(1.6)
taking the equilibrium law-of-motion for Zt as given, where C(Zt) denotes aggregate
consumption, Y (Zt) denotes aggregate output, and pt denotes the rms price relative
to the aggregate goods price. Complementing equation (1.6) is the following recursive
expression for the rms continuation value
W (kt; pt 1;Zt) =
266664
p1 "tt Y (Zt)  w(Zt)

p
 "t
t Y (Zt)
eatkt
 1
1    (kt+1   (1  ) kt)
 !
2

pt
pt 1
(1 + (Zt))  1
2
Y (Zt)
+Et
h
C(Zt+1)
 
C(Zt)
  W (kt+1; pt;Zt+1)
i
377775 :
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1.2.3 Equilibrium conditions and aggregation
In our model all households and all rms are identical and they are of unit mass. We
focus our attention on symmetric equilibria for which aggregation across agents implies
kt = Kt, ct = Ct, ht = Ht, bt = Bt, and st = St, where capital letters indicate aggregate
quantities. The bonds and stocks that are traded among households are assumed to be
in zero-net-supply and xed-net-supply, respectively, so we have Bt = 0, 8 t and St = 1,
8 t, where our normalization that stocks equal 1 is without loss of generality.
We examine the households decision problem in Appendix A.1. There we show that
after aggregating across households the rst-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium
from the households problem can be written as
C t wt = H

t ; (1.7)
C t
1 +Rt
= Et

C t+1
1 + t+1

; (1.8)
QtC
 
t = Et

C t+1Qt+1
 
1 + rst+1

: (1.9)
Equation (1.7) is an intra-temporal optimality condition for which the quasi-hyperbolic
discounting parameter does not enter. Which is to say that the households quasi-
hyperbolic discounting does not change the trade-o¤ that it faces when making its labor-
leisure choice. The same cannot be said for equations (1.8) and (1.9), which are intertem-
poral optimality conditions associated with saving through purchasing bonds and stocks,
respectively. For these saving-decisions, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting alters the rate
at which households discount the future relative to today. To the extent that  < 1,
quasi-hyperbolic discounting serves to increase the compensation that households require
in order to defer consumption.
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Turning to the rms decision problem, we show in Appendix A.2 that after aggregating
across rms the rst-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium can be expressed as
C t = Et

C t+1

rkt+1 + 1   +
(1  )

KK(Zt+1)

; (1.10)
t (1 + t) =
(1  "t) (1  )
!
+
"txt
!
+ Et

C t+1
C t
Yt+1
Yt
t+1 (1 + t+1)

; (1.11)
rkt = xt
Yt
Kt
; (1.12)
wt = (1  )xt Yt
Ht
; (1.13)
where xt represents real marginal costs, rkt represents the shadow real rental rate of capital,
and KK (Zt) is the derivative of the decision rule for next-periods capital, Kt+1 = K (Zt),
with respect toKt. Equations (1.12) and (1.13) are intra-temporal conditions that simply
dene capitals shadow rental rate and the real wage and do not depend on the households
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Equation (1.11) is the economys Phillips curve. The
structure of the Phillips curve is a¤ected by the quasi-hyperbolic discounting, but only to
the extent that it changes the rate at which next-periods outcomes are discounted relative
to today. The households quasi-hyperbolic discounting does not have a larger e¤ect on
the Phillips curves structure because we are focusing on a symmetric equilibrium in which
all rms set the same price, which means that in equilibrium the relative goods-price for
all rms always equals one.
The households quasi-hyperbolic discounting does, however, impact equation (1.10),
which characterizes the rms intertemporal decision about capital accumulation and takes
the form of a consumption-Euler equation, much like equations (1.8) and (1.9). Interest-
ingly, in equation (1.10) quasi-hyperbolic discounting manifests itself in two ways. First,
quasi-hyperbolic discounting changes the rate at which rms discount next-period relative
to today, changing the compensation that the rm requires to be enticed to purchase an
additional unit of capital rather than pay households a higher dividend. Second, quasi-
hyperbolic discounting adds a term involving the derivative KK (Zt+1). This additional
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term, which disappears when  = 1, says that when making its capital decision, the rm
takes into account how the acquisition of an additional unit of capital today changes next-
periods capital-acquisition decision, an e¤ect that arises because the rms equity holders
do not have time-invariant preferences. If the household owns the capital stock, then
this term, KK (Zt+1), arises in the consumption-Euler equation for the capital decision as
households use capital accumulation to constrain their future-selves. While the (shadow)
rental rate represents a pecuniary return that households receive through owning stocks
the derivative term, KK (Zt+1), represents a non-pecuniary return.
In addition to these rst-order conditions, aggregating across rms and households
gives us the aggregate production function
Yt = e
atKt H
1 
t ;
the resource constraint
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt   Ct +

1  !
2
2t

Yt;
and the following expression for the dividend yield, rst , which accounts for the pecuniary
return on owning stocks
Qtr
s
t =

1  xt   !
2
2t

Yt + r
k
tKt   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt) : (1.14)
Equation (1.14) says that the dividend yield rises with an increase in the shadow rental
rate of capital, rkt , and with a reduction in real marginal costs, xt, or ination, t.
1.3 Central bank
We assume that the central bank shares the households momentary utility function and
that it also has quasi-hyperbolic preferences, which is to say that we allow the central
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banks discount factors,  and , to potentially di¤er from the households,  and . Fur-
ther, we assume that the central bank does not have access to a commitment technology
and that it conducts policy under discretion. With monetary policy conducted under
discretion, and with the central bank possessing quasi-hyperbolic preferences, the central
banks decision problem can be summarized by the Bellman equation
V(Zt) = maxftg

C1 t   1
1     
H1+t
1 + 
+ Et [V (Zt+1)]

;
where the continuation value can be expressed recursively in the form
V (Zt) =
C1 t   1
1    

1 + 
H1+t + Et [V (Zt+1)] ;
subject to the constraints
C t = Et [L(Zt+1)] ; (1.15)
t (1 + t)C
 
t Yt =
"t
!

xt +
(1  "t) (1  )
"t

C t Yt + Et [M(Zt+1)] ; (1.16)
1  !
2
2t

Yt = Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt; (1.17)
Yt = e
atKt H
1 
t : (1.18)
Among these four constraints, two are forward-looking: equations (1.15) and (1.16).
In each of these forward-looking constraints we have introduced an auxiliary variable,
L(Zt) and M(Zt), respectively, which are dened according to
L(Zt) = C
 
t



xt
Yt
Kt
+ 1  

+ (1  )KK(Zt)

;
M(Zt) = t (1 + t)C
 
t Yt:
Making these auxiliary variables functions of the economys state in the central banks
decision problem reects the assumption that policy is set with discretion. Specically,
while able to inuence the economys aggregate state, the discretionary central bank is
unable to use policy to inuence the process by which private-agents form expectations
and must take the functions L(Zt) and M(Zt) as given when formulating policy.
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It is notable from equations (1.15) (1.18) that the key constraints on the central
banks policy decision are the production technology, the resource constraint, the Phillips
curve, and the consumption-Euler equation associated with the optimal capital decision.
The consumption-Euler equations associated with bonds (equation 1.8) and stocks (equa-
tion 1.9) are not binding constraints, but simply serve to determine equilibrium outcomes
for Rt and Qt, with rst determined by equation (1.14).
The central banks decision problem is treated in Appendix C, where we show that
the rst-order conditions for the optimal discretionary policy are
@
@Ct
: C t +

 + 
H1+t
Ct
  1t

1 + 
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Ct

  2tC  1t
  1 + 
+ 
3t

(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  t (1 + t)

C  1t Yt = 0; (1.19)
@
@t
:  3t (1 + 2t)C t   1t!t = 0; (1.20)
@
@xt
:   
 + 
H1+t
xt
+ 1t
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
xt
(1.21)
+3t

"txt
!
+
1  
 + 
(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  1  
 + 
t (1 + t)

C t
Yt
xt
= 0;
@
@Kt+1
:   
 + 
Et

H1+t+1
Kt+1

+ Et

1t+1


1 + 
 + 

1  !
2
2t+1
 Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1  

+
1 + 
 + 
Et

3t+1

(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt+1
!
  t+1 (1 + t+1)

Yt+1
Kt+1
C t+1

  (1  )Et

C t+1 +

 + 
H1+t+1
Ct+1

CK(Zt+1)

+
 (1  )
 + 
Et

H1+t+1
xt+1
XK(Zt+1)

 2tEt [LK(Zt+1)] + 3tEt [MK(Zt+1)]  1t = 0: (1.22)
where
Ht =

1  


eatxtK

t C
 
t
 1
+
; (1.23)
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Yt =
 
1  

1 
e(1+)atx1 t K
(1+)
t C
 (1 )
t
! 1
+
; (1.24)
L(Zt) = C
 
t



eatxt
Yt
Kt
+ 1  

+ (1  )KK(Zt)

; (1.25)
M(Zt) = t (1 + t)C
 
t Yt: (1.26)
As a counterpoint, we also solve the model for the case where monetary policy is
conducted according to the following Taylor-type rule
1 +Rt =
1 + 


1 + t
1 + 
  Yt
Yt 1
y
; (1.27)
where  represents the ination target,  > 1 and y > 0. Following Fernández-
Villaverde, et al. (2015) and Dennis (2018), this Taylor rule has the central back setting
the nominal interest rate in response to movements in ination and real output growth.
1.4 Interest rates and asset prices
From the households optimal bond-holding decision, the net nominal interest rate, Rt, is
governed by the Euler equation
1
1 +Rt
= Et

C t+1
C t
1
1 + t+1

;
where the e¤ect of the households quasi-hyperbolic discounting is seen to cause the future
to be discounted more sharply, raising the equilibrium interest rate on average. We can
also compute the shadow return on a risk-free real bond, rt, which must satisfy
1
1 + rt
= Et

C t+1
C t

;
From the rms decision problem the shadow rental rate of capital is given by
rkt = xt
Yt
Kt
;
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where households quasi-hyperbolic discounting has indirect-e¤ects through the economys
real allocation. Where the shadow rental rate of capital represents the pecuniary return
that households receive from owning stocks, the total net return they receive, rcapt , satises
1 + rcapt = r
k
t + 1   +
(1  )

KK(Zt): (1.28)
According to equation (1.28), the total gross return on capital, 1+ rcapt , is the sum of two
components: the gross pecuniary return, rkt + 1  , and the gross non-pecuniary return,
(1 )

KK(Zt). As we will see below, even for relatively small amounts of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting the non-pecuniary component can be large.
1.5 Parameterization
We assume that a period in the model corresponds to one quarter of a year and parame-
terize the model to this frequency. We set the households (geometric) discount factor, ,
to 0:99, which in the absence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies a steady state annual
real interest rate of about 4 percent. As is common, we assume log-utility with respect
to consumption, i.e.  = 1, and we set the relative weight on the disutility of labor, ,
equal to 1. The Frisch labor supply elasticity, , is set equal to 1, which is consistent
with a host of studies, including Fernández-Villarerde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and
Rubio-Ramírez (2015), Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), and Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and
Weber (2011), but smaller than Gust, Herbst, López-Salido, and Smith (2017) and Gavin,
Keen, Richter, and Throckmorton (2015), who set this elasticity to 2 and 3, respectively.
As Fernández-Villarerde, et al, (2015) comment, a lower value for  (implying a higher
labor-supply elasticity) is generally more appropriate for models that do not di¤erentiate
between the intensive and extensive margins.
In the production technology, values for  generally range from about 0:3 (Guerrieri
and Iacoviello, 2017) to 0:40 (Cooley and Prescott, 1995). We set  equal to 0:33,
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in line with Gavin, et al, (2015) and Sala, Söderström, and Trigari (2008). In the
capital accumulation equation, we set the depreciation rate, , to 0:025, which implies that
capital depreciates at a 10 percent annualized rate. We set the steady state elasticity of
substitution between goods, ", to 11, implying a steady state mark-up of 10 percent. This
value for " has been used previously in a range of studies, including Krause, López-Salido,
and Lubik (2008a) and Dennis (2018), and is consistent with the ndings of Basu and
Fernald (1997). Other recent studies have set " to 6 (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans,
2005) or 21 (Fernández-Villarerde et al, 2015; Krause, López-Salido, and Lubik, 2008b),
implying much larger and much smaller steady-state markups, respectively, however we
found that these values gave implausible values for steady state ination. Turning to the
price adjustment parameter, !, we set it to 100, consistent with Gust, et al, (2017). In
a log-linearized environment, this value for ! makes the Rotemberg model quantitatively
similar to a Calvo model where the average frequency of price adjustment equals one
year. Elsewhere in the literature, Gavin, et al, (2015) estimate ! to be 59:1, Ireland
(2001) estimates it to be about 80, while the estimates in Gertler, Sala, and Trigari
(2008) and Sala, Söderström, and Trigari (2008) imply a value closer to 150.
There are two shocks in the model, those to aggregate technology, at, and the elasticity
of substitution among goods, t. As is common, these shocks are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes:
at+1 = aat + at+1; at  i:i:d: N
 
0; 2a

;
t+1 = t + t+1; t  i:i:d:N(0; 2):
For the aggregate technology shock, we follow convention (see Faia (2009) and the refer-
ences therein) and set the persistence parameter, a, to 0:95 and the standard deviation
for the technology innovation, a, to 0:008. For the elasticity of substitution shock, the
estimates vary across the literature. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) estimate  and 
to be 0:81 and 0:008, Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate them to be 0:89 and 0:1, while
Ichiue, Kurozumi, and Sunakawa (2013) estimate them to be 0:7 and 0:05. We set  and
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Table 1.1: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0:99  0:33 a 0:95
 1:0 " 11:0  0:85
 1:0 ! 100:0 a 0:008
 1:0  0:0025  0:06
 1:0
 to 0:85 and 0:06, respectively, implying that 90 percent of the distribution for "t lies
in the interval [9:1; 13:3].
In our benchmark model the central banks discount factor and its quasi-hyperbolic
discount factor are assumed to be the same as for the household, implying that the central
bank is benevolent. We summarize our benchmark parameterization in Table 1.1.
For the simulations based on the Taylor-type rule, equation (1.27), we assume  = 2:5,
 = 1:5, and y = 0:5=4.
1.6 Results
In this section we present simulation results for a range of di¤erent model specications.
We begin with the benchmark model in section 6.1 in which households have quasi-
geometric discounting and the central bank is benevolent, sharing the households discount
factors. Section 6.2 treats the case where households and the central bank have quasi-
hyperbolic discounting and their discount factors are not equal.
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1.6.1 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
In this section we impose  =  and  =  (so that households and the central bank
discount symmetrically) to maintain the assumption that the central bank is benevolent.
In line with the standard mechanism discussed in Krusell and Smith (2003) and else-
where, greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting results in households increasing their current
consumption and reducing their current saving. As a result, less capital accumulation
takes place and output, capital, and consumption are all lower on average. The e¤ect is
quantitatively substantial, as illustrated in Table 1.2.
Focusing on the models stationary distribution, Table 1.2 shows the mean (standard
deviations in parentheses) outcomes for the models key macroeconomic and nancial vari-
ables for di¤erent values of  = . Columns (1) and (6) contain results for the benchmark
case with the standard geometric discounting.1 Looking at average outcomes, the table
shows that as greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting takes place ( =  get smaller)
biasing household and central bank decision-making toward the present output falls.
Specically, lowering  =  from 1:0 to 0:9 causes output to decline by approximately
10 percent.2 Although greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting causes output, capital, con-
sumption, labour, and the real wage to fall there are important di¤erences in how each
of these variables is a¤ected. For example, although lowering  =  from 1:0 to 0:9
causes output to fall by 10:02 percent, capital falls by much more (24:55 percent) and
labour falls by much less (1:84 percent). Labour does not decline to the same extent
as output because households sacrice some leisure in order to prevent a large decline
in consumption. As a consequence, consumption falls by 6:02 percent, considerably less
than output. The large decline in capital combined with a smaller decline in labour
1These cases are thoroughly discussed in Appendix D to this chapter.
2Cutting  from 1:0 to 0:7 causes output to fall by about 30 percent, suggesting a linear relationship
between the percent by which  falls and the percent by which output falls.
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means that the capital-labour ratio goes down, and with relatively less capital, labours
productivity diminishes and real wages go down (by 7:77 percent).
Looking at real marginal costs, Table 1.2 shows that greater quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing causes real marginal costs to rise slightly. The e¤ect that quasi-hyperbolic discounting
has on real marginal costs is related to the decline that rms face in the demand for their
good, which causes them to lower their price markup. To understand the impact quasi-
hyperbolic discounting has on ination, note that quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies
that costs to changing prices today are weighted more heavily than those to changing
prices in the future. As a consequence, when responding to shocks rms nd it bene-
cial to spread price changes out over time, making smaller price changes in the current
period and deferring the remaining price change (and its associated cost) to the future.
With smaller price changes taking place today, greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting acts
somewhat like an increase in price rigidity. From the central banks perspective, with
quasi-hyperbolic discounting operating similarly to an increase in price rigidity, it calcu-
lates that smaller ination surprises are su¢ cient to boost output to the e¢ cient level.
In equilibrium, then, greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting leads to less ination.
Turning to the nancial variables, the most pronounced and obvious e¤ect of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting is to raise the real returns on capital and bonds. With quasi-
hyperbolic discounting shifting demand from future- to current-consumption the relative
price of current-consumption rises causing the pecuniary return on capital, as reected
in the (shadow) rental rate of capital, to rise. In addition, greater quasi-hyperbolic
discounting increases greatly the non-pecuniary return on capital, which causes the (net)
total return on capital, rcap, to balloon. With households substituting between stocks and
bonds (which do not o¤er a non-pecuniary return because they are in zero-net-supply)
based on their total return, the rise in rcap leads to a commensurate rise in the real interest
rate.
Although it is clear from Table 1.2 that quasi-hyperbolic discounting has an important
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Table 1.2: Stationary Distribution as a Function of the Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount factor
Discretion Taylor rule
Dis-
counting
 =

1.00 0.99 0.95 0.90 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Output Y 2:540
[0:104]
2:516
[0:103]
2:415
[0:099]
2:286
[0:094]
2:539
[0:103]
2:509
[0:102]
2:387
[0:097]
2:231
[0:091]
Capital K 21:734
[0:936]
21:181
[0:916]
19:009
[0:837]
16:398
[0:740]
21:722
[0:929]
21:049
[0:903]
18:437
[0:799]
15:367
[0:674]
Consumption C 1:992
[0:062]
1:981
[0:062]
1:935
[0:062]
1:872
[0:061]
1:991
[0:062]
1:978
[0:062]
1:922
[0:061]
1:842
[0:060]
Investment I 0:543
[0:053]
0:530
[0:052]
0:475
[0:048]
0:410
[0:044]
0:543
[0:053]
0:526
[0:051]
0:461
[0:047]
0:384
[0:041]
Labour H 0:881
[0:010]
0:880
[0:009]
0:873
[0:009]
0:865
[0:008]
0:881
[0:010]
0:879
[0:010]
0:871
[0:010]
0:867
[0:010]
Real wage w 1:756
[0:063]
1:743
[0:063]
1:690
[0:062]
1:619
[0:060]
1:755
[0:063]
1:739
[0:063]
1:674
[0:061]
1:587
[0:059]
Real mar-
ginal cost
x 0:909
[0:008]
0:910
[0:008]
0:912
[0:008]
0:915
[0:007]
0:909
[0:011]
0:910
[0:011]
0:912
[0:011]
0:915
[0:011]
Annualized
ination
 2:580
[0:527]
2:559
[0:520]
2:478
[0:493]
2:385
[0:462]
2:519
[0:253]
2:519
[0:254]
2:520
[0:258]
2:522
[0:267]
Household
Welfare
U 29:957
[0:989]
29:270
[0:980]
26:432
[0:942]
22:685
[0:895]
29:960
[0:992]
29:180
[0:981]
25:924
[0:937]
21:457
[0:881]
Nominal
interest rate
R 6:782
[0:497]
11:139
[0:516]
30:969
[0:608]
62:443
[0:760]
6:720
[0:660]
11:098
[0:692]
31:026
[0:847]
62:664
[1:111]
Real
interest rate
r 4:097
[0:384]
8:367
[0:403]
27:804
[0:489]
58:660
[0:634]
4:098
[0:411]
8:368
[0:432]
27:804
[0:531]
58:660
[0:700]
Rental rate rk 4:098
[0:427]
4:342
[0:433]
5:413
[0:460]
7:019
[0:502]
4:098
[0:431]
4:392
[0:440]
5:713
[0:480]
7:756
[0:542]
Return on
capital
rcap 4:098
[0:427]
8:369
[0:447]
27:805
[0:543]
58:662
[0:704]
4:098
[0:431]
8:368
[0:453]
27:805
[0:558]
58:618
[0:740]
Note: Statistics calculated using 106 simulated observations;
standard deviations in brackets.
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impact on average outcomes, it also has an e¤ect on dynamics. We compute impulse
response functions for the discretionary response to technology shocks (Figure 1.1) and
price-elasticity shocks (Figure 1.2) while allowing the extent of the quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting to vary.
Looking rst at the responses to technology shocks, Figure 1.1 reveals that it is the -
nancial variables that quasi-hyperbolic discounting a¤ects most. The solid lines in Figure
1 correspond to  =  = 1, which is conventional (baseline) geometric discounting. With
quasi-hyperbolic discounting causing households to discount the entire future relative to
today, increased quasi-hyperbolic discounting leads to an increased focus on todays con-
sumption and leisure. Accordingly, relative to the baseline case, consumption (panel
C) rises by more and labour (panel E) rises by less in response to the technology shock.
Higher technology boosts the demand for labour, and with the supply of labour increasing
by less relative to the baseline case, the real wage (panel F) rises by more, which pushes
up real marginal costs (panel G). Because real marginal costs increase by more with
quasi-hyperbolic discounting than they do for the baseline case, the rms production
costs are higher and their protability is lower. At the same time, the real interest rate
(panel J) rises by more than the baseline case, due to the increased demand for current
consumption relative to future consumption. The discretionary policy response is to
increase the nominal interest rate (panel I) by more than the baseline case, primarily due
to the higher real interest rate.
Figure 1.2 shows how quasi-hyperbolic discounting alters the models dynamic behav-
ior following price-elasticity shocks. Relative to the baseline case in which  =  = 1
(solid lines), with quasi-hyperbolic discounting the impulse responses are (generally) a
little more muted. Households value leisure and consumption more today relative to the
future, so labour (panel E) rises by less following the shock and consumption rises by
more (panel C). Similarly, quasi-hyperbolic discounting makes rms want to defer costly
price changes, so ination (panel H) falls by less than the baseline case. The variables
for which the e¤ects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting are most pronounced are the real
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Figure 1.1: Responses to a technology shock with quasi-geometric discounting,  = ,
and discretionary policy
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interest rate (panel J) and the nominal return on bonds (panel I). Quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting makes all of these variables more sensitive to the price-elasticity shock because
it changes the relative demand for current consumption such that a bigger change in the
relative price of consumption (the real interest rate) is required to induce households to
defer consumption.
Although quasi-hyperbolic discounting a¤ects the dynamic behavior of the macroeco-
nomic variables, Figures 1.1 and 1.1 reveals that its greatest impact is on asset returns.
This nding is consistent with the simulation results in Table 1.2, which show that the
volatilities of asset returns and asset prices rise importantly as quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing increases.
1.6.2 Policy delegation
In the previous section we allowed the central bank to have quasi-hyperbolic preferences,
but we restricted its discount factors to equal those of the representative household. This
restriction forced the discretionary central bank to be benevolent, i.e., to conduct policy
under discretion in order to maximize the welfare of the representative household. Here,
we allow the central banks quasi-hyperbolic discounting to di¤er from the representative
household. We do this exercise for two reasons. First, by allowing the central banks
discounting to di¤er from the households we can assess the degree to which the central
banks quasi-hyperbolic discounting a¤ects economic outcomes. Second, because policy
is being conducted under discretion and discretion is suboptimal, it is possible that the
government should optimally delegate monetary policy to a central banker whose dis-
counting di¤ers from the household. If this is the case, then a related question is whether
the central bank should discount the future by more or less than the household.
Table 1.3 summarizes equilibrium outcomes when the household and the central bank
have di¤erent discount factors. Comparing columns 1 and 2 column 1 we see that the
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Figure 1.2: Responses to a price-elasticity shock with quasi-geometric discounting,  = .
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Table 1.3: The E¤ect of the Central Banks Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Discretion
Household  1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90
Central bank  1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Y 2:540
[0:104]
2:536
[0:104]
2:286
[0:094]
2:302
[0:095]
Capital K 21:734
[0:936]
21:681
[0:934]
16:398
[0:740]
16:592
[0:746]
Consumption C 1:992
[0:062]
1:993
[0:062]
1:872
[0:061]
1:876
[0:061]
Investment I 0:543
[0:053]
0:542
[0:053]
0:410
[0:044]
0:415
[0:044]
Labour H 0:881
[0:010]
0:880
[0:010]
0:865
[0:008]
0:869
[0:008]
Real wage w 1:756
[0:063]
1:754
[0:064]
1:619
[0:060]
1:630
[0:060]
Real marginal cost x 0:909
[0:008]
0:909
[0:009]
0:915
[0:007]
0:919
[0:006]
Ination  2:580
[0:527]
0:703
[0:312]
2:385
[0:462]
4:015
[0:633]
Household Welfare U 29:957
[0:989]
30:155
[0:988]
22:685
[0:895]
22:555
[0:895]
Nominal interest rate R 6:782
[0:497]
4:828
[0:388]
62:443
[0:760]
65:029
[0:947]
Real interest rate r 4:097
[0:384]
4:097
[0:390]
58:660
[0:634]
58:660
[0:622]
Rental rate rk 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:435]
7:019
[0:502]
7:016
[0:490]
Return on capital rcap 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:435]
58:662
[0:704]
58:662
[0:687]
Note: Statistics calculated using 106 simulated observations;
standard deviations in brackets.
central banks quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( = 0:9) causes it to conduct monetary
policy in order to encourage greater consumption and leisure and discourage ination.
Because the central bank places greater emphasis on the present relative to the future,
monetary policy is used to encourage households to bring consumption and leisure forward
in time while also shifting price changes (which are costly) to the future, where they are
discounted more heavily. With greater consumption and leisure taking place, investment
and capital fall slightly, which leads to a decline in output. For the nancial variables,
the real returns on assets are barely a¤ected while the stock price rises.
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Where columns (1) and (2) allow us to identify what happens when the central bank
has greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting than households (which are not quasi-hyperbolic
discounters for that comparison), columns (3) and (4) relate to the opposite comparison:
in column (3) both households and the central bank have quasi-hyperbolic discounting
whereas in column (4) only the household does. As a consequence, relative to column
(3), in column (4) the central bank uses monetary policy to encourage households to defer
consumption and leisure, while bringing forward price changes, which raises ination.
In this particular case, the households labour supply response is large, which increases
output and permits consumption to actually rise. Although allowing the central banks
discounting to di¤er from the households has e¤ects on real variables, these e¤ects are
relatively small. However, the e¤ects on nominal variables are larger and quantitatively
signicant.
Importantly, one consequence of the central banks quasi-hyperbolic discounting is to
raise household welfare. Household welfare is higher in column (2) than in column (1) and
in column (3) than in column (4). In other words, it is desirable from a welfare perspective
for the central bank to have quasi-hyperbolic discounting even if households do not. This
nding parallels other situations where distorting the central banks objectives can raise
welfare when monetary policy is conducted under discretion. For example, Dennis (2014)
showed that having monetary policy conducted by a discretionary central bank with
risk-sensitive preferences could improve welfare (lower loss) because the risk-sensitivity
rendered feasible policies that were otherwise infeasible. Here, the central reason why the
central banks quasi-hyperbolic discounting raises household welfare is that it emphasizes
the current-period cost of changing prices, in much the same way as greater price rigidity
or greater concern for price changes. The outcome is less volatile ination and an average
ination rate that is lower, closer to zero. Due to the greater emphasis placed on ination
appointing a central banker with quasi-hyperbolic discounting is similar to appointing a
conservative central banker (Rogo¤, 1985).
To explore more fully whether it is desirable for the central bank to discount the future
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Table 1.4: Impact of Quasi-Geometric Discounting on Household Welfare
  Welfare
0.90 0.865 22:6818
[0:8910]
0.92 0.865 24:2281
[0:9098]
0.94 0.865 25:7494
[0:9285]
0.96 0.866 27:2448
[0:9472]
0.98 0.868 28:7130
[0:9660]
1.00 0.873 30:1468
[0:9846]
at a rate that di¤ers from households, Table 1.4 reports the optimal value for the central
banks quasi-hyperbolic discount factor  and the households welfare level at this point
(with the standard deviation for welfare given in square brackets) as a function of the
household quasi-hyperbolic discount factor, . Several interesting and important results
are apparent from Table 1.4. First, it is desirable for the central banks quasi-hyperbolic
discounting to be stronger than that of the household ( < ). Second, even when the
household does not have quasi-hyperbolic discounting ( = 1), the central bank should
( < 1). Third, the optimal value for  is relatively insensitive to changes to .
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we study the conduct of discretionary monetary policy in an economy where
economic agents have quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Households gain utility through con-
sumption and leisure and save by purchasing bonds and equities. With the exception of
the goods market, which is characterized by monopolistic competition and Rotemberg-
prices, all other markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. As is well-known,
by weighting the present more than the future, relative to geometric discounting, quasi-
hyperbolic discounting has important implications for the equilibrium return on savings,
and hence on the capital stock and the level of production. However, in a model where
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there are costs to changing prices, quasi-hyperbolic discounting also has important con-
sequences for the ination rate.
With the central bank conducting monetary policy optimally under discretion, we show
that the households quasi-hyperbolic discounting changes the economys average ination
rate, with greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting giving rise to lower average ination. The
economys average ination rate declines because the households greater emphasis on the
present (relative to the future) strengthens the incentive for rms to spread price-changes
out over time, beneting their equity-holders by making smaller price changes today and
shifting the remaining price-change to the future (when it is discounted more heavily).
Our model also allows the central bank to have quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and
for its discounting to di¤er from the household. We show that a benevolent central
bank one that shares households preferences is able to keep steady state ination
under control for a wide range of discount factors. If the central bank, however, does not
adopt the households time discounting and tries to discourage early consumption and
delayed saving, then the resulting equilibrium produces only a small increase in output
while generating a substantial rise in ination. Indeed, we show that it is optimal
for the central bank to (quasi-hyperbolically) discount the future more heavily than the
household, and that doing so decreases ination and increases welfare.
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1.A Appendix: The model where rms own capital
This section presents our benchmark model in which rms own the capital stock. We
present an alternative formulation in which households own the capital stock in Appendix
B. The equivalence of these two formulations can be seen by comparing Appendices A.3.
and B.3. The central banks decision problem is presented in Appendix C.
1.A.1 Households problem
The households decision problem is described by the Lagrangian
U (bt; st;Zt) = minftg maxfct;ht;bt+1;st+1g

c1 t   1
1     
h1+t
1 + 
+Et [U (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)]
+t

w (Zt)ht +
bt
1 +  (Zt)
+Q (Zt) st (1 + r
s (Zt))
+Tt   ct   bt+1
1 +R (Zt)
 Q (Zt) st+1

;
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where
U (bt; st;Zt) =
c1 t   1
1     
h1+t
1 + 
+ Et [U (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] (1.29)
+t

w (Zt)ht +
bt
1 +  (Zt)
+Q (Zt) st (1 + r
s (Zt)) (1.30)
+Tt   ct   bt+1
1 +R (Zt)
 Q (Zt) st+1

: (1.31)
The aggregate state vector, Zt, contains t, at, and Kt, and its equilibrium law-of-motion
is taken as given. The rst-order conditions with respect to ct, ht, bt+1, and st+1 are
@U (bt; st;Zt)
@ct
: c t   t = 0; (1.32)
@U (bt; st;Zt)
@ht
:  ht + twt = 0; (1.33)
@U (bt; st;Zt)
@bt+1
:   t
1 +Rt
+ Et [Ub (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] = 0; (1.34)
@U (bt; st;Zt)
@st+1
:  tQt + Et [Us (bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] = 0: (1.35)
In equilibrium, the decision rules for bonds, stocks, labor and consumption take the
form
bt+1 = B (bt; st;Zt) ; (1.36)
st+1 = S (bt; st;Zt) ; (1.37)
ht = H (bt; st;Zt) ; (1.38)
ct = C (bt; st;Zt) : (1.39)
We now substitute equations (1.36) (1.39) into equation (1.29) and di¤erentiate the
resulting identity with respect to bt and st to get
Ub (bt; st;Zt) = c
 
t

1
1 + t
+
1  

Bb (bt; st;Zt)
1 +Rt
+QtSb (bt; st;Zt)

; (1.40)
Us (bt; st;Zt) = c
 
t

Qt (1 + r
s
t) +
1  

Bs (bt; st;Zt)
1 +Rt
+QtSs (bt; st;Zt)

: (1.41)
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Substituting equations (1.40) and (1.41) into equations (1.33) (1.35), using equa-
tion (1.32) to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier, and aggregating across the unit-mass of
identical households gives
C t wt =  Ht ; (1.42)
C t
Rt
= Et

C t+1


1 + t+1
(1.43)
+(1  )
BB (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1)
1 +Rt+1
+Qt+1SB (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1)))]
C t Qt = Et

C t+1
 
Qt+1
 
1 + rst+1

(1.44)
+(1  )
BS (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1)
1 +Rt+1
+Qt+1SS (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1)))] ;
where Ct and Ht represent aggregate consumption and labor, respectively. Finally, with
bonds in zero-net-supply (Bt = 0 8 t) and stocks in xed-net-supply (St = 1 8 t, where
this normalization is without loss of generality), we have that BB (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1) =
BS (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1) = SB (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1) = SS (Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1) = 0, and equations
(1.42) (1.44) simplify to equations (1.7) (1.9) in the main text. The fact that these
derivatives all equal zero simply means that households cannot use the accumulation of
bonds and/or stocks to constrain their future selves.
1.A.2 Firms problem
To formulate the representative rms decision problem, we rst substitute the production
function and the demand function for the rms good into its prot function. With these
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substitutions, the rms decision problem takes the form
W (kt; pt 1;Zt) = maxfpt;kt+1g
h
p1 "tt Y (Zt) (1  )  w (Zt)
 
p "tt Y (Zt) e
 atk t
 1
1 
  (kt+1   (1  ) kt)  !
2

pt
pt 1
(1 +  (Zt))  1
2
Y (Zt)
+Et

C (Zt+1)
 
C (Zt)
  W (kt+1; pt;Zt+1)

;
where
W (kt; pt 1;Zt) = p1 "tt Y (Zt) (1  )  w (Zt)
 
p "tt Y (Zt) e
 atk t
 1
1  (1.45)
  (kt+1   (1  ) kt)  !
2

pt
pt 1
(1 +  (Zt))  1
2
Y (Zt)
+Et

C (Zt+1)
 
C (Zt)
  W (kt+1; pt;Zt+1)

;
and where the aggregate state is Zt =

t at Kt
0
and its equilibrium law-of-motion
is taken as given.
The rst-order conditions can be written as
@W (kt; pt 1;Zt)
@kt+1
:  1 + Et

C t+1
C t
Wk (kt+1; pt;Zt+1)

= 0; (1.46)
@W (kt; pt 1;Zt)
@pt
: (1  "t) p "tt Yt (1  ) +
"t
1  wtp
 "t( 1 )
t
 
Yte
 atk t
 1
1  (1.47)
 !

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

Yt
1 + t
pt 1
+ Et

C t+1
C t
Wp (kt+1; pt;Zt+1)

= 0:
In order to nd Wk (kt; pt 1;Zt) and Wp (kt; pt 1;Zt) we substitute the solution
kt+1 = K (kt; pt 1;Zt) ;
pt = P (kt; pt 1;Zt) ;
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into equation (1.45) and di¤erentiate the resulting identity with respect to kt and pt 1.
From the rst-order conditions we obtain
Wk (kt; pt 1;Zt) =

1  wt
ht
kt
+ 1   + 1  

Kk (kt; pt 1;Zt)
+
1  


!

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

Yt
1 + t
pt 1
(1.48)
  (1  "t) (1  ) p "tt Yt  
"t
1  
wt
pt
ht

Pk (kt; pt 1;Zt) ;
Wp (kt; pt 1;Zt) = !

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

pt
p2t 1
(1 + t)Yt +
1  

Kp (kt; pt 1;Zt)
+
1  


  (1  "t) p "tt Yt (1  ) 
"t
1  
wt
pt
ht (1.49)
+!

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

Yt
1 + t
pt 1

Pp (kt; pt 1;Zt) :
We next substitute equations (1.48) and (1.49) into equation (1.46) and (1.47), and ag-
gregate across rms. In a symmetric equilibrium in which all rms set the same price, so
that the price of their good relative to that of the aggregate goods always equals one, this
aggregation implies PP (Zt) = PK (Zt) = KP (Zt) = 0. To understand why aggregation
implies PP (Zt) = PK (Zt) = KP (Zt) = 0, notice that if one rm sets the individual price
above (below) the aggregate price so that PP (Zt) 6= 0 then all rms would do the same
and the relative price would not equal one, which is inconsistent with the denition of the
economys aggregate price. Further, because the optimal relative price equals to one, it
does not vary with the level of aggregate capital, so PK (Zt) = 0. Lastly, the fact that
the optimal relative price always equals one means that KP (Zt) = 0. As a consequence,
after aggregation we get
C t = Et

C t+1


1  wt+1
Ht+1
Kt+1
+ 1   + 1  

KK (Zt+1)

; (1.50)
and
t (1 + t) =
(1  "t) (1  )
!
+
"t
! (1  )
wtHt
Yt
+ Et

C t+1
C t
t+1 (1 + t+1)Yt+1
Yt

;
(1.51)
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respectively.
Now, let us dene real marginal costs, xt, the shadow real rental rate of capital, rkt ,
and the real wage, wt, according to
xt =
1
1  
wtHt
Yt
;
rkt = xt
Yt
Kt
; (1.52)
wt = (1  )xt Yt
Ht
; (1.53)
then equations (1.50) and (1.51) become
1 = Et

C t+1
C t


xt+1Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1   + 1  

KK (Zt+1)

; (1.54)
t (1 + t) =
"t
!

xt +
(1  "t) (1  )
"t

+ Et

C t+1Yt+1
C t Yt
t+1 (1 + t+1)

: (1.55)
Equations (1.52) and (1.53) correspond to equations (1.12) and (1.13) in the main text
and equations (1.54) and (1.55) correspond to equations (1.10) and (1.11) in the main
text.
Finally, we note that aggregate prots distributed to households through dividends
are given by
Qtr
s
t =

1     xt   !
2
2t

Yt + r
k
tKt   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt) ;
which corresponds to equation (1.14) in the main text.
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1.A.3 Private sector equations
Collecting all of the rst-order conditions from Appendices A.1 and A.2 together, and
rearranging, we get
C t wt = H

t ;
C t
1 +Rt
= Et

C t+1
1 + t+1

;
C t Qt = Et
h
C t+1

Qt+1 +

1     xt+1   !
2
2t+1

Yt+1 + r
k
t+1Kt+1   It+1
i
;
It = Kt+1   (1  )Kt;
Ct +Kt+1 = Yt + (1  )Kt   !
2
2tYt;
C t = Et

C t+1

rkt+1 + 1   +
1  

KK (Zt+1)

;
t (1 + t) =
("t   1) (1  )  "txt
!
+ Et

C t+1Yt+1
C t Yt
t+1 (1 + t+1)

;
Yt = e
atKt H
1 
t ;
rkt =

1  wt
Ht
Kt
;
wt = (1  )xt Yt
Ht
:
1.B Appendix: The model where households own
capital
Here we consider an alternative version of the model in which households rather than
rms own the capital stock. With households owning the capital stock we assume that
there is a perfectly competitive market in which rms can rent the capital from households.
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1.B.1 Households problem
With households owning the capital stock their optimization problem becomes
U (kt; bt; st;Zt) = minftg maxfct;ht;kt+1t;bt+1;st+1g

c1 t   1
1     
h1+t
1 + 
+Et [U (kt+1; bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)]
+t
 
1   + rk (Zt)

kt +
bt
1 +  (Zt)
+Q (Zt) st (1 + r
s (Zt))
+w (zt)ht + Tt   ct   bt+1
1 +R (Zt)
  kt+1  Q (Zt) st+1

;
with the continuation value given recursively by
U (kt; bt; st;Zt) =
c1 t   1
1     
h1+t
1 + 
+ Et [U (kt+1; bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] (1.56)
+t
 
1   + rk (Zt)

kt +
bt
1 +  (Zt)
+w (Zt)ht +Q (Zt) st (1 + r
s (Zt))
+Tt   ct   bt+1
1 +R (Zt)
  kt+1  Q (Zt) st+1

:
The rst-order conditions with respect to ct, ht, kt+1, bt+1, and st+1 can be written as
@U (kt; bt; st;Zt)
@ct
: c t   t = 0; (1.57)
@U (kt; bt; st;Zt)
@ht
:  ht + twt = 0; (1.58)
@U (kt; bt; st;Zt)
@kt+1
:  c t + Et [Uk (kt+1; bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] = 0; (1.59)
@U (kt; bt; st;Zt)
@bt+1
:   c
 
t
1 +Rt
+ Et [Ub (kt+1;bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] = 0; (1.60)
@U (kt; bt; st;Zt)
@st+1
:  c t Qt + Et [Us (kt+1;bt+1; st+1;Zt+1)] = 0: (1.61)
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In order to nd Uk (kt; bt; st;Zt), Ub (kt; bt; st;Zt), Us (kt; bt; st;Zt), we note that the
solution we seek will give us the decision rules
kt+1 = K (kt; bt; st;Zt) ;
bt+1 = B (kt; bt; st;Zt) ;
st+1 = S (kt; bt; st;Zt) ;
ht = H (kt; bt; st;Zt) ;
which we substitute into equation (1.56) and di¤erentiate the resulting identity with
respect to kt, bt, and st. From the resulting derivatives, and employing equations (1.57)
(1.61), we obtain
Uk (kt; bt; st;Zt) = c
 
t

1   + rkt +
1  

(Kk (kt; bt; st;Zt) (1.62)
+
Bk (kt; bt; st;Zt)
1 +Rt
+QtSk (kt; bt; st;Zt)

;
Ub (kt; bt; st;Zt) = c
 
t

1
1 + t
+
1  

(Kb (kt; bt; st;Zt) (1.63)
+
Bb (kt; bt; st;Zt)
1 +Rt
+QtSb (kt; bt; st;Zt)

;
Us (kt; bt; st;Zt) = c
 
t

Qt (1 + r
s
t ) +
1  

(Ks (kt; bt; st;Zt) (1.64)
+
Bs (kt; bt; st;Zt)
1 +Rt
+QtSs (kt; bt; st;Zt)

:
With bonds in zero-net-supply (Bt = 0 8 t) and stocks in xed-net-supply (St = 1 8 t),
we have BB (Kt; Bt; St;Zt) = BS (Kt; Bt; St;Zt) = SB (Kt; Bt; St;Zt) = SS (Kt; Bt; St;Zt) =
KB (Kt; Bt; St;Zt) = KS (Kt; Bt; St;Zt) = 0, so substituting equations (1.62) (1.64) into
equations (1.58) (1.61), aggregating across households, and using equation (1.57) to
eliminate the Lagrange multiplier gives
C t wt = H

t ;
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C t = Et

C t+1

rkt+1 + 1   +
1  

KK (Kt+1; Bt+1; St+1;Zt+1)

;
C t
1 +Rt
= Et

C t+1
1 + t+1

;
C t Qt = Et

C t+1Qt+1
 
1 + rst+1

:
1.B.2 Firms problem
The rms decision problem takes the form
W (pt 1;Zt) = maxfpt;ktg
h
p1 "tt Y (Zt) (1  )  w (Zt)
 
p "tt Y (Zt) e
 atk t
 1
1 
 rk (Zt) kt   !
2

pt
pt 1
(1 +  (Zt))  1
2
Y (Zt)
+Et

C t+1
C t
Wt+1 (pt;Zt+1)

;
where the rms continuation value satises
W (pt 1;Zt) = p1 "tt Y (Zt) (1  )  w (Zt)
 
p "tt Y (Zt) e
 atk t
 1
1  (1.65)
 rk (Zt) kt   !
2

pt
pt 1
(1 +  (Zt))  1
2
Y (Zt)
+Et

C t+1
C t
Wt+1 (pt;Zt+1)

:
The rst-order conditions can be written as
@W (pt 1;Zt)
@kt
:

1  wt
ht
kt
  rkt = 0; (1.66)
@W (pt 1;Zt)
@pt
: (1  "t) p "tt Yt (1  ) +
"t
1  wtp
 "t( 1 )
t
 
Yte
 atk t
 1
1 
 !

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

Yt
(1 + t)
pt 1
+ Et

C t+1
C t
Wp (pt;Zt+1)

: (1.67)
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In order to nd Wp (pt 1;Zt) we substitute the decision rules
kt = K (pt 1;Zt) ;
pt = P (pt 1;Zt) ;
into (1.65) and di¤erentiate the resulting identity with respect to pt 1. We then use the
rst-order conditions, equations (1.66) and (1.67), to obtain
Wp (pt 1;Zt) = !

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

pt
p2t 1
(1 + t)Yt   1  

"t
1  
wt
pt
htPp (pt 1;Zt)
  1  

(1  "t) (1  ) p "tt YtPp (pt 1;Zt)
+
1  

!

pt
pt 1
(1 + t)  1

Yt
(1 + t)
pt 1
Pp (pt 1;Zt) : (1.68)
Substituting equation (1.68) into equations (1.66) and (1.65) and aggregating across rms,
which in a symmetric equilibrium where all rms set the same price, implies Pp (pt;Zt+1) =
0, yields
t (1 + t) =
(1  "t) (1  )
!
+
"t
!
xt + Et

C t+1Yt+1
C t Yt
(t+1 (1 + t+1))

;
where
wt = (1  )xt Yt
Ht
:
Finally, the dividends distributed to households are given by
Qtr
s
t = Yt (1  )  wtHt   rktKt  
!
2
2tYt:
1.B.3 Private sector equations
Collecting all of the rst-order conditions together, and rearranging, we get
C t wt = H

t ;
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C t
1 +Rt
= Et

C t+1
1 + t+1

;
C t Qt = Et
h
C t+1

Qt+1 +

1     xt+1   !
2
2t+1

Yt+1
i
;
Ct +Kt+1 = Yt + (1  )Kt   !
2
2tYt;
C t = Et

C t+1

rkt+1 + 1   +
1  

KK (Zt+1)

;
t (1 + t) =
("t   1) (1  )  "txt
!
+ Et

C t+1Yt+1
C t Yt
t+1 (1 + t+1)

;
Yt = e
atKt H
1 
t ;
rkt =

1  wt
Ht
Kt
;
wt = (1  ) xtYt
Ht
;
which are equivalent to the equations reported in Appendix A.3 that were obtained
under the assumption that rms own the capital stock.
1.C Appendix: Discretionary policy
The decision problem facing the discretionary policymaker is summarized by the Bellman
equation
V(Zt) = maxfCt;Ht;Yt;xt;Kt+1;tg

C1 t   1
1     
H1+t
1 + 
+ Et [V (Zt+1)]

; (1.69)
which is subject to the constraints
C t = Et [L(Zt+1)] ; (1.70)
t (1 + t) +
("t   1) (1  )  "txt
!

YtC
 
t = Et [M(Zt+1)] ; (1.71)
1  !
2
2t

Yt = Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt; (1.72)
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Ht =

1  

xtYtC
 
t
 1
1+
; (1.73)
Yt = e
atKt H
1 
t ; (1.74)
with the continuation value satisfying the recursion
V (Zt) =
C1 t   1
1    

1 + 
H1+t + Et [V (Zt+1)] :
Because monetary policy is conducted under discretion, the central bank cannot in-
uence how private sector expectations are formed, a restriction imposed by introducing
the auxiliary variables L(Zt) and M(Zt), which are dened according to
L(Zt) = C
 
t



xt
Yt
Kt
+ 1  

+ (1  )KK(Zt)

;
M(Zt) = C
 
t Ytt (1 + t) :
After substituting equations (1.73) and (1.74) into equations (1.69) (1.72), the central
banks decision problem can be expressed in terms of the Lagrangian
V(Zt) = C
1 
t   1
1     

1 

xte
atKt C
 
t
 1+
+
1 + 
+ Et [V (Zt+1)] (1.75)
 1t
 
Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt  

1  !
2
2t

eatKt

1  

xte
atKt C
 
t
 1 
+
!
 2t
 
Et [L(Zt+1)]  C t

+3t
 
(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
C t e
atKt

1  

xte
atKt C
 
t
 1 
+
+Et [M(Zt+1)]  t (1 + t)C t eatKt

1  

xte
atKt C
 
t
 1 
+
!
;
where 1t, 2t, and 3t, represent the Lagrange multipliers on the three remaining con-
straints. Now, di¤erentiating equation (1.75) with respect to Kt+1, Ct, t, and xt, the
rst-order conditions are
@V(Zt)
@Kt+1
: Et [VK(Zt+1)]  2tEt [LK(Zt+1)] + 3tEt [MK(Zt+1)]  1t = 0; (1.76)
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@V(Zt)
@Ct
: C t +

 + 
H1+t
Ct
  1t

1 + 
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Ct

  2tC  1t
   1 + 
+ 
3t

(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  t (1 + t)

C  1t Yt = 0;
@V(Zt)
@t
:  3t (1 + 2t)C t   1t!t = 0;
@V(Zt)
@xt
:   
 + 
H1+t x
 1
t + 1t

1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
xt

+ 3t

"txt
!
+
1  
 + 
(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  1  
 + 
t (1 + t)

C t Ytx
 1
t = 0:
To progress further we must nd VK(Zt). The solution provides the decision rules
xt = X (Zt);
Ct = C(Zt);
t = (Zt);
Kt+1 = K(Zt);
which we substitute into equation (1.75) giving the identity
V (Zt) =
C (Zt)1    1
1     

1 

eatX (Zt)Kt C(Zt) 
 1+
+
1 + 
(1.77)
+Et

V
 
t+1; at+1;K(Zt)
  1t (C(Zt) +K(Zt)  (1  )Kt
 

1  !
2
(Zt)
2
1  

e
1+
1 atX (Zt)K
1+
1 
t C(Zt) 
 1 
+
!
 2t
 
Et

L
 
t+1; at+1;K(Zt)
  C(Zt) 
+3t
 
(1  "t) (1  ) + "tX (Zt)
!
C(Zt) 

1  

e
1+
1 atX (Zt)K
1+
1 
t C(Zt) 
 1 
+
+Et

M
 
t+1; zt+1;K(Zt)

 (Zt) (1 + (Zt))

1  

e
1+
1 atX (Zt)K
1+
1 
t C(Zt) 
 1 
+
!
:
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Then, di¤erentiating equation (1.77) with respect to Kt yields
VK(Zt) =

C t +

 + 
H1+t
Ct

CK(Zt)  
 + 
H1+t
xt
XK(Zt) (1.78)
  
 + 
H1+t
Kt
+ Et [VK(Zt+1)]KK(Zt)
  1t

KK(Zt) + CK(Zt)  (1  ) +  1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Ct
CK(Zt)
+!tYtK(Zt)  1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
xt
XK(Zt)    + 1
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Kt

  2t
 
Et [LK(Zt+1)]KK(Zt) + C  1t CK(Zt)

+ 3t
 
Et [MK(Zt+1)]KK(Zt)  (1 + 2t)C t YtK(Zt)
   + 1
 + 

t (1 + t)  (1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!

Yt
Kt
C t
   + 1
+ 

(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  t (1 + t)

C  1t YtCK(Zt)
 

1  
 + 

t (1 + t)  (1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!

  "txt
!

Yt
xt
C t XK(Zt)

;
and using equations (1.76) (1.78) to simplify we get
VK(Zt) =

1  1


C t +

 + 
H1+t
Ct

CK(Zt) 

1  1



 + 
H1+t
xt
XK(Zt)
  
 + 
H1+t
Kt
+
1

1t


1 + 
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Kt
+ 1  

  

1 + 
 + 
3t

t (1 + t)  (1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!

Yt
Kt
C t : (1.79)
After substituting equation (1.79) back into equation (1.76), the system of rst-order
conditions for the discretionary optimization problem can be written as
@
@Ct
: C t +

 + 
H1+t
Ct
  1t

1 + 
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Ct

  2tC  1t
   1 + 
+ 
3t

(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  t (1 + t)

C  1t Yt = 0; (1.80)
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@@t
:  3t (1 + 2t)C t   1t!t = 0; (1.81)
  2tEt [LK(Zt+1)] + 3tEt [MK(Zt+1)]  1t = 0: (1.82)
@
@xt
:   
 + 
H1+t
xt
+ 1t
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
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+ 3t

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!
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1  
 + 
(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt
!
  1  
 + 
t (1 + t)

C t
Yt
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= 0;(1.83)
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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+ Et
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
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 + 

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2
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+ 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 + 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
3t+1

(1  "t) (1  ) + "txt+1
!
  t+1 (1 + t+1)

Yt+1
Kt+1
C t+1

   (1  )Et

C t+1 +

 + 
H1+t+1
Ct+1

CK(Zt+1)

+
 (1  )
 + 
Et

H1+t+1
xt+1
XK(Zt+1)

  2tEt [LK(Zt+1)] + 3tEt [MK(Zt+1)]  1t = 0: (1.84)
where
Ht =

1  


eatxtK

t C
 
t
 1
+
; (1.85)
Yt =
 
1  

1 
e(1+)atx1 t K
(1+)
t C
 (1 )
t
! 1
+
; (1.86)
L(Zt) = C
 
t
 

 
eatxtK
 1
t H
1 
t + 1  

+ (1  )KK(Zt)

; (1.87)
M(Zt) = t (1 + t)C
 
t Yt: (1.88)
Equations (1.80) (1.88) correspond to equations (1.19) (1.26) in the main text.
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1.D Appendix: The benchmark model
In this section we examine the e¤ect that monopolistic competition has on production,
consumption, and ination, in a deterministic environment. Switching the models sto-
chastic elements o¤, the e¤ect of varying " on the models non-stochastic steady state
outcomes, through its consequences for the price markup, are presented in Figure 1.3. To
better interpret the e¤ects of monopolistic competition, we also report in Figure 1.3 the
steady state results for the ex-price version (! = 0) of the model. For this exercise, we
assume monetary policy is conducted under discretion.
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Figure 1.3: Steady state as function of the price markup.
The e¤ect that the price markup has on steady state ination is shown in Figure 1.3,
panel F. When prices are costly to change and there is no production subsidy in place to
o¤set the monopolistic distortion a higher markup leads to higher ination, with annual-
ized ination reaching exceedingly high levels as the markup approaches 100 percent. The
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ination that occurs as the markup rises is a product of the discretionary central banks
behavior. With monopolistic competition generating ine¢ ciently low output, the central
bank lowers the nominal interest rate in order to stimulate demand and raise output. But
to meet higher demand for their good rms need to employ more workers, which boosts
the demand for labour and pushes up the nominal wage and nominal marginal costs.
Facing higher nominal marginal costs rms raise prices, causing ination. As the markup
gets bigger the central banks e¤orts to stimulate aggregate demand intensify, giving rise
to higher steady state ination.
Because there are costs to changing prices, non-zero ination has real costs. These
real costs are illustrated in panels A E through the di¤erence between the solid line,
representing the sticky-price model, and the dashed line, representing the ex-price model.
Looking at the behavior of the ex-price model, as the markup increases output (panel
A), capital (panel B), consumption (panel C), labour (panel D), and real marginal costs
(panel E) all decrease monotonically. The higher markup is associated with rms having
greater market power and leads to lower production. Lower production means less demand
for capital and labour and also leads to declines in consumption and investment. The fact
that real marginal costs decrease as the markup increases (panel E) simply reects the
increase in prots associated with rms having greater market power.
When the price markup is not too large, the steady state behavior of the sticky price
model is similar to that for the ex-price model. However, as the markup becomes in-
creasingly large important di¤erences between the two models emerge. These di¤erences
are driven by the magnitude of ination and with the output lost due to price-adjustment
costs. Specically, as the markup gets bigger, in order to partly o¤set the output lost
due to price-adjustment costs, rms in the sticky-price model increase their production
levels in order to maintain their protability. As a result, the demand for capital and
labour rises in the sticky-price model relative to the ex-price model.3 Thus, unlike for
the ex-price model, where output and labour decline monotonically, in the sticky-price
3See also the discussion in Ascari and Rossi (2012).
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model an increase in the markup causes output and labour to rise, following an initial
fall. For a given markup, steady state output, capital, and labour are all higher in the
sticky-price model than in the ex-price model, but this is not the case for consumption,
which su¤ers as goods are devoted to covering price-adjustment costs and to support-
ing the capital stock. It is also worth noting that real marginal costs are higher in the
sticky-price model than the ex-price model, indicating that ination and the resulting
price-adjustment costs have an adverse impact on prots.
Turning to the stochastic model, Table 1.5 reports the mean (standard deviation in
brackets) of the stationary distributions for the sticky-price economy under both discretion
(column 1) and the Taylor rule (column 2) to those for the ex-price economy (column 3).
Comparing the sticky-price and ex-price economies, the main e¤ect of sticky prices is to
generate a positive ination rate (an ination bias) when policy is conducted under dis-
cretion, consistent with Figure 1. With the (stochastic) price markup averaging just over
10 percent, the discretionary central banks e¤orts to o¤set the monopolistic distortion
results in higher ination and a higher nominal interest rate.
Figure 1.4 plots impulse responses for technology shocks under both discretionary
policy (solid lines) and the Taylor-rule policy (dashed lines) in the model with sticky
prices. Looking at the responses under discretion, a positive technology shock raises the
productivity of capital and labour, causing rms to demand more of these inputs, which
raises the quantities of capital (panel B) and labour (panel E) traded and increases the real
wage (panel F) and the real interest rate (panel J). With more capital and labour employed
for production, real output rises (panel A) and the resulting increase in householdsreal
income boosts consumption (panel C). Real marginal costs (panel G) are little-changed by
the shock because the productivity increase is captured by higher factor prices. Because
real marginal costs are little-a¤ected, rms face minimal pressure to change prices, so
ination too is little-changed by the shock (panel H). As a consequence, monetary policy
responds to the shock largely by accommodating it. The higher real return on capital
boosts the real return on bonds and the central bank responds by allowing the nominal
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Table 1.5: Characteristics of the Stationary Distribution
Sticky prices Flexible prices
Discretion Taylor rule
(1) (2) (3)
Output Y 2:540
[0:104]
2:539
[0:103]
2:534
[0:104]
Capital K 21:734
[0:936]
21:722
[0:929]
21:664
[0:935]
Consumption C 1:992
[0:062]
1:991
[0:062]
1:993
[0:062]
Investment I 0:543
[0:053]
0:543
[0:053]
0:542
[0:053]
Labour H 0:881
[0:010]
0:881
[0:010]
0:880
[0:011]
Real wage w 1:756
[0:063]
1:755
[0:063]
1:753
[0:064]
Real marginal cost x 0:909
[0:008]
0:909
[0:011]
0:909
[0:010]
Annualized ination  2:580
[0:527]
2:519
[0:253]
 
Household welfare U 29:957
[0:989]
29:960
[0:992]
30:163
[0:988]
Nominal interest rate R 6:782
[0:497]
6:720
[0:660]
4:097
[0:399]
Real interest rate r 4:097
[0:384]
4:098
[0:411]
4:097
[0:399]
Rental rate rk 14:793
[0:460]
14:793
[0:464]
14:793
[0:482]
Return on capital rcap 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:431]
4:098
[0:447]
Note: Statistics calculated using 106 simulated observations;
standard deviations in brackets.
interest rate to rise in line with the higher real interest rate. Qualitatively, the results for
the Taylor-rule policy are very similar to the discretionary policy, however it is noticeable
that the discretionary policy leads to a much smaller ination response, at the cost of
greater movement in labour (panel E), the real wage (panel F) and output (panel A)
when the shock hits.
Turning to Figure 1.5, under discretionary policymaking, a positive shock to the elas-
ticity of substitution among goods leads to a decline in the markup, which has a direct
negative impact on ination (panel H). Greater competition among rms causes output
to rise (panel A) and leads to greater demand for capital (panel B) and labour (panel
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Figure 1.4: Responses to a technology shock under discretion and the Taylor-rule
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E). Consumption rises (panel C) as a consequence of higher real income. Increased de-
mand for capital and labour causes the real wage to rise (panel F) and this in turn causes
real marginal costs to increase (panel G). Although real marginal costs have gone up, be-
cause there is greater competition among rms prices actually fall and ination goes down
(panel H). However, with greater costs and lower prices, rms protability is adversely
a¤ected, which is reected in a lower stock price. The central bank responds to the shock
by lowering the nominal interest rate, but by less than the decline in ination, allowing
the real interest rate to rise and bring the real return on bonds into line with the higher
real return on capital. The greatest di¤erences between the discretionary policy and the
Taylor rule policy can be seen in the behavior of ination (panel H), which falls under
discretion and rises under the Taylor rule. But this di¤erences in behavior translates into
a relatively small di¤erence in the real interest rate (panel J) and the behavior of the real
economy is qualitatively similar for the two policies.
1.E Appendix: Numerical solution
To solve the central banks optimal policy problem, described by equations (1.15) (1.26)
in the main text, it is convenient to rewrite them more compactly as
0 = C t +

 + 
H1+t
Ct
  1t

1 + 
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Ct

  2tC  1t
  1 + 
+ 
3t
  
1  "et (1  ) + "etxt
!
  t (1 + t)
!
C  1t Yt; (1.89)
0 =  3t (1 + 2t)C t   1t!t; (1.90)
0 =   
 + 
H1+t
xt
+ 1t
1  
 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
xt
(1.91)
+3t
 
"etxt
!
+
1  
 + 
 
1  "et (1  ) + "etxt
!
  1  
 + 
t (1 + t)
!
C t
Yt
xt
0 = Dt+1   2tLK;t+1 + 3tMK;t+1   1t (1.92)
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Figure 1.5: Responses to a price-elasticity shock under discretion and the Taylor rule
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0 = C t   Lt+1;
0 =
 
t (1 + t) +
 
"et   1 (1  )  "etxt
!
!
YtC
 
t   Mt+1; (1.93)
0 =

1  !
2
2t

Yt   Ct  Kt+1 + (1  )Kt; (1.94)
where
Ht =

1  


eatxtK

t C
 
t
 1
+
; (1.95)
Yt =
 
1  

1 
e(1+)atx1 t K
(1+)
t C
 (1 )
t
! 1
+
; (1.96)
and
Lt+1 = Et

L((t+1; at+1; Kt+1)

; (1.97)
Mt+1 = Et

M(t+1; at+1; Kt+1)

; (1.98)
Dt+1 = Et

D(t+1; at+1; Kt+1)

; (1.99)
LK;t+1 = Et

LK(t+1; at+1; Kt+1)

;
MKt+1 = Et

MK(t+1; at+1; Kt+1)

;
with the denitions
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 

 
eatxtK
 1
t H
1 
t + 1  

+ (1  )KK(t; at; Kt)

;
M(t; at; Kt)  t (1 + t)C t Yt;
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1t

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 + 

1  !
2
2t
 Yt
Kt
+ 1  

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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H1+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 + 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  
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H1+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
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Equations (1.89) (1.96) are a system of seven equations containing seven unknowns:
six control variables, Ct, t, xt, 1t, 2t, and 3t, and one future state variable, Kt+1. We
solve this nonlinear system on a set of nodes constructed for the state variables whose
domain given by  2 [min; max], a 2 [amin; amax], and K 2 [Kmin; Kmax]. We compute a
set of Gauss-Chebyshev nodes, Z = fk; aj; Ki; k = 1:::N ; j = 1:::Na; i = 1:::NKg, for the
state space [min; max][amin; amax][Kmin; Kmax] and use a three-dimensional Chebyshev
polynomial to approximate the unknown functions.4
Using Zk;j;i 2 Z to denote a particular grid point, our solution algorithm can be
summarized as follows:
Step 1. Initialize arrays for H(0)t , Y
(0)
t , 
(0)
t , 
(0)
1t , 
(0)
2t , and 
(0)
3t , to store solution outcomes.
Step 2. Conjecture initial state-contingent functions for K(0)t+1 = K(0) (Zk;j;i),
C
(0)
t = C(0) (Zk;j;i), x(0)t = X (0) (Zk;j;i), L(0)t = L(0) (Zk;j;i), M (0)t =M (0) (Zk;j;i),
and D(0)t = D
(0) (Zk;j;i) at each grid point Zk;j;i 2 Z.
Step 3. At iteration n, approximate the functions K(n), C(n), X (n), L(n), M (n), and D(n)
using three-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials whose weights are computed using
Chebyshev-regression. Approximate the derivatives L(n)K ,M
(n)
K , K(n)K , X (n)K , and C(n)K
by di¤erentiating the corresponding polynomial.
Step 4. At each grid point, Zk;j;i 2 Z:
Step 4.1. Compute the conditional expectations: L(n)t+1,M(n)t+1, D(n)t+1, L(n)K;t+1, andM(n)K;t+1
using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
Step 4.2. Solve equations (1.89) (1.96) using a nonlinear solver and use the solution to
updateK(n+1)t+1 (Zk;j;i), C
(n+1)
t (Zk;j;i), x
(n+1)
t (Zk;j;i), 
(n+1)
t (Zk;j;i), 
(n+1)
1t (Zk;j;i),

(n+1)
2t (Zk;j;i), and 
(n+1)
3t (Zk;j;i).
4A similar approach is discussed in Maliar and Maliar (2006), Anderson, Kim, and Yun, 2010), and
Maliar and Maliar (2005).
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Step 4.3. Update H(n+1)t (Zk;j;i), Y
(n+1)
t (Zk;j;i), L
(n+1)
t (Zk;j;i), M
(n+1)
t (Zk;j;i),
and D(n+1)t (Zk;j;i) using equations (1.95) (1.99).
Step 5. Compute the distance
 =
K(n+1)t+1  K(n)t+11 + C(n+1)t   C(n)t 1
+
x(n+1)t   x(n)t 1 + (n+1)t   (n)t 1
+
(n+1)1t   (n)1t 1 + (n+1)2t   (n)2t 1 + (n+1)3t   (n)3t 1
+
L(n+1)t   L(n)t 1 + M (n+1)t  M (n)t 1 + D(n+1)t  D(n)t 1 :
If  is greater than the given tolerance (we use 1e 6), then increment the iteration
counter, n, and return to Step 3. Otherwise, stop.
We used the following parameters in this algorithm. For the state space, we set the
domain  2 [ 3 ; 3 ], a 2 [ 3z; 3z], and K 2 [5; 35]. We used a grid with 15
nodes for capital and 7 nodes each for technology and the elasticity of substitution. Each
function was approximated with a Chebyshev polynomial of order 4 for , 4 for a, and 14
for capital. Conditional expectations were computed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature
with 5 points for each shock.
The same algorithm was used to compute Taylor rule policy. We set capital domain
K 2 [15; 30] ; and output domain Y 2 [1:5; 3:2] : We used a grid on output with 9 nodes
and a Chebyshev polynomial of order 4 in output to approximate functions. All other
parameters were identical to those in the model of discretionary policy.
Table D1 reports the Euler-equation residuals for certain combinations of  and .
To compute them we split the domain for capital into 200 uniform points and those for
technology and the elasticity of substitution into 50 uniform points, and computed the
residuals of the consumption Euler equation at each point on this grid. We found the
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key determinant for accuracy to be the order of the Chebyshev polynomial for capital.
When this order was below 14 there was a noticeable decline in accuracy.
Table D1: Numerical accuracy: Consumption-Euler residuals
Discretionary policy Taylor-type rule
Discount factor HH  1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.90
Discount factor CB  1.00 0.90 1.00  
Maximum 1.5e-06 1.3e-06 1.1e-06 4.2e-07 5.4e-07
Mean 4.6e-07 4.0e-07 3.9e-07 1.4e-07 1.9e-07
Median 4.3e-07 3.5e-07 3.5e-07 1.2e-07 1.6e-07
To compute the stochastic steady state we used 106 random draws. We followed
Potter (2000) to compute the nonlinear impulse responses.
1.F Appendix: Other results
Focusing on the models stationary distribution, Table 1.7 shows the mean (standard devi-
ations in parentheses) outcomes for the models key macroeconomic and nancial variables
for di¤erent values of  = , allowing the steady state to be either ine¢ cient (columns
(1) (4)) or e¢ cient (columns (5) (8)). Looking at average outcomes, the table shows
that as greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting takes place ( =  get smaller) biasing
household and central bank decision-making toward the present output falls. Specif-
ically, lowering  =  from 1:0 to 0:9 causes output to decline by approximately 10
percent.5 Although greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting causes output, capital, con-
sumption, labour, and the real wage to fall there are important di¤erences in how each
of these variables is a¤ected. For example, although lowering  =  from 1:0 to 0:9
causes output to fall by 10:02 percent, capital falls by much more (24:55 percent) and
labour falls by much less (1:84 percent). Labour does not decline to the same extent
5Cutting  from 1:0 to 0:7 causes output to fall by about 30 percent, suggesting a linear relationship
between the percent by which  falls and the percent by which output falls.
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as output because households sacrice some leisure in order to prevent a large decline
in consumption. As a consequence, consumption falls by 6:02 percent, considerably less
than output. The large decline in capital combined with a smaller decline in labour
means that the capital-labour ratio goes down, and with relatively less capital, labours
productivity diminishes and real wages go down (by 7:77 percent).
Looking at real marginal costs, Table 1.7 shows that greater quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing causes real marginal costs to rise slightly when the steady state is ine¢ cient (and to
have no discernible e¤ect on real marginal costs when the steady state is e¢ cient). The ef-
fect that quasi-hyperbolic discounting has on real marginal costs is related to the decline
that rms face in the demand for their good, which causes them to lower their price
markup. To understand the impact quasi-hyperbolic discounting has on ination, note
that quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies that costs to changing prices today are weighted
more heavily than those to changing prices in the future. As a consequence, when re-
sponding to shocks rms nd it benecial to spread price changes out over time, making
smaller price changes in the current period and deferring the remaining price change (and
its associated cost) to the future. With smaller price changes taking place today, greater
quasi-hyperbolic discounting acts somewhat like an increase in price rigidity. From the
central banks perspective, with quasi-hyperbolic discounting operating similarly to an in-
crease in price rigidity, it calculates that smaller ination surprises are su¢ cient to boost
output to the e¢ cient level. In equilibrium, then, greater quasi-hyperbolic discounting
leads to less ination.
Finally, we note fromTable 1.8 that the nding that the central banks quasi-hyperbolic
discounting can raise household welfare relies on the economys steady state being inef-
cient. In the case where the economys steady state is e¢ cient there is no discre-
tionary ination bias. As a consequence, the decline in ination generated by the central
banks quasi-hyperbolic discounting serves to drive ination further from zero, which low-
ers household welfare.
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Table 1.6: Characteristics of the Stationary Distribution
Ine¢ cient s.s.,  = 0 E¢ cient s.s.,  = (1  ") 1
Sticky prices Flexible prices Sticky prices Flexible prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Y 2:540
[0:104]
2:534
[0:104]
2:825
[0:115]
2:824
[0:116]
Capital K 21:734
[0:936]
21:664
[0:935]
26:561
[1:106]
26:556
[1:108]
Consumption C 1:992
[0:062]
1:993
[0:062]
2:161
[0:066]
2:161
[0:066]
Investment I 0:543
[0:053]
0:542
[0:053]
0:664
[0:062]
0:664
[0:063]
Labour H 0:881
[0:010]
0:880
[0:011]
0:936
[0:011]
0:935
[0:012]
Real wage w 1:756
[0:063]
1:753
[0:064]
2:022
[0:072]
2:021
[0:073]
Real mar-
ginal cost
x 0:909
[0:008]
0:909
[0:010]
0:999
[0:011]
0:999
[0:011]
Annualized
ination
 2:580
[0:527]
  0:040
[0:220]
 
Household
Welfare
U 29:957
[0:989]
30:163
[0:988]
33:190
[0:989]
33:189
[0:989]
Nominal
interest rate
R 6:782
[0:497]
4:097
[0:399]
4:139
[0:361]
4:098
[0:400]
Real
interest rate
r 4:097
[0:384]
4:097
[0:399]
4:098
[0:394]
4:098
[0:400]
Return on
capital
rk 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:447]
4:099
[0:440]
4:099
[0:449]
Return on
capital
rcap 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:447]
4:099
[0:440]
4:099
[0:449]
Dividend
yield
rs 4:101
[0:305]
4:100
[0:332]
4:101
[0:296]
4:101
[0:309]
Asset price Q 43:966
[1:588]
44:602
[1:607]
54:651
[1:908]
54:672
[1:911]
Note: Statistics calculated using 106 simulated observations;
standard deviations in brackets.
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Table 1.7: Stationary Distribution as a Function of the Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount factor
Ine¢ cient s.s.,  = 0 E¢ cient s.s.,  = (1  ") 1
Discount-
ing
 =

1.00 0.99 0.95 0.90 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Output Y 2:540
[0:104]
2:516
[0:103]
2:415
[0:099]
2:286
[0:094]
2:825
[0:115]
2:795
[0:114]
2:676
[0:110]
2:524
[0:104]
Capital K 21:734
[0:936]
21:181
[0:916]
19:009
[0:837]
16:398
[0:740]
26:561
[1:106]
25:857
[1:082]
23:110
[0:987]
19:847
[0:871]
Consump-
tion
C 1:992
[0:062]
1:981
[0:062]
1:935
[0:062]
1:872
[0:061]
2:161
[0:066]
2:149
[0:066]
2:098
[0:066]
2:028
[0:065]
Investment I 0:543
[0:053]
0:530
[0:052]
0:475
[0:048]
0:410
[0:044]
0:664
[0:062]
0:646
[0:061]
0:578
[0:057]
0:496
[0:051]
Labour H 0:881
[0:010]
0:880
[0:009]
0:873
[0:009]
0:865
[0:008]
0:936
[0:011]
0:933
[0:011]
0:924
[0:011]
0:913
[0:010]
Real wage w 1:756
[0:063]
1:743
[0:063]
1:690
[0:062]
1:619
[0:060]
2:022
[0:072]
2:005
[0:072]
1:939
[0:070]
1:851
[0:068]
Real mar-
ginal cost
x 0:909
[0:008]
0:910
[0:008]
0:912
[0:008]
0:915
[0:007]
0:999
[0:011]
0:999
[0:011]
1:000
[0:010]
1:000
[0:010]
Annualized
ination
 2:580
[0:527]
2:559
[0:520]
2:478
[0:493]
2:385
[0:462]
0:040
[0:220]
0:039
[0:219]
0:038
[0:216]
0:036
[0:211]
Household
Welfare
U 29:957
[0:989]
29:270
[0:980]
26:432
[0:942]
22:685
[0:895]
33:190
[0:989]
32:525
[0:979]
29:757
[0:942]
26:064
[0:895]
Nominal
interest rate
R 6:782
[0:497]
11:139
[0:516]
30:969
[0:608]
62:443
[0:760]
4:139
[0:361]
8:410
[0:379]
27:852
[0:464]
58:717
[0:606]
Real
interest rate
r 4:097
[0:384]
8:367
[0:403]
27:804
[0:489]
58:660
[0:634]
4:098
[0:394]
8:368
[0:413]
27:804
[0:503]
58:661
[0:654]
Return on
capital
rk 4:098
[0:427]
4:342
[0:433]
5:413
[0:460]
7:019
[0:502]
4:099
[0:440]
4:338
[0:447]
5:390
[0:479]
6:964
[0:526]
Return on
capital
rcap 4:098
[0:427]
8:369
[0:447]
27:805
[0:543]
58:662
[0:704]
4:099
[0:440]
8:369
[0:462]
27:806
[0:564]
58:662
[0:734]
Dividend
yield
rs 4:101
[0:305]
8:368
[0:588]
27:785
[1:523]
58:617
[2:439]
4:101
[0:296]
8:368
[0:573]
27:787
[1:515]
58:618
[2:500]
Asset price Q 43:966
[1:589]
22:054
[0:839]
7:267
[0:289]
3:852
[0:155]
54:651
[1:908]
24:429
[1:007]
9:074
[0:349]
4:824
[0:190]
Note: Statistics calculated using 106 simulated observations;
standard deviations in brackets.
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Table 1.8: The E¤ect of the Central Banks Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
Ine¢ cient s.s.,  = 0 E¢ cient s.s.,  = (1  ") 1
Household  1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90
Central
bank
 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Output Y 2:540
[0:104]
2:536
[0:104]
2:286
[0:094]
2:302
[0:095]
2:825
[0:115]
2:825
[0:115]
2:524
[0:104]
2:537
[0:104]
Capital K 21:734
[0:936]
21:681
[0:934]
16:398
[0:740]
16:592
[0:746]
26:561
[1:106]
26:551
[1:106]
19:847
[0:871]
20:035
[0:877]
Consumption C 1:992
[0:062]
1:993
[0:062]
1:872
[0:061]
1:876
[0:061]
2:161
[0:066]
2:158
[0:066]
2:028
[0:065]
2:034
[0:065]
Investment I 0:543
[0:053]
0:542
[0:053]
0:410
[0:044]
0:415
[0:044]
0:664
[0:062]
0:664
[0:063]
0:496
[0:051]
0:501
[0:051]
Labour H 0:881
[0:010]
0:880
[0:010]
0:865
[0:008]
0:869
[0:008]
0:936
[0:011]
0:936
[0:012]
0:913
[0:010]
0:916
[0:010]
Real wage w 1:756
[0:063]
1:754
[0:064]
1:619
[0:060]
1:630
[0:060]
2:022
[0:072]
2:020
[0:073]
1:851
[0:068]
1:863
[0:068]
Real mar-
ginal cost
x 0:909
[0:008]
0:909
[0:009]
0:915
[0:007]
0:919
[0:006]
0:999
[0:011]
0:999
[0:011]
1:000
[0:010]
1:004
[0:009]
Annualized
ination
 2:580
[0:527]
0:703
[0:312]
2:385
[0:462]
4:015
[0:633]
0:040
[0:220]
 1:795
[0:039]
0:036
[0:211]
1:658
[0:376]
Household
Welfare
U 29:957
[0:989]
30:155
[0:988]
22:685
[0:895]
22:555
[0:895]
33:190
[0:989]
33:053
[0:988]
26:064
[0:895]
26:107
[0:895]
Nominal
interest rate
R 6:782
[0:497]
4:828
[0:388]
62:443
[0:760]
65:029
[0:947]
4:139
[0:361]
2:229
[0:387]
58:717
[0:606]
61:291
[0:674]
Real
interest rate
r 4:097
[0:384]
4:097
[0:390]
58:660
[0:634]
58:660
[0:622]
4:098
[0:394]
4:098
[0:398]
58:661
[0:654]
58:661
[0:640]
Return on
capital
rk 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:435]
7:019
[0:502]
7:016
[0:490]
4:099
[0:440]
4:099
[0:447]
6:964
[0:526]
6:962
[0:511]
Return on
capital
rcap 4:098
[0:427]
4:098
[0:435]
58:662
[0:704]
58:662
[0:687]
4:099
[0:440]
4:099
[0:447]
58:662
[0:734]
58:663
[0:714]
Dividend
yield
rs 4:101
[0:305]
4:101
[0:314]
58:617
[2:439]
58:618
[2:320]
4:101
[0:296]
4:101
[0:307]
58:618
[2:500]
58:621
[2:353]
Asset price Q 43:966
[1:588]
44:514
[1:603]
3:852
[0:155]
3:751
[0:151]
54:651
[1:908]
54:499
[1:904]
4:824
[0:190]
4:756
[0:185]
Note: Statistics calculated using 106 simulated observations;
standard deviations in brackets.
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Chapter 2
Distributional E¤ects of Endogenous
Discounting
Based on joint work with Nigar Hashimzade and Tatiana Kirsanova
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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ect of endogenous discounting on wealth inequality in an
endowment economy with heterogeneous agents, subject to occasionally binding borrow-
ing constraint. We demonstrate that introduction of Uzawa-type preferences may launch
strong redistribution mechanism leading to high equilibrium real interest rate and a more
dispersed wealth distribution in comparison to the model with standard preferences.
Keywords: heterogeneous agents; recursive utility; endogenous discounting; wealth distri-
bution; precautionary savings
JEL codes: D91, E21
2.1 Introduction
The standard discounted utility model assumes preferences over time and over payo¤s,
attaching probabilities to all possible histories. But there are alternatives. Some of them
were developed to account for anomalous predictions, others arose from advances in the
pure theory of intertemporal choice, see Backus, Routledge and Zin (2005) for a discussion.
Uzawa-type preferences have been born mostly from such advances. The idea that
consumers have a preference for advancing the time of future satisfaction has been around
at least since Fisher (1930) where the notion of impatience was introduced. How to
describe such a preference remained an issue, with one appealing idea to try to dene
preferences for timing advances entirely in terms of utility function (Koopmans, 1960).
Unlike the standard discounted utility approach with constant time preference and the
intra-temporal utility, Koopmans (1960) introduced recursive representation of the inter-
temporal utility, allowing for endogenous time preferences.
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To advance the time of future satisfaction requires an assumption of increasing mar-
ginal impatience, this was identied by Koopmans (1960) and Uzawa (1968). This as-
sumption implies that richer households tend to discount future consumption more heav-
ily. Although a bit counter-intuitive, as we discuss later, the recursive nature of these
preferences became very appealing, and they appeared in many models in the 1970-80s.
The original application of Uzawa-Koopmans preferences was to growth theory (Uzawa,
1968), to explain the fact that poorer countries tend to delay consumption relatively to
richer countries, so they grow faster and can catch up. Uzawas preference structure
has also been used in trade theory by Kouri (1980), Obstfeld (1981) and others. One
appealing feature of these preferences is that, dispensing with constant time-preference
rates, they generate intertemporal interdependence, with applications to business cycles
(Kydland and Prescott, 1982), high excess return to US equity investments (Constanti-
nides, 1990) and drug addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988) among others. As a bonus,
these preferences naturally rule out the random walk behavior of the real exchange rate
in open economy models (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003). Furthermore, Epstein (1983,
1987) noted that in the stochastic version of the general equilibrium model with Uzawa
preferences in discrete time, an increasing marginal impatience implies an individuals
aversion to correlation between random consumption levels in any two periods. Empirical
evidence of intertemporal correlation aversion, consistent with such increasing marginal
impatience, was reported by Cheung (2015) and Andersen et al. (2018).
Direct tests of whether richer households tend to discount future consumption more
heavily are di¢ cult to design. The literature which compares countries often shows com-
pletely di¤erent results: poor countrieshouseholds seem to discount future more heavily
than households in rich countries, see Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) and Lawrance (1991) em-
pirical work. This empirical work, however, does not dismiss the underlying assumption
that individuals are impatient and would like to advance the time of future events with
high utility.1 Inherent di¢ culties and lack of consensus over empirical approaches and
1Moreover, the reverse assumption of decreasing marginal impatience would result in instability of a
representative agent dynamic economy, see Obstfeld (1990). In an economy with permanently patient
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use of theoretical models in measuring individual time preferences were noted by Cohen
et al. (2020) in a recent survey of a large body of literature in this eld.
The assumption of impatience, combined with heterogeneity of agents and incomplete
markets, can create rich dynamics and a non-trivial wealth distribution (Epstein and
Hynes 1983, Lucas and Stokey 1984, and Farmer and Lahiri 2005). Recently, Wang
(2007) demonstrates that a model with heterogeneous-income agents (a la Huggett 1993)
is able to generate stationary wealth distribution with relatively fat tails.
Intuitively, with Uzawa preferences (henceforth UP) the rich, being less patient than
the poor, have incentives to consume more and save less. Therefore, in the long run the
distribution of wealth with UP should be less dispersed than in the standard case. The
model analyzed in Wang (2007) does not allow direct comparison, because it employs
CARA exponential utility function for which stationary wealth distribution under con-
stant discounting does not exist. The stationary wealth distribution obtained under UP
in Wang (2007) has fat tails relative to the underlying income distribution. A similar
analysis, based on the discount rate locally linear in consumption, as in Wang (2007), but
with the CRRA utility, allows direct comparison between two stationary wealth distribu-
tions. Indeed, this framework generates a more concentrated wealth distribution under UP
than under standard preferences, although with still fatter tails relative to the underlying
income distribution. This is one of the results shown in our paper.
Even more interestingly, at odds with the above intuition, we show in this paper
that UP with CRRA utility can also generate a long-run wealth distribution that is
substantially more dispersed than the one in an economy with standard preferences, when
the discount rate is non-linear in consumption. With an S-shaped discount rate, reecting
diminishing marginal impatience in the tails, the wealth distribution in a model with UP
and impatient consumers the patient consumer will have all the wealth. This property is often used as
a trick to model a permanently binding borrowing constraint in representative agents literature, see e.g.
Iacoviello (2005).
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is more skewed and has fatter tails than under the standard preferences. It is, thus, more
unequal, and, thus, more empirically relevant, than the distribution obtained in the
standard model.
In this paper we analyze a continuous-time economy with incomplete markets and sto-
chastic shocks to exogenous incomes following a two-state Markov process, as in Huggett
(1993) but with an exogenous constraint on borrowing. Achdou et al. (2017) showed
that in such an economy with constant discount rate there is a unique stationary distri-
bution of wealth, with individuals mobile across consumption, income, and wealth levels.
We assume CRRA instantaneous utility and an endogenous instantaneous discount rate,
which depends on the instantaneous consumption. We investigate the e¤ect of endoge-
nous discounting on wealth inequality and compare two models. In the rst model, the
instantaneous discount rate is a locally linear function of consumption, as in Wang (2007).
We demonstrate that it yields more concentrated wealth distribution than the model with
standard preferences. In the second model which is the model of our main interest 
the instantaneous discount rate is an S-shaped function of consumption, meaning that
the agents in the tails of the wealth distribution have diminishing marginal discount rate.
This model is characterizes by a substantially higher equilibrium interest rate and a more
dispersed wealth distribution, relative to the model with locally-linear discount rate.
To get intuition for these results it is helpful to trace the di¤erences in the behavior
of the negative-wealth agents, who demand loans, and the positive-wealth agents, who
supply loans, across three economies: an economy with the standard, constant discount
rate (CDR), an economy with locally linear discount rate (LDR), and an economy with S-
shaped discount rate (SDR), when all three economies have the same long-run population
average discount rate. Putting together these di¤erences suggests how the stationary
distributions would di¤er across these economies.
In the LDR economy, the densely populated small-positive-wealth group has consump-
tion above the benchmark level and so discounts future by more than their CDR coun-
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terpart. It therefore o¤ers a lower supply of loans and thus creates an upward pressure
on the equilibrium interest rate relative to the CDR. This e¤ect is substantially amplied
by the behavior of wealthy agents. The negative-wealth LDR agents, however, become
more patient than their CDR counterparts and thus have a lower demand for loans, lead-
ing to a downward pressure on the equilibrium interest rate relative to the CDR. The
two opposite e¤ects on interest rate coming from the two tail groups nearly o¤set each
other, and the moderate increase in equilibrium interest rate is implied by the behavior of
central group of agents who have only slightly higher impatience than in the CDR econ-
omy. With equilibrium interest rate only slightly higher than under CDR, the demand
for loans is still higher, as the negative-wealth agents need to renance their loans, but
there is also an income e¤ect forcing them to reduce consumption. The opposite is true
for the high-positive-wealth agents and so the aggregate e¤ect is moderate.
The balance of these opposite pressures on interest rate changes signicantly if the
discount rate of the two tail groups changes only moderately, as in the case with the SDR,
despite the fact that the central group with small positive wealth behaves in the same way
as in the LDR economy. Given the same interest rate, smaller reduction in patience of the
negative-wealth agents implies less reduction in the loan demand and, therefore, weaker
downward pressure on the equilibrium interest rate. Similarly, the high-positive-wealth
group produces only moderate reduction in loan supply and less upward pressure on the
interest rate. However, the reduction in supply is greater than the reduction in demand.
Higher interest rate results in a substantially higher debt of the negative-wealth group,
and in a higher proportion of population in the left-hand tail. Self-reinforcing mechanism
of higher demand for loans to renance the existing debt and stronger upward pressure
on the interest rate produced by this group results in a higher equilibrium interest rate.
The central group with moderate positive wealth generates a moderate increase in
general equilibrium interest rate, while the interactions of the two tail groups limit interest
rate increase in the LDR economy, but amplify its increase substantially in the SDR
economy. The corresponding redistribution of population across wealth levels accompanies
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the latter process and reinforces the equilibrium e¤ect. Thus, the UP can generate a
more dispersed wealth distribution, with fatter tails, than the standard preferences, under
a plausible assumption of declining marginal impatience above and below the average
discount rate.
We next investigate the distributional e¤ects of taxes. We nd that a consumption
tax reduces the welfare inequality. Capital income tax increases current consumption,
reduces the current saving but does not a¤ect future output. As a result, in this economy
life-time welfare unambiguously rises because of higher current consumption.
Finally, we demonstrate that in production economy the redistribution e¤ect of Uzawa-
type preferences is mitigated. In contrast to the endowment economy with zero total
wealth, movements of population between borrower and lender positions skew the pop-
ulation distribution towards its higher end. Large movements between borrowers and
savers are no longer possible, and the redistribution mechanism does not engage with a
shift in preferences. The mechanism discussed in this paper may help to understand ad-
ditional reasons leading to high observed income inequality in developing countries with
little production opportunities and binding borrowing constraints.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 2
describes the functional form of preferences. First order conditions describing stationary
equilibrium are obtained in Section 3 and parameterization of the model is given in Section
4. The results are discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are gathered
in the Technical Appendix.
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2.2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely-lived individuals with di¤erent
levels of wealth a and income y: Individual preferences are described by the following
life-time utility function:Z 1
0
exp

 
Z s
0
 (c ()) d

u (c (s)) ds (2.1)
where the discount rate  depends on consumption c. The ow utility function u(c) is
strictly increasing and strictly concave. An individual receives income y in the form of
an endowment of the economys consumption good. An individuals income follows a
two-state Poisson process, y 2 fy1; y2g with y2 > y1, describing large surprisechanges
in income: The process jumps from state 1 to state 2 with intensity 1 and from state
2 to state 1 with intensity 2. Parameters 1 and 2 are exogenous constants. The
income process is uninsurable, and individuals can only lend or borrow in the form of
non-contingent private bonds at interest rate r determined in equilibrium.
The wealth accumulation equation takes the form

a = ra+ y   c (2.2)
where a is the holding of private bonds. We assume that individuals face a borrowing
limit
a  a (2.3)
with  1 < a < 0:
Individuals choose consumption path c to maximize utility (2.1) subject to the budget
constraint (2.2), the borrowing limit (2.3) and an exogenously specied labor income
process, taking interest rate as given. We denote the joint probability distribution of
income yj and wealth a by Gj (a; t), with the corresponding density function gj (a; t),
j = 1; 2.
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We assume that private bonds are in zero net supply, so in general equilibrium, at
every instant t Z 1
a
ag1 (a) da+
Z 1
a
ag2 (a) da = 0: (2.4)
Finally, we assume that the ow utility function takes the CRRA form,
u (c) =
c1    1
1   ;  > 0: (2.5)
It remains to dene the functional form of discount rate (c).
2.3 Uzawa preferences
We assume that individual time preferences are endogenous and depend on the consump-
tion path. The functional form of the instantaneous discount rate (c) must satisfy the
following properties: (i) (c) > 0; (ii) c(c) > 0; (iii) (c) < R < 1: The rst property
simply states that individuals discount future utility, and the second property is required
to ensure existence of a stationary equilibrium (see, for example, Obstfeld 1990).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the shape of the discount rate and its derivative in three cases:
standard preferences model with constant discount rate (CDR)
 (c) = ; (2.6)
locally linear discount rate (LDR)
 (c) = +(c  c0) : (2.7)
and S-shaped discount rate (SDR)
 (c) = +

d
arctan (d (c  c0)) ; (2.8)
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Figure 2.1: Discount rate as a function of consumption.
where parameters f;; d; c0g are all positive. In the consumption domain shown in
Figure 2.1 the discount rate varies around the benchmark value of  = 0:05 within about
10%. This consumption domain, as we shall see later, is su¢ ciently wide and covers nearly
entire distribution of consumption for the benchmark parameterization.2
In the LDR and SDR specications parameter  is the discount rate at a certain
benchmark level of consumption c0: Parameter
  c (c0)
determines the slope of the discount rate function at the benchmark consumption level.
Parameter d a¤ects the curvature of the discount rate in the SDR case. Note that with
2We refer to the LDR case as locally linearbecause it may be non-linear outside this consumption
domain. In particular, it can be S-shaped, but as long as the tails with diminishing marginal impatience
are outside the relevant consumption domain, these tails have no e¤ect.
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d tending to zero the discount rate tends to a locally linear function with slope  so the
LDR is a limiting case of the SDR.
Panel B illustrates that 0 

@(c)
@c

CDR
<

@(c)
@c

SDR


@(c)
@c

LDR
for any a. Deriv-
ative

@(c)
@c

LDR
 ; while derivative

@(c)
@c

SDR
= 
1+d2(c c0)2 is hump-shaped and
achieves maximum max

@(c)
@c

SDR
=  at c = c0:
2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
Individuals consumption and saving decisions and the evolution of their income and
wealth can be summarized with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
0 = max
c

u (c)   (c)Vj (a) + (ra+ yj   c) @Vj (a)
@a
+ j (V j (a)  Vj (a))

; (2.9)
and Kolmogorov Forward equation3
0 =   d
da
(sj (a) gj (a))  jgj (a) +  jg j (a) ; (2.10)
where j = 1; 2 and index  j denotes other than j. Here the saving policy function is
sj (a) = ra+ yj   cj (a)
and the value function is denoted Vj (a) :The derivation of these two equations is given in
the Technical Appendix.
Maximization of (2.9) yields the following rst order condition:
@u (c)
@c
=
@ (c)
@c
Vj (a) +
@Vj (a)
@a
: (2.11)
3This is also known in the literature as the Fokker-Planck equation.
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Compared with the CDR model with constant  =  there is an additional term @(c)
@c
Vj (a)
in the right-hand side of this equation. This term captures the e¤ect of endogenous dis-
counting on the agents trade-o¤. With greater past consumption the agent has incentives
to consume more. For this model Vj (a) < 0 and, therefore,
@u(c)
@c
<
@Vj(a)
@a
so that the mar-
ginal utility of consumption is less than the marginal value of saving @Vj(a)
@a
at the point
of optimality.
Together with market clearing condition (2.4), boundary condition,
@Vj (a)
@a
+
@ (yj + ra)
@c
Vj (a)  @u (yj + ra)
@c
(2.12)
and the normalization of the joint distribution,Z 1
a
g1 (a) da+
Z 1
a
g2 (a) da = 1 (2.13)
the system of equations (2.9) (2.11) describes the stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The consumption and saving functions cj (a) and sj (a) for j = 1; 2 corre-
sponding to the HJB equation (2.9) satisfy the Euler equation,
0 = (r    (c))j (a) +
@j (a)
@a
sj (a) + j
 
 j (a)  j (a)

(2.14)
where
j (a) =
@Vj (a)
@a
=
@u (c)
@c
  @ (c)
@c
Vj (a)
sj (a) = ra+ yj   cj (a)
The next proposition describes asymptotic saving behavior of the low income types.
Assumption 1 Discount rate  (c) satises the following inequality
@2u (c)
@c2
@cj(a)
@a
<

@2 (c)
@c2
@cj(a)
@a
+
@ (c)
@c

j (a) :
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Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satised, r <  (c) ; y1 < y2 and the coef-
cient of risk aversion R (c) =   lima!a @2u(c)@c2 =@u(c)@c < 1: Then the solution to the HJB
equation (2.9) and the corresponding policy functions have the following properties:
1. s1 (a) = 0 but s1 (a) < 0 for a > a: That is, among those with current low income
draw, only individuals exactly at the borrowing constraint are constrained, while those with
wealth a > a are unconstrained and decumulate assets.
2. as a ! a the saving and consumption policy function of the low income type and
the corresponding instantaneous marginal propensity to consume satisfy
s1 (a)   
p
21
p
a  a
c1 (a)  ra+ y1  
p
21
p
a  a
@c1 (a)
@a
= r  
r
1
2 (a  a)
where
1 =
(r    (c1 (a)))1 (a) + 1 (2 (a)  1 (a))
@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c1)@c21

a=a
and
V2 (a) =

u (c2 (a)) + s2 (a)
@u(c)
@c

c2(a)

( (c1 (a)) + 1) + 2u (c1 (a))
 (c2 (a)) + s2 (a)
@(c)
@c

c2(a)

( (c1 (a)) + 1) + 2 (c1 (a))
V1 (a) =
u (c1 (a)) + 1V2 (a)
 (c1 (a)) + 1
1 (a) =
@u (c)
@c

c1(a)
  V1 (a) @ (c)
@c

c1(a)
2 (a) =
@u (c)
@c

c2(a)
  V2 (a) @ (c)
@c

c2(a)
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Corollary 2 Under assumptions of Proposition 1 the wealth of an individual with initial
wealth a0 and successive low income draws y1 converges to the borrowing constraint in
nite time at speed governed by 1 :
a (t)  a0  1
2
(T   t)2 ; 0  t  T
where T is the hitting time.
Wealth distribution of the low income group has a point mass at the borrowing con-
straint, as shown in Achdou et al. (2018); their results are directly transferable to our
case. In the next Proposition we borrow their results relevant for our investigation, and
also derive a compact expression relating the point mass on the constraint to the savings
function.
The cumulative probability function Gj(a) satisesZ 1
a
dGj(a) =
 j
j +  j
:
Proposition 2 Assume that r <  (c) ; y1 < y2, the relative risk aversion  c
@2u(c)
@c2
@u(c)
@c
< 1
and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion R (c) =   lima!a
@2u(c)
@c2
@u(c)
@c
< 1: Then there is exist a
unique stationary distribution given by
gj (a) =
j
sj (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

j
sj (x)
+
 j
s j (x)

dx

for some constants of integration 1 < 0 and 2 =  1. The stationary wealth distribution
of low income group g1 (a) has a point mass of m1 at the borrowing constraint a: The
cumulative distribution function has the following asymptotic property
G1 (a)  m1 exp
0@1
s
2 (a  a)
1
1A
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with
m1 =
1
1
s2 (a) g2 (a) :
The stationary distribution of high income types at the borrowing constraint is bounded,
g2 (a) <1:.
The saving behavior of the high income group is the same as formulated in Achdou et
al. (2017) in the standard case with constant discount :
Proposition 3 Assume that r <  (c) ; y1 < y2 and relative risk aversion  c@2u(c)@c2 =@u(c)@c <
1: Then there exists amax < 1 such as sj (a) < 0 for all a  amax; j=1,2, and s2 (a) 
2 (amax   a) as a ! amax for some constant 2: The wealth of an individual with initial
wealth a0 and successive high income draws y2 converges to amax asymptotically: a amax 
e 2t (a0   amax) :
Therefore, the support for wealth is limited: a 2 [a; amax):
2.5 Parameterization
We adopt parameterization from Achdou et al. (2018) and set y1 = 0:1; y2 = 0:2; 1 =
2 = 1:2: In the numerical example discussed in this paper we set  = 0:1; and  = d =
0:01:
It remains to calibrate the benchmark level of consumption. To make di¤erent models
comparable one plausible choice is to require that the average discount rate in all three
equals : For the SDR model with  = 0:1 and  = 0:01 this condition pins down
cSDR0 = 0:1508 which is di¤erent from c
LDR
0 = 0:1500: We can alternatively choose to set
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~cSDR0 = ~c
LDR
0 = 0:1500 which is the mean consumption in the CDR model. It turns out
that our results are only marginally quantitatively di¤erent with c0 2 [0:1500; 0:1508] and
all our conclusions remain unchanged. In tables below we use c0 based on equating the
average discount rates to :
2.6 Stationary Distributions and Equilibrium Inter-
est Rate
2.6.1 Constant Discount Rate
The benchmark CDR case with  = 0 is thoroughly discussed in Achdou et al. (2017).
The model is solved for stationary distributions for each of the two current-income groups:
the low-income group (those with current realization of y = y1) and the high-income group
(y = y2). Table 2.1 presents numerical characteristics of wealth distributions by di¤erent
groups and for the entire population, and Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present these distributions
labelled as  = 0. Comparison of statistics in columns (1) and (2) of Panel III of Table
2.1 suggests that the CDR wealth distribution is substantially more dispersed than the
underlying income distribution.
The key properties of the solution, as illustrated in these gures, are the following.
The high-income group are period-savers, while the low-income group are period-
dissavers (see Panel A of Figure 2.2). Consumption of both groups rises with wealth (see
Panel B).
Both low-income and high-income groups have a bounded wealth support: a  a 
amax, but only the low-income group has positive mass on constraint a. Once individuals
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Figure 2.2: Stationary distributions in the LDR and CDR cases
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Table 2.1: Numerical Characteristics of the Stationary Distribution
CDR LDR SDR
 = 0:0  = 0:1  = 0:1
(1) (2) (3)
Panel I: General equilibrium interest rate and tails of the wealth distribution
Interest rate r 0.0352 0.0385 0.0392
Asymptotic parameter, 1 0.0260 0.0256 0.0216
Mass at the borrowing constraint, m1 0.0151 0.0146 0.0156
Top 10% by wealth, low income group, a^L;90 0.1074 0.1054 0.1199
Top 10% by wealth, high income group, a^H;90 0.1448 0.1427 0.1593
Panel II: Statistical characteristics of the total wealth distributions
mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
standard deviation 0.0939 0.0937 0.1053
skewness 0.6697 0.6736 1.0366
kurtosis 3.2674 3.2810 4.3323
Panel III: Statistical characteristics of consumption distributions
by current income group
standard deviation, low income group 0.0168 0.0169 0.0179
standard deviation, high income group 0.0102 0.0106 0.0096
standard deviation, total 0.0196 0.0200 0.0204
Panel IV: Net supply of loans, LS   LD
The poor, a < 0 -0.0382 -0.0378 -0.0414
The middle class, a & 0 0.0227 0.0230 0.0203
The rich, a 0 0.0155 0.0148 0.0211
hit this constraint, they remain there for a nite time period as long as they subsequently
draw low income. This is illustrated in Panel C.
Consumption densities of both groups are plotted in Panel D of Figure 2.2. One can
see that the high-income group has almost symmetric distribution of consumption, while
the density of the low-income group has a pronounced long tail on the left-hand side and
a spike on the right-hand side corresponding to the point-mass on borrowing constraint,
where the individuals consume their total income net of interest payments.
Panel E of Figure 2.2 illustrates the distribution of the individual discount rate for
each income groups in the LDR case, and Panel F plots the value function for each group.
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The level of welfare for the high-income group is higher than for the low-income group
for all wealth levels.
For the further discussion, it is helpful to split the total distribution by wealth into
three groups: those with negative wealth (a < a < 0), those with moderate positive
wealth (0 < a < ~a) and those with high positive wealth (~a < a). We will label them as
the poor, the middle classand the richrespectively.4 We also refer to these three
groups as having wealth of a < 0; a & 0 and a  0; respectively. For our numerical
example we use ~a = jaj :
At every moment of time, the poor agents have negative wealth and thus are net
debtors. The low-income poor agents are period-borrowers (

a < 0): they consume more
than they earn and nance consumption expenses and interest payments by borrowing
the di¤erence. The high-income poor agents are period-savers (

a > 0): they consume
less than they earn, use their income to nance consumption and interest payments, and
save the di¤erence. However, as both income groups are net debtors (a < 0), their need
to renance (roll-over) this debt generates demand for loans. The numerical values are
reported in Panel II of Table 2.1.
The middle-class and the rich have positive wealth and thus are net creditors. Among
them, the low-income agents are period-borrowers (

a < 0): they consume more than they
earn in income and interest on loans, and so they borrow the di¤erence to nance their
consumption. The high-income agents are period-savers (

a > 0): they consume less than
they earn in income and interest, use their income to nance consumption, and save the
rest. These groups generate supply of loans. The numerical values are given in Panel II
in Table 2.1.
Interest rate adjusts to ensure that the net supply of loans in the economy is zero.
4Note that this classication refers to the stock of accumulated wealth, rather than the ow of income.
Thus, a poor individual can receive high income in any given moment t, or a rich individual can receive
low income.
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Next, we analyze the LDR case as the second convenient benchmark that helps to
explain the SDR results.
2.6.2 Linear Discount Rate Model
The LDR model was investigated in Wang (2007), in a setting with the CARA utility
function, Gaussian di¤usion income process but without a borrowing constraint. In this
framework Wang (2007) has demonstrated that the wealth distribution is more dispersed
than the underlying income distribution. The CARA utility and unconstrained borrowing
allow to derive a closed-form solution for the distribution of wealth, but a stationary
distribution only exists for  > 0. Lack of the the natural benchmark of CDR ( = 0)
precludes direct comparison of the LDR and CDR wealth distributions.
In contrast to Wang (2007), our model, with CRRA utility along with the borrowing
constraint, does not have a closed-form solution, so we have to resort to numerical com-
putations. However, we can compare stationary wealth distribution to the benchmark
CDR case discussed above (see Table 2.1).
Let us start with the comparison of the benchmark CDR case reported in column (1)
with the LDR case in column (2). Panel I suggests that the e¤ect of lower discount rate
in the left tail of the wealth distribution under LDR is numerically small and ambiguous:
although the point mass on the borrowing limit is lower, parameter 1 which is inversely
proportional to the slope of the cdf function G1 (a) is also lower, so G1 (a) grows faster
with a at a = a under LDR In addition, top 10% of both income types have less wealth
under LDR, so overall the LDR wealth distribution must be slightly more concentrated.
Overall, Panel II conrms that the wealth distribution reported in column (3) for the LDR
case is more concentrated and less skewed, although quantitatively the e¤ect is not very
large. This appears consistent with Uzawa-type preferences: with increasing marginal
impatience the rich save less, while the poor dissave less.
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Note that the equilibrium interest rate is higher in LDR than in the CDR case. To see
whether higher interest rate is consistent with more concentrated distribution of wealth,
we look at the three wealth groups described above. It is helpful to describe the compar-
ison of the CDR and LDR economies as a thought experiment of changing the marginal
discount rate from  = 0:0 to  = 0:1. Table 2.2 documents partial and general equi-
librium e¤ects on consumption c, saving s, demand and supply of loans LD and LS, the
interest rate r, the discount rate  and the proportion of population n; as we describe
next.
Consider the e¤ect of change in the discount rate recorded in columns (1)-(3). A
change in the discount rate has substitution e¤ect on consumption and saving decisions.
Consumption of the poor (a < 0) falls below the benchmark level, so that in the LDR
economy their discount rates are lower than the (benchmark) constant discount rate of 
in the CDR economy. Because of these lower discount rates they consume less and borrow
less, as recorded in columns (1) and (2). As a result, for a given interest rate, the demand
for loans among these individuals falls below that in the CDR case, and this exerts a
downward pressure on interest rate, recorded in column (3). Meanwhile, consumption of
the middle class (a & 0) and the rich (a 0) is, on average, above the benchmark level,
and so their discount rates are higher than the benchmark CDR. With higher discount
rate they consume more and save less than they would under the CDR economy. The
supply of loans goes down, which has an upward pressure on interest rate compared to
the CDR case, this is recorded in column (3).
Panel IV in Table 2.1 shows that, as a result of such changes in the discount rate, in the
stationary equilibrium the total supply and total demand for loans are lower in the LDR
economy than in the CDR economy. The reduction in supply dominates the reduction in
demand, and so the equilibrium interest rate is higher under the LDR compared to the
CDR, as recorded in column (4).
Next, consider the e¤ect of higher interest rate on these three groups, recorded in
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columns (4)-(6). Consider the income e¤ect of higher interest rate on consumption and
saving decisions of each group of agents. First, to service their debt, the poor (a < 0)
increase borrowing and simultaneously reduce their current consumption, as recorded in
column (5). Lower current consumption further reduces their discount rate, and higher
borrowing increases the demand for loans thus exerting upward pressure on the interest
rate, as shown in column (6).
Second, with higher interest rate the middle class (a & 0) and the rich (a 0) receive
higher return on their saving and increase both saving and current consumption. Higher
current consumption further increases their discount rate. At the same time, higher
savings mean higher supply of loans thus creating downward pressure on the interest rate,
as recorded in columns (5)-(6).
Table 2.1 reports the general equilibrium outcomes, also summarized in column (7) of
Table 2.2. In general equilibrium, the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect and
determines the outcome for the two tail groups, the poor and the rich. The poor (a < 0)
in the CDR economy have lower debt thus generating weaker demand for loans, compared
to the LDR economy. Furthermore, the point mass on the borrowing constraint under
the LDR is smaller, and the relative population share of this group falls as some of its
members accumulate positive wealth and move up into the middle class. The rich in the
LDR economy have lower wealth thus generating weaker supply of loans, compared to the
CDR economy. In addition, the relative population share (denoted by n) of this group
falls as some of its members decumulate wealth and move down into the middle class, as
shown in Table 2.2.
As a result, the middle class (a & 0) in the LDR economy is larger than in the
CDR economy. However, while it becomes the most populous, it has only moderate
consumption and savings, so the equilibrium interest rates do not di¤er very much between
the two economies.
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Table 2.2: General Equilibrium E¤ects of Linear Discount Factor
Wealth Dis- Substi- Partial Eqm. Income Partial LDR
Group count tution Eqm. Interest Eq. General
Rate E¤ect E¤ect Rate E¤ect E¤ect Equilibrium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a < 0  # c #; s " LD #; r # s #; c # LD "; r ";  # LD #; a "; n #
a & 0  " c "; s # LS #; r " r " s "; c " LS "; r #;  " LS "; a "; n "
a 0  " c "; s # LS #; r " s "; c " LS "; r #;  " LS #; a #; n #
To summarize, the LDR economy is characterized by a slightly more concentrated
wealth distribution and, in this sense, exhibits lower wealth inequality than the CDR
economy. The distribution of consumption under LDR is more dispersed for both income
groups, although the e¤ect is small. Similar to the wealth distribution, the consumption
distribution of the low-income group has a point mass at the level of consumption cor-
responding to the borrowing limit. This boundary is lower in the LDR economy than
in the CDR economy. Consumption smoothing leads to the distribution of consumption
that is less dispersed than the distribution of wealth for each group for all three types of
preferences, but with the LDR the distribution of consumption has lower peaks and fatter
tails for both income groups, compared to the CDR. That is, the LDR economy exhibits
higher consumption inequality for both income groups.
2.6.3 S-Shaped Discount Factor
The result on wealth distribution is completely reversed in the SDR case described by
(2.8).5 Compared to the LDR case, the discount rate  (c) deviates less from constant ,
and it has diminishing sensitivity to consumption relative to the benchmark. Column (3)
in Table 2.1 shows that in the SDR case the equilibrium interest rate rises over the CDR
case by more than in the LDR case.
5We do not have a proof of uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium in this setting. Instead, we have
computed stationary equilibrium using widely di¤erent initializations. In our simulations the algorithm
converged to the same distribution in all cases. The details are available upon request.
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Figure 2.3: Stationary distributions, non-linear discount factor function
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Figure 2.3 reports stationary distributions in the SDR case. The quantitative e¤ects
are signicantly larger than in the LDR case. First, from Panels I and II one can see
that the dispersion of consumption and wealth distributions is noticeably larger: there
are more agents in the tails of the distribution (the poor and the rich). In particular, the
point mass on the borrowing constraint is larger, and the distribution function G1 (a) at
the constraint, is steeper (because 1 is smaller). The top 10% of population by wealth
have higher level of wealth under the SDR compared to the CDR. In other words, in an
SDR economy the consumption and wealth distributions have fatter tails compared to
those in a CDR economy. Second, Table 2.1 reports that the equilibrium interest rate
is much higher under SDR than under CDR. It is not surprising that a higher interest
rate results in fatter tails, as this comes from the substantial income e¤ects. However,
the reason for why the interest rate in the SDR economy is even higher than in the LDR
economy and why the income e¤ects dominate is more subtle.
Table 2.3: General Equilibrium E¤ects of Non-Linear Discount Factor
Wealth Dis- Substi- Partial Eqm. Income Partial SDR
Group count tution Eqm. Interest Eqm. General
Rate E¤ect E¤ect Rate E¤ect E¤ect Equilibrium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a < 0   c ; s  LD ; r  s ; c  LD ; r ;   LD "; a #; n "
a & 0  " c "; s # LS #; r " r  s ; c  LS ; r ;   LS #; a #; n #
a 0   c ; s  LS ; r  s ; c  LS ; r ;   LS "; a "; n "
As before, consider the same three wealth groups: the poor (a < 0), the middle class
(a & 0) and the rich (a  0). As discussed above, the rst group generates the demand
for loans, while the other two groups generate the supply of loans. Table 2.3 shows the
same directions of e¤ects recorded in columns (1)-(6) as Table 2.2. However, the general
equilibrium e¤ects described in column (7) have di¤erent directions.
Similar to the LDR economy, in the SDR case the poor agents have lower discount rate
than in the benchmark CDR case, and thus have lower current consumption. As a result,
for a given interest rate, these individuals have lower demand for loans than in the CDR
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case, which puts a downward pressure on the interest rate. Importantly, the poor in the
SDR case are more impatient than in the LDR case, as one can see in Figure 2.3. They
consume more and dissave or borrow more to nance consumption and renance debt.
Their demand for loans does not fall as much as under LDR, and there is less downward
pressure on equilibrium real interest rate coming from this group, see column (3) in Tables
2.2 and 2.3. In the same vein, the other two groups have higher discount rate than in
the CDR case, but they are more patient than in the LDR case. The consumption does
not go up as much and the saving does not reduce as much as they do in the LDR case.
The reduction in the supply of loans is smaller than in the LDR case; hence there is less
upward pressure on interest rate.
Although there is less upward and downward pressure on equilibrium interest rate,
the balance of these pressures is shifted compared to the LDR case. In the stationary
distribution in an SDR economy a larger proportion, about 50 percent of population
are poor, so that (i) the aggregate demand for loans is higher, (ii) the upward pressure on
interest rate is stronger than the downward pressure and (iii) the equilibrium real interest
rate is higher than in the LDR case.
A higher interest rate has an income e¤ect on the consumption and saving behavior
of each group of agents. The poor increase borrowing to service the debt and, at the
same time, reduce the current consumption. This further reduces their discount rates,
but limits the reduction in the demand for loans which weakens the downward pressure
on the interest rate. Table 2.1 reports that in general equilibrium the e¤ect of higher
interest rate dominates, so that the demand for loans is higher in comparison to the CDR
case. In general equilibrium, therefore, the poor have higher debt, the point mass on the
borrowing constraint is larger, and the relative population share of this group is bigger,
as some middle-class agents decumulate wealth and become net borrowers. As the poor
constitute about a half of the population, the self-reinforcing mechanism of higher interest
rate and higher demand for loans to service previous loans results in higher interest rate
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in general equilibrium.6
A signicantly high interest rate has strong income e¤ect on the net creditors, who
increase both current consumption and savings. Although the increased supply of loans
creates a downward pressure on interest rate, this e¤ect is generated by a relatively small
proportion of the overall population, so the general equilibrium interest rate, mainly
determined by the net borrowersbehavior, remains high. The rich group accumulate
more wealth at the higher rate (because of the higher return on loans) and so their
relative share in the population is higher in the SDR economy, while the population share
of the middle class is lower, compared to the CDR and LDR economies.
This behavior of di¤erent wealth groups bends, not tilts, consumption and saving
proles as shown in Figure 2.3. The stronger income e¤ect of a high interest rate a¤ects
both tails of the distribution and leads to greater wealth inequality.
Note that this reinforcing mechanism can only be triggered if > 0:Only then, relative
impatience of the poor and the relative patience of the rich generate signicant increase
in equilibrium interest rate with the poor and rich the tails of the wealth distribution
wanting to increase borrowing and saving, respectively. Therefore, only LDR and SDR
models are comparable, with less (im)patience of the two tail groups resulting in higher
interest rate and higher equilibrium demand for loans. These two models are not directly
comparable to the CDR model.
To summarize, the distribution of wealth in the SDR economy exhibits a larger in-
equality in the aggregate and within each group relative to the CDR and LDR economies.
The wealth distribution of the low-income group has a larger mass at the borrowing con-
straint (see Panel I in Table 2.1). While the e¤ect of the SDR on the mean wealth is
negligible in this parameterization, the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the
6An exogenous borrowing constraint prevents a Ponzi-game behaviour of accumulating ever growing
debt.
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wealth distribution are all higher for both the low-income and the high-income groups, as
shown in Panel IV in Table 2.1 (see also the bottom quantiles, the medians, and the upper
deciles of the wealth distribution for three types of preferences reported in this table). All
of these suggests that the wealth distribution under the SDR is more dispersed and more
skewed, and in this sense is more unequal than in the CDR case.
The e¤ect on consumption distribution is less clear. The higher interest rate reduces
consumption on the borrowing limit. For both groups, under SDR the distribution of
consumption has higher peak relative to the CDR. At the same time, it has fatter tails
for the low-income group under SDR, while the opposite is true for the high-income
group. That is, the SDR reduces consumption inequality for the high-income group and
exacerbates it for the low-income group, as shown in Panel III of Table 2.1.
2.7 Transition Dynamics
To explore the transition dynamics in this economy, we conduct the following experiment.
We start with stationary distribution generated by the standard CDR model and at some
point instantaneously change the discount factor to become dependent on consumption
and record the transition dynamics towards the new stationary equilibrium under LDF
or SDR assumption in Figures 2.4-2.5.
In the LDR model interest rate rises quickly to its new steady-state level. It then
uctuates around this level for about 3 years, but its deviations are of about 1% of the
new level. In contrast, in the SDR model interest rate immediately rises by much more
than the new-steady state level and then converges to it with deviations of about 10%
from this new level. The much higher interest rate consistently observed after one year
from the switch to new preferencesgenerate a noticeable income e¤ect clearly a¤ecting
the poor types with negative wealth, as discussed above. There is a clear concentration of
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Figure 2.4: Transition dymnamics, LDF model
112
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.04
0.042
0.044
Panel A: Equilibrium Interest Rate, r(t)
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
t = 0.1
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
t = 2
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
t = 5
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
t =
g1(a), NLDF model g2(a), NLDF model initial g 1(a), CDF model initial g 2(a), CDF model
Panel B: Dynamics of Wealth Distribution
Figure 2.5: Transition Dynamics, NLDF model
113
population of debtors causing stronger upward pressure on equilibrium interest rate due
to the increased need to renance the existing debt. With strong income e¤ect on the high
positive-wealth group the supply of loans increases and the equilibrium interest rate falls
to its new steady-state level. The dynamics takes about ve years to reach distribution
which is reasonably close to the stationary distribution.
2.8 Distributional E¤ects of Taxes
In this section we introduce production and compare the equilibrium outcomes with the
endowment economy. We investigate how the distributional consequences of endogenous
discounting are a¤ected by redistributive policies. In this model consumption and asset
holding are the only decision variables of individual agents, therefore taxes on consumption
and on capital income are the natural choice.
Consumption and capital income taxes are redistributed as a uniform lump-sum pay-
ment to everyone. The individual budget constraint can be written as

a = yj +
 
1  ta  1[a0]

ra  (1 + tc) c+ T
where tc is consumption tax rate, ta is capital income tax rate and T is a lump-sum
government transfer. We assume that the government balances budget at every instant
so the government budget constraint can be written as
tc
Z amax
a
[c1 (a) g1 (a) + c2 (a) g2 (a)] da+ tar
Z amax
0
a [g1 (a; r) + g2 (a; r)] da = T:
To account for taxes we modify the HJB equation
0 = max
c
(u (c)   (c)Vj (a) (2.15)
+
  
1  ta  1[a0]

ra+ yj   (1 + tc) c+ T
 @Vj (a)
@a
+j (V j (a)  Vj (a)))
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while in Kolmogorov Forward equation (2.10) the saving policy function accounts for
taxation:
sj (a) =
 
1  ta  1[a0]

ra+ yj   (1 + tc) cj (a) + T:
Maximization of (2.15) yields the following rst order condition
@u (c)
@c
=
@ (c)
@c
Vj (a) + (1 + tc)
@Vj (a)
@a
(2.16)
The boundary condition becomes
(1 + tc)
@Vj (a)
@a
+
@ ((yj + ra+ T ) = (1 + tc))
@c
Vj (a)  @u ((yj + ra+ T ) = (1 + tc))
@c
(2.17)
as no capital income tax is imposed on borrowers with wealth a.
The adjusted marginal utility in the Euler equation (2.14) can be written as
j (a) =
@Vj (a)
@a
=
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c)
@c
  @ (c)
@c
Vj (a)

:
Consider consumption tax rst. As this tax is applied to all consumers, we can prove
the following proposition which describes asymptotic saving behavior of the low income
types.
Proposition 4 Assume that Assumption 1 is satised, r <  (c) ; y1 < y2; tc > 0 and the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion R (c) =   lima!a @2u(c)@c2 =@u(c)@c < 1: Then the solution to the
HJB equation (2.9) and the corresponding policy functions have the following properties:
1. s1 (a) = 0 but s1 (a) < 0 for a > a: That is, only individuals exactly at the
borrowing constraint are constrained, while those with wealth a > a are unconstrained and
decumulate assets.
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Figure 2.6: Distributional e¤ects of taxes, SDR model
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Table 2.4: Distributional e¤ects of taxes
CDR LDR NLDR
 = 0:0  = 0:1  = 0:1
No No tc ta No tc ta
tax tax 20% 5% tax 20% 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel I: General equilibrium interest rate and behavior on the borrowing constraint
Interest rate r 0.0352 0.0385 0.0408 0.0401 0.0392 0.0416 0.0405
Parameter, tax1 0.0260 0.0256 0.0286 na 0.0216 0.0223 na
Mass at m1 0.0151 0.0146 0.0161 0.0142 0.0156 0.0177 0.0157
Panel II: Statistical characteristics of total wealth distributions
standard deviation 0.0939 0.0937 0.0959 0.0925 0.1053 0.1077 0.1042
skewness 0.6697 0.6736 0.7064 0.6343 1.0366 1.0716 0.9780
kurtosis 3.2674 3.2810 3.3501 3.2000 4.3323 4.4725 4.1152
Panel III: Standard deviation of consumption distributions by income group
low income group 0.0168 0.0169 0.0144 0.0169 0.0179 0.0152 0.0179
high income group 0.0102 0.0106 0.0088 0.0108 0.0096 0.0081 0.0097
total 0.0196 0.0200 0.0169 0.0200 0.0204 0.0173 0.0203
Panel IV: Net supply of loans, LS   LD
The poor, a < 0 -0.0382 -0.0378 -0.0385 -0.0373 -0.0414 -0.0423 -0.0412
The middle class, a & 0 0.0227 0.0230 0.0119 0.0233 0.0203 0.0201 0.0207
The rich, a 0 0.0155 0.0148 0.0228 0.0139 0.0211 0.0222 0.0205
Panel IV: Statistical characteristics of wealth distributions by current income group
Bottom 20%, a^L;20 -0.1043 -0.1043 -0.1064 -0.1023 -0.1106 -0.1126 -0.1106
Median, a^L;50 -0.0337 -0.0337 -0.0337 -0.0317 -0.0420 -0.0420 -0.0400
Top 10%, a^L;90 0.1074 0.1054 0.1074 0.1033 0.1199 0.1220 0.1178
Bottom 20%, a^H;20 -0.0670 -0.0670 -0.0690 -0.0649 -0.0732 -0.0753 -0.0732
Median, a^H;50 0.0057 0.0057 0.0036 0.0057 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0005
Top 10%, a^H;90 0.1448 0.1427 0.1469 0.1406 0.1593 0.1614 0.1573
Median Welfare, VL;50 -137.01 -138.15 -137.16 -135.87 -138.39 -137.40 -135.93
Median Welfare, VH;50 -133.51 -133.55 -133.43 -131.48 -133.85 -133.60 -131.50
2. as a ! a the saving and consumption policy function of the low-income type and
the corresponding instantaneous marginal propensity to consume satisfy
s1 (a)   
p
2tax1
p
a  a
c1 (a)  1
(1 + tc)

ra+ y1  
p
2tax1
p
a  a

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@c1 (a)
@a
= 1
(1 + tc)
 
r  
s
tax1
2 (a  a)
!
where
tax1 =
(1 + tc)
2 ((r    (c))1 (a) + 1 (2 (a)  1 (a)))
@2u(c1)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c1)@c2
and
V2 (a) =

u (c2) +
s2(a)
(1+tc)
@u(c2)
@c

( (c1) + 1) + 2u (c1)
 (c2) +
s2(a)
(1+tc)
@(c2)
@c

( (c1) + 1) + 2 (c1)
V1 (a) =
u (c1) + 1V2 (a)
 (c1) + 1
1 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c1)
@c
  @ (c1)
@c
V1 (a)

2 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c1)
@c
  @ (c1)
@c
V2 (a)

The e¤ect of consumption tax on consumption and savings is non-monotone: both
high and low income groups with su¢ ciently large positive wealth reduce consumption and
increase savings. The negative-wealth group increases consumption. The point mass on
the borrowing constraint is larger, but the cdf function G1 (a) is atter at the constraint,
as parameter 1 is higher. The distributional e¤ect of the consumption tax can be
described as higher inequality, if measured by the moments: standard deviation, skewness,
and kurtosis are all higher with tax both for current poor and current rich, see columns
(2), (3), (5), (6) in Table 2.4 and Panels A-D in Figure 2.6 for SDR model. In this sense,
the consumption tax appears to be regressive. However, the welfare e¤ect is similar to the
e¤ect on discount factor, see panels C and D in Figure 2.6. Both low current income and
high current income groups with su¢ ciently negative wealth gain from the consumption
tax, whereas those with su¢ ciently large positive wealth lose. Consumption tax results in
atter Vj (a) curves and in this sense reduces the welfare inequality. For LDR and SDR
the standard deviation of consumption distribution falls with higher tax rate, see Table
2.4.
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Capital income tax is only levied on individuals with positive wealth (there is no
subsidy to borrowers for interest payments) so it is not possible to obtain analytical
results similar to those for consumption tax. We report and briey discuss the numerical
results only.
Capital income tax results in uniform increase of welfare for both current income
groups, as one can see from Table 2.4 and panels E-H in Figure 2.6. Consumption and
discount rates rise as well as interest rate. As this is endowment economy with exogenous
level of output (streams of y1 and y2) , increase in current consumption reduces the
current saving but does not a¤ect future output. In a production economy a reduction in
saving would have negative e¤ect on the future output and therefore on future earnings
and consumption, and the overall e¤ect on welfare may not be unambiguously positive.
In contrast, in the endowment economy life-time welfare unambiguously rises because of
higher current consumption.
2.9 Distributional E¤ects of Uzawa-type Preferences
in A Production Economy
As noted in the previous section, an unambiguously positive e¤ect of capital income
tax on the aggregate welfare is fundamentally the property of an endowment economy.
To investigate further the di¤erences between an endowment economy and a production
economy in the equilibrium outcomes of Uzawa-type recursive preferences we now analyze
an economy where wealth is used as a productive capital.
We assume that the production sector can be described by a representative rm hiring
labour and renting capital from perfectly competitive markets. An individuals income
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y is determined by an economy-wide wage w and idiosyncratic labour productivity z 2
fz1; z2g, with z2 > z1, as
yj = wzj
The wealth accumulation equation takes the form

a = ra+ wz   c (2.18)
where a is the holding of wealth in the form of capital. We assume that individuals face
an exogenous borrowing limit
a  a (2.19)
with  1 < a < 0:
As in the Huggetts (1993) model, individuals choose consumption path c to maximize
utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.2), the borrowing limit (2.3), and an
exogenously specied labor productivity process, taking interest rate as given. We denote
the joint probability distribution of productivity zj and wealth a by Gj (a; t), with the
corresponding density function gj (a; t), j = 1; 2.
In a stationary equilibrium, at every instant tZ 1
a
ag1 (a) da+
Z 1
a
ag2 (a) da = K: (2.20)
Capital depreciates at rate : We assume Cobb-Douglas production function
Y = KL1 
so that from the rms prot maximization it follows
r = 

K
L
 1
(2.21)
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w = (1  ) 

K
L

(2.22)
and we normalize L = 1:
Finally, we assume that the ow utility function takes the same CRRA form (2.5).
When we set full depreciation of capital  = 1 and the capital share  = 0 we
obtain the endowment economy, with results discussed in the previous chapter. Important
characteristics of this economy with constant discount rate are presented in column (1)
of Table 2.5 and in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 using solid lines.
We now increase capital share while keeping full depreciation, see column (2) in Table
2.5. This is equivalent to injecting wealth into an endowment economy. Indeed, equation
(2.22) implies
w = (1  ) K
and we can choose  = 1
(1 )K to normalize w = 1 in general equilibrium. The model
with normalized wage is isomorphic to the endowment economy with A > 0:
The results in the previous section were shown to originate from movements of pop-
ulation between borrower and lender positions, and the main quantitative requirement
was that the number of lenders was comparable to the number of borrowers, so that the
redistribution mechanism could interact with a shift in preferences.
This requirement is no longer necessary. With positive total wealth the exogenous
borrowing limit a =  0:15 imposes weaker constraint on wealthier population. In par-
ticular, the point mass at this constraint goes down substantially. A possible way to
see if distributional mechanisms remain operational is to make the borrowing limit less
negative, so that it constrains households in a quantitatively similar way.
121
Column (2) in Table 2.5, therefore, imposes much smaller borrowing limit, to (partly)
compensate for higher total wealth. The new borrowing limit ensures a quantitatively
similar value for the point mass at the constraint.
Table 2.5: Numerical Characteristics of the Stationary Distribution
CDR CDR SDR CDR SDR
Type of Economy Endowment Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital share,  0.00 0.30 0.30 0.3 0.3
Depreciation rate,  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.10
Borrowing limit, a -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Mass at the borrowing constraint, m1 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.002 0.001
Standard deviation of the
total wealth distributions
0.094 0.044 0.044 0.298 0.283
Interest rate, r 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.048 0.049
Table 2.5 and Figures 2.7 and 2.8 demonstrate that the e¤ect of wealth injection
although with tighter borrowing constraint is more concentrated wealth distributions.
The average wealth is positive, and there are more lenders then borrowers. Consumption
distribution is also more concentrated around lower average consumption level.
Column (3) demonstrates that with these initial conditions, a switch to the Uzawa-type
variable discounting rate does not result in any notable changes in wealth distribution.
Dashed and dash-dotted lines in Figure 2.8 are virtually indistinguishable, as columns (2)
and (3) in Table 2.5 conrm.
Reducing depreciation rate allows reusing capital. This has positive e¤ect on the aver-
age level of aggregate wealth, and reduces the impact of the borrowing limit. Comparison
of columns (2) and (4) in Table 2.5 shows that, keeping the borrowing limit constant, a
reduction in depreciation rate in CDR economy results in sharp reduction of the point
mass at the constraint, strong increase in interest rate and a substantially more dispersed
wealth distribution. This is also illustrated in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Constant Discount Rate Model, Comparison of Distributions in Endowment
and Production Economics.
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of Distributions for Constant and Variable Discounting Models
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Columns (4) and (5) in Table 2.5 demonstrate that a shift to variable Uzawa-type
discounting has virtually no e¤ect on wealth inequality. Introducing production sector is
likely to lead to lower inequality even with Uzawa-type preferences.
2.10 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrate that with Uzawa-type preferences, a simple model with
uninsurable risk can generate more unequal wealth distribution than the standard model
with constant discount rate. With Uzawa-type preferences there is substantial income
e¤ect which results in higher consumption and saving by high-wealth households. We
also demonstrate that consumption tax can reduce wealth inequality.
Finally, endogenous Uzawa-type discounting by households may have substantial ef-
fect on wealth and consumption inequality in an endowment economy with borrowing
constraints. However, with production possibilities resulting in endogenous creation of
positive wealth, the e¤ect of discounting on wealth inequality is greatly reduced. The
mechanism discussed in this chapter may help to understand additional reasons leading
to high observed income inequality in developing countries with little production possi-
bilities and binding borrowing constraints.
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2.A Derivation of HJB, KF and Euler equations with
endogenous discount rate
2.A.1 HJB equation
Household maximizes the following value function:
V (at; yt; t) = max
ct
Et
Z T
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds

+ g (aT )
subject to
dat = (rtat + yt   ct) dt
dyt = tdt+ tdW + tdNt
and given state at:
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Consider interval [t; t+ h]. We can rewrite
V (at; yt; t) = max
ct
Et
Z t+h
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds
+
Z T
t+h
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds

= max
ct
Et
Z t+h
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds
+exp

 
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d
Z T
t+h
exp

 
Z s
t+h
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds

= max
ct
Et
Z t+h
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds
+exp

 
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d

V (at+h; yt+h; t+ h)

;
with terminal condition
V (aT ; yT ;T ) = g (aT ; yT ) :
It follows
0 = max
ct
Et
Z t+h
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds
+exp

 
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d

V (at+h; yt+h; t+ h)  V (at; yt; t)

= max
ct
Et

1
h
Z t+h
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds
+
1
h

exp

 
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d

V (at+h; yt+1; t+ h)  V (at; yt; t)

Take the limit as h! 0:
lim
h!0
1
h
Z t+h
t
exp

 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds
 lim
h!0
1
h
Z t+h
t

1 
Z s
t
 (c ) d

u (cs) ds = u (ct)
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lim
h!0
1
h

exp

 
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d

V (at+h; yt+h; t+ h)  V (at; yt; t)

 lim
h!0
1
h

1 
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d

V (at+h; yt+h; t+ h)  V (at; yt; t)

= lim
h!0
1
h

(V (at+h; yt+h; t+ h)  V (at; yt; t))  V (at+h; yt+1; t+ h)
Z t+h
t
 (c ) d

= Vt (at; yt; t) + V (at; yt; t)   (ct)V (at; yt; t)
where
V (at; yt; t) = Va (at; yt; t) [rtat + yt   ct] + tVy (at; yt; t) (2.23)
+
2t
2
Vyy (at; yt; t) + tE [V (at; y
0
t; t)  V (at; yt; t)] :
Finally,
0 = max
ct
Et [u (ct) + Vt (at; yt; t) + V (at; yt; t)   (ct)V (at; yt; t)]
The rst order condition (Euler equation) can be written as:
0 = u0 (ct)  0 (ct)V   Va
Assume the stochastic income process y follows Poisson processes, as in Achdou et al.
(2017). If we dene
Vj (at)  V (at; yt)jyt=yj ;
V 0j (at)  Va (at; yt)jyt=yj ;
then
Vj (at; yj)   V (at; yt)jyt=yj = V 0j (at) [rtat + yj   ct] + j [V j (at)  Vj (at)]
and the HJB equation becomes
0 = max
ct
Et [[u (ct)   (ct)Vj (at) + Vj (at)]]
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The time-dependent evolution of the economy is described by the same equation with
an additional term:
0 = max
ct
Et [[u (ct)   (ct)Vj (at; t) + Vj (at; t)]] + @Vj (at; t)
@t
:
We can introduce the local rate of time preference (Epstein and Hynes 1983, Obstfeld
1990): e (c; Vj; t)    d
dt
log Vj (at; t)
 
c(t)=0
; (2.24)
which is the continuous-time analogue of the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption at t and consumption at t   dt. At t = 0 present value of (2.24) is given
by e (c; Vj)  e (c; Vj; t) exp Z t
0
 (c ) d

=   d
dt
log Vj (a0; y0; 0)
 
c(t)=0
:
There is no steady state in this economy in the sense that

c (t) = 0 for all agents at the
same time, but we can dene the local rate of time preference for a given individual by
calculating the log-derivative along his consumption path at the point where

c (t) = 0 for
this agent.
The derivations in Obstfeld (1990) are reproduced below. For our economy
e (c; ) =  (c) + 0 (c)
u0 (c)  0 (c)Vj
@Vj (at; t)
@t
 
c(t)=0
:
Thus, the local rate of time preference is higher than the instantaneous time discount
rate, e (c; ) >  (c),when
0 (c)
u0 (c)  0 (c)Vj
@Vj (at; t)
@t
 
c(t)=0
> 0
Since 0 (c) > 0 and u0 (c)  0 (c)Vjj c(t)=0 = Vj;a > 0, the sign is determined by
@Vj (at; t)
@t
=  max
ct
Et [[u (ct)   (ct)Vj (at; t) + Vj (at; t)]] :
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This is positive when ct is below its level in the stationary equilibrium (where
@Vj(at;t)
@t
=
0). Therefore, when ct is growing towards its stationary equilibrium level from below
the agent puts lower weight on the future utility, meaning higher impatience at lower
consumption levels. The opposite is true for ct falling towards stationary equilibrium
from above. Impatience is measured by the di¤erence between the rate of time preference
and the instantaneous discount factor.
2.A.2 KF equation
Suppose individual wealth of j-type evolves
d~at = sj (~at; t) dt
there are two densities gj (a; t) ; j = 1; 2:
We can discretize evolution of wealth:
~at+ = ~at + sj (~at; t) (2.25)
this is if a j-type person had ~at and makes per period saving decision sj (~at; t) then after
 being in state j, the wealth is ~at+:
After saving decision is made, next period income is realized for a j-state is ~yt+:
Dene
Gj (a; t) = Pr (~at  a; ~yt = yj)
is fraction of population with income yj with wealth below a: Here
G1 (a; t) +G2 (a; t) = 0
lim
a!1
(G1 (a; t) +G2 (a; t)) = 1
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Dene density
gj (a; t) =
@Gj (a; t)
@a
From (2.25) it follows
~at = ~at+   sj (~at+; t+)
which can be interpreted as if j-type individual at time t+ has ~at+ then his wealth a
moment before was ~at = ~at+   sj (~at+; t+):
Consider fraction of individuals with wealth below a at t+: Let sj (~at+; t+) < 0:
Pr (~at+  a) = Pr (~at  a) + Pr (a  ~at  a  sj (a; t+))
= Pr (~at  a  sj (a; t+))
Then
Pr (~at+  a; ~yt+ = yj) = pj ()Pr (~at+  a; ~yt = yj)
+ (1  p j ()) Pr (~at+  a; ~yt = y j)
= pj ()Pr (~at  a  sj (a; t+); ~yt = yj)
+ (1  p j ()) Pr (~at  a  s j (a; t+); ~yt = y j)
= (1  j)Pr (~at  a  sj (a; t+); ~yt = yj)
+ jPr (at  a  s j (a; t+); ~yt = y j)
so that
Gj (a; t+) = (1  j)Gj (a  sj (a; t+); t)
+ jG j (a  s j (a; t+); t)
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subtract Gj (a; t) from both sides
Gj (a; t+) Gj (a; t) = (1  j)Gj (a  sj (a; t+); t)
+ jG j (a  s j (a; t+); t) Gj (a; t)
and divide by  :
Gj (a; t+) Gj (a; t)

=
Gj (a  sj (a; t+); t) Gj (a; t)

(2.26)
 jGj (a  sj (a; t+); t)
+ jG j (a  s j (a; t+); t) :
Linear approximation at a yields
Gj (a  sj (a; t+); t) ' Gj (a; t)  sj (a; t+) @Gj (a; t)
@a
so that (2.26) can be written as
Gj (a; t+) Gj (a; t)

=  sj (a; t+) @Gj (a; t)
@a
  jGj (a  sj (a; t+); t)
+ jG j (a  s j (a; t+); t)
Take limit ! 0 to obtain
@Gj (a; t)
@t
=  sj (a; t) @Gj (a; t)
@a
  jGj (a; t) +  jG j (a; t)
which is equivalent to
@Gj (a; t)
@t
=  sj (a; t) gj (a; t)  jGj (a; t) +  jG j (a; t) :
Di¤erentiate it with respect to a to yield
@
@t
gj (a; t) =   @
@a
[sj (a; t) gj (a; t)]  jgj (a; t) +  jg j (a; t) :
Finally, in a stationary equilibrium we have
0 =   d
da
[sj (a) gj (a)]  jgj (a) +  jg j (a)
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2.A.3 Euler Equation
HJB equation can be written as
0 = max
c

u (c)   (c)Vj (a) + (ra+ yj   c) @Vj (a)
@a
+ j (V j (a)  Vj (a))

;
Di¤erentiate it with respect to c to yield
@u (c)
@c
=
@ (c)
@c
Vj (a) +
@Vj (a)
@a
: (2.27)
In equilibrium, all decision variables are functions of the state, a, so that
c = C(a) (2.28)
substitute it back to the Bellman equation, it becomes an identity
0 = u (C(a))   (C(a))Vj (a) + (ra+ yj   C(a)) @Vj (a)
@a
+ j (V j (a)  Vj (a)) ; (2.29)
We can di¤erentiate it with respect to a :
0 =

@u (c)
@c
  @ (c)
@c
Vj (a)

@C(a)
@a
   (c) @Vj (a)
@a
(2.30)
+

r   @C(a)
@a

@Vj (a)
@a
+ sj (a)
@2Vj (a)
@a2
+ j

@V j (a)
@a
  @Vj (a)
@a

where
sj (a) = ra+ yj   C(a):
Introduce new variable
j (a) =
@Vj (a)
@a
=
@u (c)
@c
  @ (c)
@c
Vj (a)
where the last equality follows from equation (2.27).
Substitute j (a) and
@j(a)
@a
=
@2Vj(a)
@a2
into (2.30) to yield
0 = j (a)
@C(a)
@a
  (c)j (a)+

r   @C(a)
@a

j (a)+sj (a)
@j (a)
@a
+j
 
 j (a)  j (a)

which, after rearrangements yields (2.14).
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2.B Proposition 1
Part 1.
Consider a < a < a0 where a0 corresponds to the reference consumption point, c0: In
this domain  (c) is a convex function, i.e. 0 < @(c1)
@c
 @(c2)
@c
. We know that 0 < @u(c2)
@c
<
@u(c1)
@c
and V1 (a) < V2 (a) < 0 for any a: Consider
1 (a) =
@u (c1)
@c
  V1 (a) @ (c1)
@c
2 (a) =
@u (c2)
@c
  V2 (a) @ (c2)
@c
Then 0 < 2 (a) < 1 (a) as soon as  (c) is not too convex, i.e. it satises Assumption
1. If a  a0 then  (c) is a concave function so that 0 < 2 (a) < 1 (a) : In this case the
right hand side of Euler equation
@1 (a)
@a
s1 (a)
1 (a)
=

 (c)  r   1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

is strictly positive but @1(a)
@a
is negative. Therefore, s1 (a)  0 for a < a < a0: As on the
borrowing constraint wealth cannot fall, then s1 (a)  0 . It follows that s1 (a) = 0:
Part 2.
On the borrowing constraint s1 (a) = 0 but 1 (a) <1: HJB equations, evaluated at
a yield
0 = u (c1)   (c1)V1 (a) + 1 (V2 (a)  V1 (a))
0 = u (c2)   (c2)V2 (a) + s2 (a)2 (a) + 2 (V1 (a)  V2 (a))
where
2 (a) =
@u (c)
@c
  V2 (a) @ (c)
@c
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From these three equations we obtain
V2 (a) =
s2 (a)
@u(c)
@c
+ u (c2) + 2
u(c1)
((c1)+1)
2(c1)
((c1)+1)
+  (c2) + s2 (a)
@(c)
@c

V1 (a) =
u (c1)
( (c1) + 1)
+
1
( (c1) + 1)
V2 (a)
2 (a) =
@u (c)
@c
  @ (c)
@c
V2 (a)
so V2 (a) ; V1 (a) and 2 (a) are all nite at a:
From Euler equation (2.14) for agents type j = 1
@1 (a)
@a
s1 (a)
1 (a)
=  

r    (c) + 1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

(2.31)
it follows that
@1 (a)
@a

a=a
=1
as s1 (a) = 0 and all other variables in the RHS of (2.31) are nite.
Therefore, @C1(a)
@a

a=a
=1 as @V1(a)
@a

a=a
= 1 (a) <1: Indeed,
@1 (a)
@a

a=a
=1 =

@2u (c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @
2 (c)
@c2

@C1(a)
@a

a=a
  1 (a)
@ (c)
@c
Here, in the RHS all variables except @C1(a)
@a

a=a
are nite. So @C1(a)
@a

a=a
must be innite.
It follows that
@s1 (a)
@a

a=a
= r   @C1(a)
@a

a=a
=1
We can now rearrange and evaluate (2.31) at a :
@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2

1 (a)

s1 (a) r   s1 (a) @s1 (a)
@a

a=a
  s1 (a) @ (c)
@c
=  

r    (c) + 1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

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From this equation
lim
a!a
s1 (a)
@s1 (a)
@a
=
(r    (c))1 (a) + 1 (2 (a)  1 (a))
@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2
= 1
the limit is nite as all variables in RHS are nite. As Achdou et al. (2018) show
lim
a!a
(s1 (a))
2
a  a = 2s1 (a)
@s1 (a)
@a
= 2
(r    (c))1 (a) + 1 (2 (a)  1 (a))
@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2
= 21
so that
(s1 (a))
2  21 (a  a)
and
s1 (a)   
p
21
p
a  a (2.32)
Therefore
c1 (a) = ra+ y1 + s1 (a)  ra+ y1  
p
21
p
a  a
@c1 (a)
@a
= r  
r
1
2 (a  a)
2.C Proposition 2
KF equation for type j can be written as
0 =   d
da
[sj (a) gj (a)]  jgj (a) +  jg j (a) :
Their sum yields
d
da
[s1 (a) g1 (a) + s2 (a) g2 (a)] = 0
so that
s1 (a) g1 (a) + s2 (a) g2 (a) = A:
The support for both distributions is bounded from the left (the support is a  a). This
implies A = 0: Therefore
s1 (a) g1 (a) =  s2 (a) g2 (a) : (2.33)
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Substitute into KF equation
d
da
[gj (a)] =  
 
d
da
[sj (a)]
sj (a)
+
j
sj (a)
+
 j
s j (a)
!
gj (a)
which solution is
gj (a) =
j
sj (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

j
sj (x)
+
 j
s j (x)

dx

for some constants of integration with 1 + 2 = 0
g1 (a+ ) =
1
s1 (a+ )
exp

 
Z a+
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

=
1
s1 (a+ )
exp

 
Z a+
a

1
s1 (x)

dx

exp

 
Z a+
a

2
s2 (x)

dx

lim
!0
exp

 
Z a+
a

2
s2 (x)

dx

= 1
Use (2.32) to obtain
lim
!0
1
 s1 (a+ ) exp
Z a+
a

1
 s1 (x)

dx

= lim
!0
1p
21
p

exp

 
Z 
0

1p
21
p
x

dx

= lim
!0
1p
21
p

exp
 
 21
p
p
21
!
= +1
Therefore, g1 (a) is unbounded at a :
lim
a!a
g1 (a) = lim
a!a
1
s1 (a+ )
exp

 
Z a+
a

1
s1 (x)

dx

= lim
a!a
1
 p21pa  a
exp
0@ 1
s
2 (a  a)
1
1A =1:
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There is point mass at a for g1 (a) : Denote it m1; then
m1 + lim
!0
Z a
a+
g1 (a) da =
2
1 + 2
(2.34)
Z a
a
g2 (a) da =
1
1 + 2
(2.35)
Also, integration of KF equation yieldsZ a
a+
d [s1 (a) g1 (a)] =  
Z a
a+
1g1 (a) da+
Z a
a+
2g2 (a) da
so that
0 = lim
!0
s1 (a+ ) g1 (a+ )  1 lim
!0
Z a
a+
g1 (a) da+ 2 lim
!0
Z a
a+
g2 (a) da
= lim
!0
s1 (a+ ) g1 (a+ )  1

2
1 + 2
 m1

+ 2

1
1 + 2

= lim
!0
s1 (a+ ) g1 (a+ ) + 1m1
= lim
!0

 p21
p

 1
 p21
p

exp
 
 1
r
2
1
!
+ 1m1 = 1 + 1m1
where we used (2.34)-(2.35). We obtain
1 =  1m1 =  2 < 0
and
lim
a!a
g1 (a) = +1
Now
g1 (a) =
1
s1 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

=  1m1
s1 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

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g2 (a) =
2
s2 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

=
1m1
s2 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

Use (2.35): Z a
a
g2 (a) da =
1
1 + 2Z a
a
1m1
s2 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

da =
1
1 + 2
so that
m1 =
2
1 + 2
~m1
where
1
~m1
= 2
Z a
a
1
s2 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

da
Equation (2.33) yields
1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)
=
1g1 (x)
s1 (x) g1 (x)
+
2g2 (x)
s2 (x) g2 (x)
=   1g1 (x)
s2 (x) g2 (x)
+
2g2 (x)
s2 (x) g2 (x)
=
 1g1 (x) + 2g2 (x)
s2 (x) g2 (x)
=   1
s2 (x) g2 (x)
d
dx
(s2 (x) g2 (x))
where the last equality follows from the KF equation
d
da
[s2 (a) g2 (a)] =  2g2 (a) + 1g1 (a) :
It follows
 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx
=  
Z a
a

  1
s2 (x) g2 (x)
d
dx
(s2 (x) g2 (x))

dx
= ln
s2 (a) g2 (a)
s2 (a) g2 (a)
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It implies
1
~m1
= 2
Z a
a
1
s2 (a)
exp

 
Z a
a

1
s1 (x)
+
2
s2 (x)

dx

da
= 2
Z a
a
1
s2 (a)
exp

ln
s2 (a) g2 (a)
s2 (a) g2 (a)

da
=
2
s2 (a) g2 (a)
Z a
a
g2 (a) da
=
2
s2 (a) g2 (a)
1
1 + 2
Finally,
m1 =
2
1 + 2
~m1 =
1
1
s2 (a) g2 (a)
To derive asymptotic behavior of the cdf, we use KF equation
0 =   d
da
[sj (a) gj (a)]  jgj (a) +  jg j (a) :
and integrate it to obtain
0 =  s1 (a) dG1 (a)
da
  1G1 (a) + 2G2 (a)
at the limit,
0 =   lim
a!a
s1 (a)
dG1 (a)
da
  lim
a!a
1G1 (a)
so that
dG1 (a)
G1 (a)
=
1
 s1 (a)da
which we integrate to obtain
G1 (a) = m1 exp
Z a
a
1
 s1 (a)da

 m1 exp
Z a
a
1p
21
p
a  ada

= m1 exp
0@1
s
2 (a  a)
1
1A
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2.D Proposition 4
Part 1.
Consider a < a < a0 where a0 corresponds to the reference consumption point, c0:
In this domain  (c) can be a convex function, i.e. 0 < @(c1)
@c
 @(c2)
@c
. We know that
0 < @u(c2)
@c
< @u(c1)
@c
and V1 (a) < V2 (a) < 0 for any a: Consider
1 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c1)
@c
  V1 (a) @ (c1)
@c

2 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c2)
@c
  V2 (a) @ (c2)
@c

Then 0 < 2 (a) < 1 (a) as soon as  (c) is not too convex, i.e. it satises Assumption
1. If a  a0 then  (c) is semi-concave and so 0 < 2 (a) < 1 (a) : In this case the right
hand side of Euler equation
@1 (a)
@a
s1 (a)
1 (a)
=

 (c)  r   1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

is strictly positive but @1(a)
@a
is negative. Therefore, s1 (a)  0 for a < a < a0: As on the
borrowing constraint wealth cannot fall, then s1 (a)  0 . It follows that s1 (a) = 0:
Part 2.
On the borrowing constraint s1 (a) = 0 but 1 (a) <1: HJB equations, evaluated at
a yield
0 = u (c1)   (c1)V1 (a) + 1 (V2 (a)  V1 (a))
0 = u (c2)   (c2)V2 (a) + s2 (a)2 (a) + 2 (V1 (a)  V2 (a))
where
2 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c)
@c
  V2 (a) @ (c)
@c

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From these three equations we obtain
V2 (a) =
s2(a)
(1+tc)
@u(c)
@c
+ u (c2) +
2u(c1)
((c1)+1)
2(c1)
((c1)+1)
+  (c2) +
s2(a)
(1+tc)
@(c)
@c

V1 (a) =
u (c1) + 1V2 (a)
( (c1) + 1)
2 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)

@u (c)
@c
  @ (c)
@c
V2 (a)

so V2 (a) ; V1 (a) and 2 (a) are all nite at a:
From Euler equation (2.14) for agents type j = 1
@1 (a)
@a
s1 (a)
1 (a)
=  

r    (c) + 1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

(2.36)
it follows that
@1 (a)
@a

a=a
=1
as s1 (a) = 0 and all other variables in the RHS of (2.36) are nite.
Therefore, @C1(a)
@a

a=a
=1 as @V1(a)
@a

a=a
= 1 (a) <1: Indeed,
@1 (a)
@a

a=a
=1 = 1
(1 + tc)

@2u (c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @
2 (c)
@c2

@C1(a)
@a

a=a
  1
(1 + tc)
1 (a)
@ (c)
@c
Here, in the RHS all variables except @C1(a)
@a

a=a
are nite. So @C1(a)
@a

a=a
must be innite.
It follows that
@s1 (a)
@a

a=a
= r   (1 + tc) @C1(a)
@a

a=a
=1
We can now rearrange and evaluate (2.36) at a : 
1
(1 + tc)

@2u (c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @
2 (c)
@c2

@C1(a)
@a

a=a
  1
(1 + tc)
1 (a)
@ (c)
@c
!
s1 (a)
1 (a)
=  

r    (c) + 1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

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@C1(a)
@a

a=a
=
1
(1 + tc)
 
r   @s1 (a)
@a

a=a
!
=1

@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2

(1 + tc)1 (a)
 
s1 (a) r   s1 (a) @s1 (a)
@a

a=a
!
  s1 (a) @ (c)
@c
=   (1 + tc)

r    (c) + 1

2 (a)
1 (a)
  1

From this equation
s1 (a) r  
(1 + tc)1 (a)

s1 (a)
@(c)
@c
  (1 + tc)

r    (c) + 1

2(a)
1(a)
  1


@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2

= s1 (a)
@s1 (a)
@a
we take the limit
lim
a!a
s1 (a)
@s1 (a)
@a
=
(1 + tc)
2 ((r    (c))1 (a) + 1 (2 (a)  1 (a)))
@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2
= tax1 :
The limit is nite as all variables in RHS are nite. As Achdou et al. (2018) show
lim
a!a
(s1 (a))
2
a  a = 2s1 (a)
@s1 (a)
@a
=
2
(1 + tc)
2 ((r    (c))1 (a) + 1 (2 (a)  1 (a)))
@2u(c)
@c2
  V1 (a) @2(c)@c2
= 2tax1
so that
(s1 (a))
2  2tax1 (a  a)
and
s1 (a)   
p
2tax1
p
a  a
Therefore
c1 (a) =
1
(1 + tc)
(ra+ y1 + s1 (a))  1
(1 + tc)

ra+ y1  
p
2tax1
p
a  a

@c1 (a)
@a
= 1
(1 + tc)
 
r  
s
tax1
2 (a  a)
!
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Chapter 3
Macroprudential Policy and Banking
Crises
146
Abstract
This paper studies macroprudential policy in a macro-model with a heterogeneous
banking sector, prone to asymmetric information and moral hazard a la Boissay et.al.
(2016). This model is shown to generate nancial crises when a sequence of small positive
technology shocks can lead to an increase in lending, as well as to a reduction in all
market rates. This paper investigates a scope for a macroprudential policy that would
reduce probability of a nancial crisis, but not lead to a too sharp reduction in a social
welfare. It demonstrates that the introduction of a direct proportional tax on interbank
lending can substantially reduce the amount of credit and reduce probability of a nancial
crisis.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, Lending Boom, Credit Crunch, Bank-
ing Crisis, Macroprudential Policy
JEL Reference Number: E32, E44, G01, G21
3.1 Introduction
The nancial crisis of 2009 has highlighted the failure of early literature to build quantita-
tively sound models to demonstrated vulnerability of economies to nancial shocks. The
last decade of economic research has led the rapid growth of models aiming to explain how
a sequence of shocks can lead to a deep and prolong recession combined with a nancial
crisis.
One strand of the emerging literature is mainly concerned with demonstrating how
the nancial system can propagate the impact of adverse shock and spread it, lead-
ing to a signicant decrease in economic activity. This literature begins with Mishkin
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(1978), Bernanke (1983) and Gertler (1988), and demonstrates how bank balance sheet
and collateral constraints (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999) can amplify shocks
to have quantitatively important macroeconomic consequences. Post-crisis literature has
shifted towards more explicit modelling of nancial intermediaries, including their fragility,
leading to occasional defaults (crises), see Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Jermann and
Quadrini (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, 2015), Akinci and Queralto (2017) and
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) to mention only a few.
This literature has shown how a particular shock can cause a nancial crisis with a
deep recession, but it failed to discuss how such shock may come along. They do not relate
to the stylized fact uncovered in Schularik and Taylor (2012) that a nancial crisis is a
rare event that follows a long period of credit growth. A credit boom can lead to a buildup
of fragilities in the nancial system (Lorenzoni, 2008) or a high level of accumulated debt
can lead to changes in economic behavior around the point of potential instability of debt
(Gorton and Ordoñez, 2014).
In a recent paper Boissay, Collard and Smets (2016) demonstrate how a crisis can
follow a credit boom caused by a sequence of standard, not necessarily large, technology
shocks. In this model, the interbank market intermediates lending to rms. Banks are
heterogeneous in their e¢ ciency and are prone to asymmetric information and moral haz-
ard problems. Positive (and persistent) technology shock leads to an increase in lending,
as well as to a decrease in all market rates. Lower interest rates exacerbate agency prob-
lems of banks and the interbank market closes. This leads to a sharp decline in lending,
the nancial crisis and recession. The model is non-linear, with an occasionally binding
constraint, but it allows a numerical analysis of the implied probability of a nancial
crisis.
Boissay et.al. (2016) does not have overborrowingin the sense of Lorenzoni (2008)
or Bianchi and Mendoza (2012), since a social planner with access to a state-contingent
taxation will not reduce the amount of credit, but rather extend it, which will result in
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higher probability of a nancial crisis. The output loss due to the crisis can be mitigated
by an appropriate design of taxes and subsidies.
We, therefore, are exploring the possibility for a di¤erent type of macroprudential
policy, a policy that would reduce the likelihood of a nancial crisis, while not lead
to a too sharp reduction in social welfare. We demonstrate that the introduction of
a direct proportional tax on interbank lending can substantially reduce the volume of
credit and reduce the probability of a nancial crisis. The tax a¤ects this probability
through two main channels. First, it shifts the crisis threshold boundaryupward - the
interbank market will withstand a greater overlending, so the economy would need to
accumulate more assets before the interest rate drops low enough for the interbank market
to freeze. Second, the level of the steady state overlendingwill decrease: the level of
assets in the stochastic steady state is lower at a higher tax rate on interbank lending.
As a result, the distancebetween the state in which the economy spends most of the
time and the boundary of a rare event unambiguously rises. Although the rate of asset
accumulation interest rate is increasing, this e¤ect is relatively small, and the overall
impact of macroprudential policies on the economy is positive. Although we expect that
macroprudential policies to create higher costs for nancial intermediation, we nd that
in our environment a moderate increase in tax rates leads to an increase in social welfare
in a stochastic steady state.
In this model, increasing the tax rate on interbank lending reduces both supply and
demand of funds in the interbank market. More banks will leave the interbank market
to directly lend to rms, reducing supply of funds. In a model with asymmetric informa-
tion and moral hazard, the demand for loans may rise with higher interbank rate, since
each bank is able to borrow more due to incentive participation constraint. With higher
taxes on interbank lending, however, the incentive participation constraint for lenders is
tightened, so the market funding ratio falls. This e¤ect dominates the overall e¤ect on
demand, and the demand for funds falls with a higher tax on lending. The equilibrium
interbank rate increases, and so all other interest rates. The e¢ ciency of the marginal
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bank rises as more banks switch to nance rms directly. In stochastic steady state the
total amount of lending and capital falls, as well as output and labour. Consumption also
falls, but the social welfare rises, as the disutility of labour dominates the period utility.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model. We then briey
discuss how to solve the model in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents results and section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model follows Boissay et al. (2013). It is based on the standard RBC-type model
but with heterogeneous banking sector. Households sector is homogeneous, it consumes
and supplies labour to rms, and it saves in the form of deposits. The production sector
is standard with continuum of identical perfectly competitive rms which take loans to
rent capital, employ labour and produce. The banking sector, however is heterogeneous,
with di¤erent privately-known e¢ ciency levels of each bank. The banking sector attracts
deposits from households, issues loans to rms, but is also engaged into wholesale trade
at an interbank market. We consider the detailed set up in this section.
3.2.1 Households
All households are identical and are innitely lived. Households have preferences over
consumption and labour and maximize utility
E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct; ht) (3.1)
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where utility function u (ct; ht) satises the usual regularity conditions, i.e. u0c (ct; ht) > 0;
u00c (ct; ht) < 0: Parameter  < 1 is the household discount factor, and E0 is conditional
expectations operator.
At the beginning of each period household has assets at; it supplies labour ht with
trending labour productivity 	t and is paid the wage rate wt: The household consumes
ct: The budget constraint is therefore
ct + at+1 = ~rtat + wt	tht + t + gt + Tt: (3.2)
There are no nancial frictions between banks and households and nancial wealth and
at can be thought of either bank deposits or bank equity. Households lend to banks at
gross deposit rate rt > 1 which will be later endogenously determined. The after-tax real
rate is
~rt = (1 + (rt   1) (1   t)) :
Here t is lump-sum transfer that corresponds to banksintermediation cost, Tt is transfer
which corresponds to tax rebate, Tt = (rt   1) tat; and gt collects all other transfers.
Households optimize objective (3.1) subject to constraint (3.2) and the optimization
problem is standard and yields the following rst order conditions:
wt =   1
	t
uh (ct; ht)
uc (ct; ht)
uc (ct; ht) = uc (ct+1; ht+1) ~rt+1 (3.3)
ct + at+1 = ~rtat + wt	tht + t + t + gt + Tt (3.4)
which are the labour supply equation, consumption Euler equation and equation describ-
ing accumulation of household wealth.
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3.2.2 Firms
All rms are identical and live for one period only. Each rm produces a homogeneous
good that can either be consumed or invested, and used factors of production capital kt
and labour ht. Production technology is given by production function eztF (kt; ht) : The
level of total factor productivity is determined by a technology shock which follows an
AR(1) process
zt = zzt 1 + "t
where jzj < 1 and "t is standard normal stochastic innovation. "t is realized before the
rm decides on the production plan.
Capital depreciates at rate 0 <  < 1: The rm is born at the beginning of the period
and needs to borrow capital kt from the bank at gross corporate loan rate Rt > 1 which
will be determined later. The corporate loan is repaid at the end of the period, Rtkt > kt.
Firms rent labour services at the wage rate wt:
The prot maximization problem of a rm is standard and can be written as follows
max
ht;kt
E0
1X
t=0
 (eztF (kt; ht) + (1  ) kt   wt	tht  Rtkt) :
Firms produce, pay wages and pay banks at the end of the period, they also keep (1  ) kt
after one period.
The rst order conditions to the rm optimization problem are standard, they yield
	twt = e
ztFh (kt; ht) ; (3.5)
Rt = e
ztFk (kt; ht) + 1  ; (3.6)
which determine demand for labour and capital.
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3.2.3 Banking sector
The banking sector is heterogeneous. Banks di¤er in respect to banking (intermediation)
technology. They are involved in two types of activity: they do retail banking by attracting
household deposits and lending to rms, and they participate in an interbank market and
reallocate funds among themselves. There are asymmetric information and moral hazard
problems for banks which a¤ect the work of the interbank market. In retail banking
business, banks own capital which they rent to rms. They also collect households
deposits and issue loans to rms, that are used to rent capital from banks. The model of
the banking sector is one-period.
Interbank rate
There is a continuum of risk-neutral banks which exist for one period between t  1 and t
and die at the end of period t. When banks are born at the beginning of the period they
are identical and each of them attracts the same amount of deposits. Then they draw a
random level of intermediation skill, or the level of e¢ ciency p, 0  p  1:
The individual level of e¢ ciency is privately known, and only the distribution of ps is
a public knowledge. The distribution is described by a cumulative density function  (p)
such that  (0) = 0;  (1) = 1; 0 (p) > 0:
Bank p pays an intermediation cost (1  p)R per unit of corporate loan at the end of
period t so that its e¤ective gross return on loan is pR: (Most e¢ cient banks will have p
close to one.) The intermediation cost is rebated to household in the form of lump-sum
transfers t: This intermediation cost reects monitoring costs that banks have as loan
providers and loan services.
153
Bank indexed p borrows maximum amount xt from households and can borrow a
fraction of xt; xtt, at the interbank market at gross interbank lending rate t > 1. It
also pays proportional tax on interbank borrowing, regulated by variable t < 1; so that
the regulator gets xttt which is rebated to households: If this amount is lent to rms
at rate Rt, the revenue is pRtxt (1 + t) ttxt xttt and the after-tax rate of return
is pRt (1 + t)  tt tt: Alternatively, the bank can lend everything at the interbank
market achieving the rate of return 1 + (t   1)t where 0  1 t  1 is an interbank
lending tax.
The interbank lending tax is a macroprudential policy tool. It is proportional tax paid
on net interest income. Tax receipts are then rebated to households in the form of lump
sum transfers. If the interbank interest rate t falls below one, t regulates a proportional
subsidy paid from lump-sum taxes levied on households.
The banks return on deposits is rt is a function of banks e¢ ciency p :
rt (p) = maxfpRt (1 + t)  tt   tt; 1 + (t   1)tg: (3.7)
The marginal banker is indi¤erent between lending to rms and to the interbank
market so that
pRt (1 + t)  tt   tt = 1 + (t   1)t
is a participation constraint which determines the e¢ ciency level of the marginal banker
pt and can be written as
pt =
1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)
: (3.8)
Banks with pt < pt do not participate in lending to rms and sell deposits at the interbank
market only. The direct e¤ect of higher interbank lending taxes results in a reduction in
pt so that more banks choose to lend to rms directly. Higher tax on interbank borrowing
increases the number of interbank participating banks and increases the average e¢ ciency
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of banks that lend directly to rms, as the marginal bank has to have higher e¢ ciency to
be indi¤erent between lending to rms directly and lending at the interbank market with
higher costs.
As an outside option, banks can use storage facilityunder gross rate ;  < 1 +
(t   1)t: Banks can divert the whole amount (1 + t)xt; at the end of the period get
 (1 + t)xt; and try to keep it. The investments into the storage facility cannot be traced
and cannot be seized by creditors. Keeping funds in the storage facility is also costly, so
the banks may end up keeping only  (1 + t)xt   (1 + t)xt; as 0    1: Here 
is the cost of diversion, when  = 1 then the bank keeps the whole amount, and when
 = 0 the bank cannot keep the return on the whole amount of the diverted interbank
borrowing. The existence of the storage facility gives rise to a moral hazard problem, as
the gain from diversion increases with the amount diverted, t, and the opportunity cost
of diversion increases with bank e¢ ciency and the relative return, Rt   : Most e¢ cient
banks will prefer to operate as normal, but ine¢ cient banks may nd attractive to divert
funds.
There is an asymmetric information problemwhen bankse¢ ciency is privately known,
and lenders cannot observe and verify it. Therefore, all contracts signed at the interbank
market are the same for all banks. The market funding ratio t and the interbank rate t
does not depend on the level of bank e¢ ciency p. As lenders want to prevent borrowers
from using the storage facility, they impose upper limit on borrowing so that even most
ine¢ cient banks with p < pt will not nd borrowing and then diverting protable. In
other words, the return on diversion should be less then the return on interbank activity,
so the banks do not attempt to divert and instead participate in the standardbanking
activity. The incentive compatibility constraint can be written as
 (1 + t)  1 + (t   1)t: (3.9)
This constraint always binds, so that it satises with equality
 (1 + t) = 1 + (t   1)t:
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It follows that the amount of interbank borrowing is determined by:
t =
1   + (t   1)t

: (3.10)
Lower return on interbank lending due to taxes results in lower market funding ratio.
Together, constraints (3.10) and (3.8) determine the bank p decision to participate in
the interbank market and how much to borrow.
Equilibrium at the interbank market.
Banks with e¢ ciency p are distributed over [0,1], with cumulative distribution  (p) : The
mass of participating banks with ability above p, m (p) is therefore can be written as
m (p) =
Z 1
p
d =  (1)   (p) = 1   (p)
With the e¢ ciency level of the marginal banker pt; a mass  (pt) lend xt and the
aggregate supply of funds is  (pt)xt: A mass 1    (pt) borrow txt and the aggregate
demand is (1   (pt))txt: The market clears when demand is equal to supply and
 (pt)xt = (1   (pt))txt; (3.11)
which can be rewritten as


1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)

=

1  

1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)

1 + (t   1)t   

:
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Using it, we can determine the gross return on loans to rms:
Rt =
1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
(1 + t)
 1

1+(t 1)t 
(( 1)+1+(t 1)t)
 = 
(t;t; t) ; (6)
where t is determined from equation (3.10).
For given t and t this equation has ve solutions. Two do not satisfy  < 1 +
(t   1)t; one always exists: Rt =  (no trade at the interbank market) and another
two which may not exist. There is a threshold Rt = 
(t; t;t) when these two solutions
are identical and with further reduction in Rt they disappear and there is no trade at the
interbank market. In other words, the line Rt = 
(t; t; t;t) is U-shaped in t, and
there exists a limit below which there is no trade at the interbank market.
Finally, the banking sectors return on equity xt is given by
rt =
Z 1
0
rt (p) d (p) =
8<:
R 1
pt
pRt (1 + t) d (p)
(3.11)
=
R 1
pt
pRt
(1 (pt))d (p) ; if trade existsR 1

Rt
pRtd (p) +
R 
Rt
0 d (p) = Rt
R 1

Rt
pd (p) + 


Rt

; no trade
(3.12)
In the second case the interbank market is shut, so the funding ratio t = 0; but e¢ cient
banks with e¢ ciency level p  
Rt
still lend to the corporate sector. Ine¢ cient banks use
storage technology. In equilibrium no diversion of funds happens, as the participation
constraint holds.
Parameterization
In all numerical results we assume the standard Cobb-Douglas functional form for the
production function:
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F (kt; ht; zt) = e
ztkt (	tht)
1 
so that its derivatives are:
Fh (kt; ht; zt) = (1  )	teztkt (	tht) 
Fk (kt; ht; zt) = e
ztk 1t (	tht)
1  :
We assume the following utility function:
u (ct; ht) =
1
1  

ct   #	t h
1+
t
1 + 
1 
with derivatives
uc (ct; ht) =

ct   #	t h
1+
t
1 + 
 
uh (ct; ht) =  #	tht

ct   #	t h
1+
t
1 + 
 
:
Finally, the cumulative distribution function of the bank e¢ ciency is determined by
 (p) = p:
3.2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
In our model all households and all rms are identical, and each of them is of unit mass.
As a consequence, aggregation across agents implies: kt = 	tKt; ct = 	tCt; ht = Ht;
at = 	tAt, where capital letters indicate aggregate quantities.
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Aggregate supply of corporate loans
If the interbank market is open then all banks nance total capital Kt with At, if the
market is shut, then only e¢ cient banks supply capital to rms. Therefore, the amount
of capital supplied by banks can be written as
Kst =
(
At; if trade existsR 1

Rt
Atd (p) = At

 (1)  


Rt

= At

1  


Rt

When Rt = Rt and the market freezes, then At = At which is the maximum quantity
of assets which the bank can reallocate e¢ ciently, called the absorption capacity of the
banking sector.
Using parameterization above and solving (3.6) for capital yields
Kdt =

1  
#
 1



Rt +    1
 +
(1 )
e
1+
(1 ) zt =  te
1+
(1 ) zt (3.13)
where coe¢ cient
 t =

1  
#
 1

 
 
Rt +    1
! +(1 )
depends on taxation t; and the volume of trade t via R; where R is the lowestpoint
where the interbank market trade exists.
Transfers
Appendix demonstrates that lump-sum transfer that corresponds to banksintermediation
cost t can be written as
t =

At (Rt   rt) ; trade
At (Rt   rt)  (At  Kt) (Rt   ) ; no trade ;
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tax rebate transfers are
Tt = (rt   1) tat;
and the remaining transfers are
gt = ((t   1) (1 t) + t) att:
3.3 Solving the Decentralized Problem
3.3.1 Equilibrium Conditions
Appendix demonstrates that the aggregation of rst order conditions, accounting for
transfers and using the parameterization, yields the following system.
trade no trade
1 Ct +  At+1 = eztKt h
1 
t + (1  )Kt +  (At  Kt) + ((t   1) (1 t) + t)tAt
2 Rt = eztK 1t H
1 
t + 1  
3

Ct   #H
1+
t
1+
 
=   Et

Ct+1   #H
1+
t+1
1+
 
(1 + (rt+1   1) (1   t+1))
4 Ht =

(1 )
#
eztKt
 1
+
5 Kt = At Kt = At

1 


Rt

6 rt = Rt (+1)
(1 p+1t )
(1 pt )
rt = Rt

+p+1t
+1

7 t =
ptRt(1+t) 1+t tt
(t+t)
t = 
8 pt =
1 +(t 1)t
(( 1)+1+(t 1)t) pt =

Rt
9 t =
pt
(1 pt )
t = 0
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3.3.2 Occasionally Binding Constraint
Appendix demonstrates that relationships between pt; t; Rt yield the following function
of interest rate as a function of interbank rate
Rt =


(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1
 1


 (1 t)
 + (1 + (t   1)t   )
(3.14)
+t

 (t   1)
 + (1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1

+t

1  
 + 1   + (t   1)t

which describes a U-shaped function Rt = Rt (t). We can nd its minimum with coor-
dinates (t; Rt): Then the e¢ ciency level of the marginal banker pt is determined from
equation:
pmin =

1 + (t   1)t   
( (   1) + 1 + (t   1)t)
 1

and equation (3.13) yields the boundary
At =

1  
#
 1



Rt +    1
 +
(1 )
e
1+
(1 ) zt =  te
1+
(1 ) zt
It is clear that the level of interbank taxes t and t a¤ect the boundary trough interest
rate Rt: If there is trade then t < 1;t > 0 and t = 1;t = 0 if the interbank market
is shut.
Boundary At is binding, when interest rate Rt occasionally moves down so that the
interbank market shuts down. The boundary conditions on the left side of the boundary
can be determined from equations
pt =
1 + (t   1)t   
( (   1) + 1 + (t   1)t)
;
t =
ptRt (1 + t)  1 + t   tt
(t + t)
;
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t =
pt 
1  pt
 ;
rt = Rt

+ 1
 
1  p+1t
 
1  pt

that determine pt; t; Rt; rt in the tradedomain. As we know the limit R; we can compute
other variables.
However, the problem is not symmetric. Equations
pt =

Rt
t = 
t = 0
rt = Rt

+ p+1t
+ 1

determine pt; t; Rt; rt in the no tradedomain. At the right from boundary At :
 = 
p =

R
 = 0
r = R

+ p+1
+ 1

However, as we do not know R; we can only compute these values numerically, as a limit
of the solution in the no tradearea.
3.3.3 Calibration and Numerical Solution
Parameters follows Boissay et.al. (2016) and are given in the following table
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adjusted discount factor    1/1.03
capital share  0.3
elasticity of labour supply  0.5
rate of depreciation  0.1
parameter of bank e¢ ciency function  21.5
parameter in diversion function  0.093
growth rate of the economy  1.012
relative weight of disutility of labour # 0.945
intertemporal elasticity of substitution  4.5
return on storage facility  0.9417
persistence of technology shock z 0.98
standard deviation of shock innovation z 0.013
We solve the non-linear problem numerically using projection methods. All unknown
function are parameterized as functions of two states, asset position At and the level
of technology zt: We then solve generalized Euler equations on the grid. As the model
has occasionally binding constraint, we parameterized functions using splines, as they
have shown better performance than Chebyshev Polynomials. The solution algorithm is
described in Appendix.
3.4 Results
To investigate the role of the proposed macroprudential policy it is instructive to compare
the allocation generated by our model to several well known benchmark allocations. Main
results are summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Table 3.1 compares steady state allocation
for several important models, that are closely related to the one we consider here. Table 3.2
provides steady state e¤ects of the proposed macroprudential regulation in the stochastic
setting.
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3.4.1 Real Business Cycles Model
The decentralized model with interbank market collapses to the standard Real Business
Cycles (Kydland and Prescott, 1982) model once nancial frictions are removed. This
version of RBC model can be summarized by the following set of equations
At = Kt
rt = Rt
Ht =

(1  )
#
eztKt
 1
+

Ct   #H
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   Et

Ct+1   #H
1+
t+1
1 + 
 
rt+1
Rt = e
ztK 1t H
1 
t + 1  
Ct +  Kt+1 = e
ztKt H
1 
t + (1  )Kt
Solution algorithm is discussed in Appendix and the steady state allocation is given in
column (1) in Table 3.1. This model generates the highest consumption and utility levels,
it also generates steady state level of assets well above the absorption capacity boundary
A:
3.4.2 Constrained E¢ cient Equilibrium
It is instructive to look at constrained e¢ cient allocation in our model. The central planner
chooses assets, consumption, labour and capital to maximize the household utility subject
to the household budget constraint. The central planner knows the e¤ect of household
consumption and saving decisions on market rates, and therefore on bankse¢ ciency. In
this equilibrium the policymaker solves the following problem:
maxEt
1X
t=0
tu (Ct; Ht) = maxEt
1X
t=0
t
1
1  

Ct   #H
1+
t
1 + 
1 
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subject to constraints
trade no trade
1 Ct +  At+1 = eztKt H
1 
t + (1  )Kt +  (At  Kt)
2 Rt = eztK 1t H
1 
t + (1  )
3 Kt = At Kt = At

1 


Rt

Solution is given in Appendix. We arrive to the following system of rst order condi-
tions.
In trade area:
Rt = e
ztK 1t h
1 
t + (1  ) (3.15)
ht =

(1  )
#
eztKt
 1
+
(3.16)
Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   Et

Ct+1   #h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 
Rt+1 (3.17)
 t+1At+1 = e
ztKt h
1 
t + (1  )Kt   Ct (3.18)
Note that because the labour allocation is the same as in the decentralized equilibrium,
the values of ; R; A do not change.
In no trade (crisis) area:
Rt = e
ztK 1t h
1 
t + (1  ) (3.19)
pt =

Rt
(3.20)
ht =

(1  )
#
eztKt
 1
+

1 + 
pt
1  pt
Rt   
Rt
 1
+
(3.21)
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
Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   Et

Ct+1   #h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 
(3.22)
Rt+1

1  Rt+1   
Rt+1
pt+1

1 +  (1  ) Rt+1   (1  )
Rt+1

 t+1At+1 = e
ztKt h
1 
t + (1  )Kt +  (At  Kt)  Ct (3.23)
This nonlinear system can be solved numerically and the result labelled CE is presented
in column (2) in Table 3.1. It is apparent that this equilibrium generates lower household
welfare than the standard RBC model without nancial frictions. Both consumption and
labor are reduced and interest rate spread is positive. The steady state level of assets is
close to the absorption capacity boundary A: In a stochastic setting this model has much
higher probability of a nancial crisis.
3.4.3 Optimal State Contingent Tax on Savings
Given the crisis boundary A and high probability of crossing it, the central planner may
tax the return on saving with  t > 0 and give incentives to households to dissave.
If the interbank market open then the central planner decides on  t+1, but because it
only enters the consumption Euler equation, we assume that the policymaker choose the
optimal consumption plan, and then the tax can be chosen consistent with the plan.
We, therefore, form the following Lagrangian:
Et
1X
t=0
t
0BB@
1
1 

Ct   #1+

(1 )
#
ezt (At)

 1+
+
1 
+1t

e
+1
+
zt

(1 )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Ct   At+1 

1CCA
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other variables can be found as functions of Ct; At:
The FOCs describe the evolution of the economy under optimal taxation:
U t =

 
EtU t+1
 


(1  )
#
 1 
+
e
+1
+
zt+1A
  1
+
t+1 + (1  )
!
(3.24)
Ut = Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
eztAt
 1+
+
(3.25)
 At+1 = e
+1
+
zt

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Ct (3.26)
We now nd the optimal tax rate, consistent with this dynamics of the economy. From
equations (3.24) with (3.26) optimal future tax is
 t+1 = Rt+1
 +  (1  pt+1) (  Rt+1pt+1)
 ( (1 Rt+1) + 1) +Rt+1 (1  pt+1) (  Rt+1pt+1)
it depends on pt:
At the boundary
 =
R
 
 +  (1  pmin)
 
   Rpmin


 

 
1  R+ 1+ R (1  pmin)     Rpmin
and the denominator is not zero, which can be checked numerically.
If the interbank market is shut, the decentralized equilibrium can be described by the
following system:
Ct +  t+1At+1 =
 
(1  )
#
 1 
+1
eztAt
 
1  pt
! +1+
+(1     )At
 
1  pt

+ At
Rt = 

1  
#
 1 
+  
At
 
1  pt
  1
+ e
1+
+
zt + (1  )
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Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt
 
At
 
1  pt
 1++! 
=   t+1
 
Ct+1   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt+1
 
At+1
 
1  pt+1
 1++! 
 (1 + (rt+1   1) (1   t+1))
rt = Rt

+ p+1t
+ 1

pt =

Rt
As before, the central planner decides on  t+1, but because it only enters the consump-
tion Euler equation, we assume that the policymaker choose the optimal consumption
plan, and then the tax can be chosen consistent with the plan.
We, therefore, form the following Lagrangian:
1X
t=0
t
0@ 1
1  
 
Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt

At
 
1  pt
 1++!1 
+1t
0@ (1  )
#
 1 
+1
eztAt
 
1  pt
! +1+
+ (1  )At
  (1     )Atpt   Ct   At+1 t+1

+2t
 
(1  ) + 

1  
#
 1 
+
e
1+
+
zt
 
At
 
1  pt
  1
+  Rt
!
+ 4t (Rtpt   )
!
where we do not include equation for rt as constraints, as it can be found as functions of
Ct; At; Rt; pt:
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The rst order conditions yield the system which describes the evolution of the econ-
omy under optimal taxation:
ht =

(1  )
#
eztAt
 
1  pt
 1+
(3.27)
U t =

 
U t+1
0BB@
 
1  pt+1

(Rt+1   )Rt+1
Rt+1 + (1  ) (Rt+1   (1  )) p

t+1
(1 pt+1)

+
 + 
1CCA (3.28)
At+1 = e
+1
+
zt

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t
 
1  pt
 +1
+ (3.29)
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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Rtpt =  (3.31)
We now nd the optimal tax rate, consistent with this dynamics of the economy.
Compare equation (3.24) with (3.28). They must be identical for consistency of the
model. This condition gives us the equation for optimal taxes
 t =
Rt
+p+1t
+1
  
Rt
+p+1t
+1
  1
    1  pt  (Rt   )Rt
Rt   (Rt   (1  )) p

t
(1 pt )
  1
+

Rt
+p+1t
+1
  1

If there is trade, then equations (3.15)-(3.18) are equivalent to (3.24)-(3.26).
However, if there is no trade then the system (3.19)-(3.23) is not equivalent to (3.27)-
(3.31). Specically,
ht =

(1  )
#
eztAt
 
1  pt

Xt
 1
+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; optimal time-contingent taxes
The social planner creates an additional employment. The return on saving is also dif-
ferent. Under optimal taxes consumption in no tradearea is lower than in the e¢ cient
equilibrium, so that inability of the policymaker to manipulate labour results in exces-
sive taxation. Lower tax rate would improve the no tradesituation but will not bring
enough taxes to subsidize the tradesituation, where the economy spends most of the
time. Manipulating labour supply is more e¢ cient than imposing state-contingent tax on
savings.
To summarize, as the no tradeallocation is di¤erent, the optimal taxation cannot
replicate the centralized equilibrium. It is optimal to subsidize households in the trade
area and tax in the crisis area. Column (3) in Table 3.1, with solution labelled OT,
illustrates it clearly. Given proximity of the steady state level of assets to absorption
capacity of the banking sector, this model generates high probability of a nancial crisis.
3.4.4 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
The benchmark calibration of the decentralized model yields steady state allocation pre-
sented in column (4) in Table 3.1 and the stochastic allocation is given in column (1) in
Table 3.2. Financial frictions and inability to use state-contingent taxes result in lowest
consumption and welfare levels out of the four regimes considered by now.
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RBC CE OT DC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
assets a 3.711 3.338 3.379 2.776
consumption c 1.192 1.148 1.142 1.055
labor h 1.124 1.101 1.082 1.008
loan rate R 1.030 1.042 1.036 1.048
deposit rate r 1.030 1.012 1.012 1.030
spread R  r 0.000 0.030 0.024 0.018
interbank rate   0.968 0.976 1.007
e¢ ciency p  0.929 0.942 0.961
trade volume   0.303 0.389 0.745
welfare W -284.8 -341.6 -310.6 -347.9
boundary A  3.390 3.390 3.390
min. loan rate R  1.035 1.035 1.035
min. interb. rate   0.975 0.975 0.975
min. bank e¤. pmin  0.942 0.942 0.942
Table 3.1: Steady State Values for Di¤erent Equilibria
Tax Rate t: 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
assets a 2.7581 2.7286 2.6974 2.6609 2.6127
consumption c 1.0496 1.0448 1.0398 1.0341 1.0255
labor h 1.0024 0.9989 0.9941 0.9893 0.9822
loan rate R 1.0492 1.0500 1.0508 1.0518 1.0532
deposit rate r 1.0306 1.0317 1.0328 1.0343 1.0361
spread R  r 0.0186 0.0183 0.0180 0.0175 0.0171
interbank rate  1.0060 1.0076 1.0093 1.0114 1.0139
e¢ ciency p 0.9588 0.9596 0.9605 0.9616 0.9627
trade volume  0.7302 0.7483 0.7690 0.7939 0.8232
welfare W -363.9 -362.5 -361.3 -359.6 -358.6
probability P 2.2842 1.9468 1.7120 1.3952 1.1612
boundary A 3.390 3.412 3.437 3.466 3.498
min. loan rate R 1.035 1.035 1.034 1.034 1.033
min. interb. rate  0.975 0.973 0.971 0.970 0.967
min. bank e¤. pmin 0.942 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941
Table 3.2: The E¤ect of Interbank Lending Fee on Stochastic Steady State in Decen-
tralaised Competitive Equilibrium
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Figure 3.1: Typical dynamic path of the economy around the crisis boundary.
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Our calibration was chosen to replicate the probability to hit boundary At to be 2.3%
as reported in BCS.
A su¢ ciently long sequence of highly persistent technology shock results in low interest
rate on corporate loans that falls below the threshold Rt: Technology shocks triggering
crisis are not particularly large, just positive. Interbank market close, the amount of funds
channeled to rms contracts and the price of capital rises. Interest rate Rt rises above
the threshold and the interbank market reopens. A typical path of key macroeconomic
variables to nancial recession is plotted in Figure 3.1. The time scale is normalized such
that the interbank market closes in period zero.
Monte Carlo simulations show that the market feelsthe approach of the boundary 
the behavior is highly non-linear in all pre-crisis years. A sequence of positive technology
shocks drive all interest rates down. Households reduce saving and increase consumption
before getting to close to the crisis boundary. Closer to the threshold households realize
that the face a large reduction in income should the nancial recession materialize and so
they reduce consumption to save and hedge themselves against a possible recession. The
dis-saving however is not fast enough, it does not lead to an increase of interest rate and
does not allow to avoid the crisis. This happens because households do not internalize
the e¤ect of their actions on banks and then on the overall economy. The hedging is only
partial and consumption falls when the interbank market shuts.
Consider imposing an interbank lending tax which is a proportional tax imposed on
the net interest income from lending activity. We describe the tax by a return variable
t: If the interbank market is open then then t < 1 while if the interbank market is shut
then t  1:
To understand how the proposed macroprudential policy works, it is instructive to
consider the interbank market clearing condition (3.11). Using parameterization this
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Figure 3.2: Interbank Market Clearing
equation can be rewritten as
xt

1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)

| {z }
Supply
=
Extensive Marginz }| {
xt
 
1 

1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)
!

Intensive Marginz }| {
1 + (t   1)t   
| {z }
Demand
(3.32)
where the expression
1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)

=

 + t + t
Rt
+ 
((1  )    t)  t
Rt ( + 1   + (t   1)t)

describes the supply of funds given loan rate Rt and where we substituted the market
funding ratio from equation (3.10). The supply of funds is an unambiguously increasing
function of t as the rst term numerically dominates the second. It is plotted with solid
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line in Panel A in Figure 3.2. As interbank lending taxes are imposed on net return and
become a subsidy when the gross interest rate t falls below one, lower t reduces supply
for t > 1 and increases supply for t < 1; so that it pivots supply and makes it atter
for a given loan rate Rt:
The aggregate demand is a¤ected by t via two channels. First, the aggregate demand
decreases with the interbank rate as fewer banks will want to borrow, see Panel B in Figure
3.2. Second, the higher interbank rate increases aggregate demand as each borrower is able
to borrow more with higher interest rate, see Panel C in Figure 3.2. Lower t makes both
lines atter, increasing the extensive margin, and reducing intensive margin for t > 1.
The total demand for funds is hump-shaped, see Panel D, and higher interbank taxes
increase it everywhere except small positive t   1; where the e¤ect of intensive margin
dominates and the volume of trade falls with rising interbank lending taxes (lower t).
Panel E plots demand and supply for equilibrium loan rate Rt = 1:049 and demonstrates
that there are two equilibria, with t > 1 in the relevant equilibrium. A close inspection
shows that, given Rt; both demand and supply fall in the neighborhood of the equilibrium
with t > 1 as discussed above. As a result, higher interbank lending taxes are likely to
increase the equilibrium interbank rate t in the steady state, which is indeed the case,
see Table 3.2.
Moreover, these two equilibria may not exist if interest rate falls below certain thresh-
old Rt; as Panel F, which plots demand and supply forRt = Rt = 1:035. A close inspection
of this panel suggests that demand and supply lines in the economy with interbank lend-
ing taxes still intersect, so the threshold interest rate Rt should fall with lower t: This
is, indeed, the case, see Table 3.1.
Figure 3.3 summarizes these results. Market clearing condition (3.32) is solved with
respect to the loan rate to yield Rt = 
(t;t; t) ; which is U-shaped in t >  area, as
plotted with solid line in Panel A in Figure 3.3. With lower t this line moves down-left,
and the minimum Rt at which the trade is possible is also going down-left, see the the
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Figure 3.3: The E¤ect of Interbank Lending Tax on Threshold Characteristics of the
Interbank Market, and on Probability of Financial Crises
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top left panel in Figure 3.3 which plots the market clearing condition Rt = 
(t;t; t)
for two cases t = 1 and t = 0:8 with solid and dashed lines respectively: The threshold
Rt = 
(t; t) below which the trade cannot happen is shown by large dots on each
line in Panel A, and as a function of the interbank tax size in Panel B. The threshold
interbank rate t also falls. The e¢ ciency level of the marginal banker pmin and the
market funding ratio t at the threshold fall. Lower threshold interest rate on loans Rt
increase the absorption capacity A and allows agents to accumulate more assets before
the threshold is achieved and the interbank market closes, see Panel E in Figure 3.3. As
a result of higher threshold, the boundary A it is likely to be achieved less frequently, and
the probability of nancial crises should go down with t. Panel F in Figure 3.3 conrms
that this is exactly what happens.
However, the frequency at which the absorption capacity A is achieved is also a¤ected
by the steady state allocation, as it determines the actual distanceto the threshold, and
how large is the speedof movement of the economy to boundary A.
It turns out that the second e¤ect works in the same direction as the threshold e¤ect
described above. Higher interbank taxes result in higher interbank rate in the stochastic
steady state (see Table 3.2), which drives up loan and deposit rates. The higher de-
posit rate and the intertemporal substitution e¤ect makes households to consume less in
equilibrium. Lower current consumption results in lower current demand, and so lower
output, capital; and labour demand. At the same time, the e¢ ciency of the marginal
bank falls as less e¢ cient banks leave the interbank market and nance rms directly.
The overall supply of credit in this economy falls. At the same time, less e¢ cient banks
leave the interbank market and nance rms directly. The supply of credit is allocated to
its best users. The market funding ratio  (which determines the trade volume) rises and
the interest rate spread a measure of nancial frictions reduces with higher interbank
lending tax. As a result, there is no increase in accumulated assets in the stochastic steady
state, they decrease with higher taxes and lower t.
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We therefore, obtain that the steady state level of assets  around this state the
economy spends most of the time goes down, while the absorption capacity level goes
up. Although all interest rates go up and so the speedto move towards At increases,
this e¤ect is limited, and the overall probability of a nancial crisis goes down.
Although it is expected that a macroprudential policy would lead to a deterioration
of welfare, as new frictions and constraints are imposed, the results reported in Table
3.2 suggest the opposite. This is explained by greater reduction in hours worked, and so
higher utility of leisure outweighs disutility of lower consumption.
3.5 Conclusion
We discuss a regulation problem in a simple RBC-type economy with banking sector and
an interbank market, which is capable to tell a coherent story of a run up to the nancial
crisis of 2009. The unregulated model features a banking sector and a fragile interbank
market which closes should interest rate fall su¢ ciently low. When a sequence of positive
technology shocks results in capital accumulation and high volume of lending to rms 
either directly or through the interbank market the interbank interest rate falls below
the threshold, the closure of the interbank market results in sharp contraction in real
and nancial activity. We demonstrate that introducing an interbank lending tax as an
instrument of macroprudential policy results in substantial reduction of the probability of
a crisis event. Although such measures reduces the aggregate supply of credit, it promotes
the allocation of credit to its best users, and leads to higher household welfare.
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3.A Appendix: Interbank Borrowing Tax
Tax on interbank borrowing works in a di¤erent way. An interbank borrowing taxes
unambiguously raise supply of funds at the interbank market, as the marginal e¢ ciency
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to lend to rms goes up and more e¢ cient banks decide to lend at the interbank market.
The supply relationship shifts to the left with higher t: Only the extensive margin is
a¤ected by higher borrowing taxes t: With higher tax on borrowing the hump-shaped
demand schedule shifts down-left, with a very substantial e¤ect on equilibrium: higher
interbank borrowing rate reduces both the equilibrium interbank rate t and the corporate
loan rate Rt in the steady state, see Figure3.4. This gure compares the benchmark case
of no taxes with tax rate of 5%. Panel E reports that the point of intersection of demand
and supply shifts to the left substantially.
Figure 3.5 shows the e¤ect of the borrowing tax on the absorbtion capacity. It is
apparent that the e¤ect is likely to increase the probability of crises. With higher tax
the interest rate, at which the interbank market closes, is rising. Although additional
investigation is needed, it is highly likely that this policy does nor reduce probability of
the nancial crisis.
3.B Appendix: Decentralized Problem
3.B.1 Solving Decentralized Equilibrium
Collect all FOCs for rms and households, rst substitute prot
t = e
ztF (kt; ht) + (1  ) kt   wt	tht  Rtkt
into the household budget constraint and collect all together
ct + at+1 = ~rtat + wt	tht + t + t + Tt + gt = ~rtat + wt	tht
+eztF (kt; ht) + (1  ) kt   wt	tht  Rtkt + t + gt + Tt
= ~rtat + e
ztF (kt; ht) + (1  ) kt  Rtkt + t + gt + Tt
	twt = e
ztFh (kt; ht)
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Figure 3.4: Interbank Market Clearing, tax on borrowing
182
0.95 1 1.05
1.05
1.1
1.15
0 2 4
Interbank Tax,
1.0352
1.0354
1.0356
1.0358
1.036
1.0362
1.0364
Loan Rate, R
0 2 4
Interbank Tax,
0.968
0.97
0.972
0.974
Interbank Rate,
0 2 4
Interbank tax,
0.934
0.936
0.938
0.94
0.942
Bank Efficienicy, p min
0 2 4
Interbank Tax,
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
Market Funding Ratio,
0 2 4
Interbank Tax,
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
3.38
Absobtion Capacity, A
Figure 3.5: The E¤ect of Interbank Borrowing Tax on Threshold Characteristics of the
Interbank Market
183
Rt = e
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solve for the absorption capacity of the banking sector
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Therefore, if Rt = Rt then
kdt
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and it depends on taxation t; and the volume of trade t
Note that by denition R is the lowestpoint where the trade exists, so k
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We have two situations to describe:
1. trade does not exist
2. trade exists
In the limiting case the trade does exist, Rt = Rt
rt =
Z 1
0
rt (p) d (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
R 1
pt
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R 
Rt
0 d (p)
= Rt
R 1

Rt
pd (p) + 


Rt

; no trade
(7)
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Finally, dene transfers as
t =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R 1
pt
(1  p) (1 + t)Rtatd (p) = (1 + t)Rtat

1   (pt) 
R 1
pt
pd (p)

= (1 + t)Rtat

1
(1+t)
  R 1
pt
pd (p)

= Rtat   at
R 1
pt
pRt (1 + t) d (p) = at (Rt   rt) ; tradeR 1

Rt
(1  p)Rtatd (p) =
R 1

Rt
Rtatd (p) 
R 1

Rt
pRtatd (p)
= Rtat

1  


Rt

  at
R 1

Rt
pRtd (p)
= Rtat

1  


Rt

  at

rt   


Rt

= at (Rt   rt)  (at   kt) (Rt   ) ; no trade
Tt = (rt   1) tat
gt = ((t   1) (1 t) + t) att
The nal system can be written as
ct + at+1 = ~rtat + e
ztkt (	tht)
1  + (1  ) kt  Rtkt + t + gt + Tt
Rt = e
ztk 1t (	tht)
1  + (1  )
ct   #	t h
1+
t
1 + 
 
= 

ct+1   #	t+1 h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 
(1 + (rt+1   1) (1   t+1))
ht =

(1  )
#
ezt

kt
	t
 1+
Tt = (rt   1) tat
t =

(Rt   rt) at; trade
Rtkt   rtat +  (at   kt) ; no trade
at =
(
kt; trade
1  


Rt
 1
kt; no trade
rt
Rt
=
8<:
R 1
pt
p
(1 (pt))d (p) ; tradeR 1

Rt
pd (p) + 
Rt



Rt

; no trade
pt =
(
1+(t 1)t+tt
Rt(1+t)
; trade

Rt
; no trade
186
gt =

((t   1) (1 t) + t)tat; trade
0; no trade


1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)

=
1 + (t   1)t   
1 + (t   1)t +  (   1)
t =
1   + (t   1)t

then


 +  (t   1)t + (t + t) (1   + (t   1)t)
Rt ( (   1) + 1 + (t   1)t)

=
1 + (t   1)t   
1 + (t   1)t +  (   1)
t =
(
RootOf



1+(t 1)t 
(( 1)+1+(t 1)t)

= 1+(t 1)t 
(( 1)+1+(t 1)t)

; trade
; no trade
We simplify the system. We relabel variables At = at	t ; Kt =
kt
	t
; Ct =
ct
	t
; Xt =
t
	t
;t =
Tt
	t
; Gt =
gt
	t
;  t+1 =
	t+1
	t
and substitute out transfers
Ct +  t+1At+1 =

eztKt h
1 
t + (1  )Kt

+  (At  Kt) + (t   1) (1 t)tAt
Rt = e
ztK 1t h
1 
t + (1  )
Ct   # h
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   t+1

Ct+1   # h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 
(1 + (rt+1   1) (1   t+1))
ht =

(1  )
#
eztKt
 1
+
Kt =
8<: At; tradeAt1   Rt ; no trade
rt =
8<: Rt

(+1)
(1 p+1t )
(1 pt )
; trade
Rt

+p+1t
+1

; no trade
t =
(
ptRt(1+t) 1+t
(t+t)
; trade
; no trade
pt =
8<:

1+(t 1)t 
(( 1)+1+(t 1)t)
 1

; trade

Rt
; no trade
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t =
(
pt
(1 pt )
; trade
0; no trade
where unknowns are: rt; t; Rt; ht; Ct; Kt; At; pt; t:
Finally, at the boundary
At =

1  
#
 1



R +    1
 +
(1 )
e
1+
(1 ) zt =  e
1+
(1 ) zt
and if there is trade then t  1 and t = 1 if the interbank market is shut.
3.B.2 Absorption Capacity
Recall that we have three equations to determine pt; t; Rt
t =
1   + (t   1)t

pt =
1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)
pt =
t
1 + t
from where
t
(1 + t)
=
1 + (t   1)t   
( (   1) + 1 + (t   1)t)
pt =

t
1 + t
 1

=
1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
Rt (1 + t)
and
t =
1   + (t   1)t

Rt =
1 + (t   1)t + tt + tt
t
1+t
 1

(1 + t)
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Substitute out t to yield
Rt =


(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1
 1


 (1 t)
 + (1 + (t   1)t   )
(3.33)
+t

 (t   1)
 + (1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1

+t

1  
 + 1   + (t   1)t

which is a form of equation (6) but where t is substituted out. In what follows we assume
1 + (t   1)t > : This implies that the denominator is positive as t > 1 +  1t >
1 +  1 
t
We nd minimum of (3.33) in analytical form:
R0t =  
1

t
(1 + (t   1)t   )2


(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1
 1

 1
0@ (1 t)+(1+(t 1)t ) + t  (t 1)+(1+(t 1)t ) + 1
+t

1  
+1 +(t 1)t
 1A
+


(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1
 1

0@   (1 t)t(+(1+(t 1)t ))2 + t  t(+1 +(t 1)t)2
+

(t 1)
+(1+(t 1)t ) + 1

  t

(t 1)t
(+(1+(t 1)t ))2
 1A
R0t =  
1

t
(1 + (t   1)t   )2


(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1
 1

 1

 (1 t) + t ( (t   1) +  + (1 + (t   1)t   ))
+t ( + 1   + (t   1)t   )

 + (1 + (t   1)t   )
+


(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1
 1

 1

(1 + (t   1)t   )
+ 1

   (1 t)t + tt + ( (t   1) +  + (1 + (t   1)t   ))
 ( + (1 + (t   1)t   ))  t (t   1)t

( + (1 + (t   1)t   ))2
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If t = 1 and t = 0 then solution
R0t =


(1 + (t   1)  )
+ 1
 1

 1
(1  )2 + (     2) t + 2t
 (   t)2
from where:
 =
  (      2) +
q
(      2)2   4 (1  )22
2
and

R
=

  
   + 
 1

In general case
R0t =


(1+(t 1)t ) + 1
 1

 1
 ( +t  tt   1)2 (   t +  +tt + 1)
P (t)
where
P (t) =
 
3t

3t +
2
t (3     3   3t + 2) 2t
+tt (  (   1) (3     3 + 3)
+t
  6  22 +  + 6   2 + 22   3 + 3t
+ (   1)2 (  +  + 1) t
 
3+ 22   6   3t
+32   2   3   22 + 23 + 2
+t
  22 + 3 + t   2 + 22   
So that
t = RootOf (P (t))
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Rt =
(1 + (t   1)t + tt)
(1 + t)

( (   1) + 1 + (t   1)t)
1 + (t   1)t   
 1

pmin =

1 + (t   1)t   
( (   1) + 1 + (t   1)t)
 1

At =

1  
#
 1



Rt +    1
 +
(1 )
e
1+
(1 ) zt =  te
1+
(1 ) zt
and the boundary At depends on taxes t:
3.C Appendix: Centralized Equilibrium
We assume that the policymaker solves the following problem:
max
Ht;Ct
1X
t=0
tu (Ct; Ht) = max
Ht;Ct
1X
t=0
t
1
1  

Ct   #H
1+
t
1 + 
1 
subject to constraints
Ct +  At+1 =

eztKt H
1 
t + (1  )Kt

+  (At  Kt)
Rt = e
ztK 1t H
1 
t + (1  )
Kt =
8<: At; tradeAt1   Rt ; no trade
3.C.1 Interest rates in Equilibrium with Trade
The Lagrangians can be written
1X
t=0
t
 
	1 t
1  

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
1 
+ 1t
 
eztA 1t h
1 
t + (1  ) Rt

+2t
 
eztAt h
1 
t + (1  )At   Ct    t+1At+1

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and the rst order conditions are:
@
@Ct
: 	1 t

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
  2t
@
@ht
:  #ht	1 t

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
+ 1t (1  )eztA 1t h t + 2t (1  ) eztAt h t
@
@Rt
: +1t
@
@At+1
: 1t+1 (  1) ezt+1A 2t+1 h1 t+1 + 2t+1
 
ezt+1A 1t+1 h
1 
t+1 + (1  )
  2t t+1
@
@1t
: eztA 1t h
1 
t + (1  ) = Rt
@
@2t
: eztAt h
1 
t + (1  )At   Ct =  t+1At+1
Substitute out Lagrange multipliers to yield
ht =

(1  )
#
eztAt
 1
+

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   t+1

Ct+1   #h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 
Rt+1
Rt = e
ztA 1t h
1 
t + (1  )
 t+1At+1 = e
ztAt h
1 
t + (1  )At   Ct
Note that because the labour allocation is the same as in the decentralized equilibrium,
the values of ; R; A do not change.
3.C.2 Interest rates in Equilibrium with No trade
The Lagrangian can be written as
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1X
t=0
t
 
	1 t
1  

Ct   #
1 + 
h1+t
1 
+1t
0@eztA 1t h1 t
 
1 


Rt
! 1
+ (1  ) Rt
1A
+2t
0B@ eztAt h1 t

1 


Rt

+ (1  )At
+( +    1)At


Rt

  Ct    t+1At+1
1CA
1CA
The rst order conditions are
@
@Ct
: 	1 t

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
= 2t
@
@ht
: h+t =
(1  )
#
eztAt
 
1 


Rt
!0BB@1 + 


Rt

1 


Rt
 (Rt   )Rt
1CCA
@
@Rt
: 1t = 	
1 
t

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
(Rt   )At


Rt


Rt
@
@At+1
: 1t+1 (  1) (Rt+1   (1  ))+At+12t+1
 
Rt+1 + (  Rt+1)


Rt+1
!
 2tAt+1 t+1
@
@1t
: eztA 1t h
1 
t
 
1 


Rt
! 1
= Rt   (1  )
@
@2t
: eztAt h
1 
t
 
1 


Rt
!
+ (1  )At + ( +    1)At


Rt

  Ct    t+1At+1
They can be simplied to yield
ht =
 
(1  )
#
eztAt
 
1 


Rt
!! 1+ 0BB@1 + 


Rt

1 


Rt
 (Rt   )Rt
1CCA
1
+

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   t+1

Ct+1   #h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 0@ Rt+1   (Rt+1   ) Rt+1


1 +  (1  ) (Rt+1 (1 ))
Rt+1

1A
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Rt = e
ztA 1t h
1 
t
 
1 


Rt
! 1
+ (1  )
 t+1At+1 = e
ztAt h
1 
t
 
1 


Rt
!
+ (1  )At + ( +    1)At


Rt

  Ct
ht =

(1  )
#
eztAt
 
1  pt
 1+  
1 + 
pt 
1  pt
 (Rt   )
Rt
! 1
+

Ct   #h
1+
t
1 + 
 
=   t+1

Ct+1   #h
1+
t+1
1 + 
 


Rt+1   (Rt+1   ) pt+1

1 +  (1  ) (Rt+1   (1  ))
Rt+1

Rt = e
ztA 1t h
1 
t
 
1  pt
 1
+ (1  )
 t+1At+1 = e
ztAt h
1 
t
 
1  pt

+ (1  )At + ( +    1)Atpt   Ct
pt =

Rt
3.D Appendix: Note on Numerical Solution
The standard deterministic RBC model can be written in three equations
Ct +  At+1 =

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At
rt = 

1  
#
 1 
+
A
  1
+
t + (1  ) 
Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
A
 1+
+
t
! 
=   
 
Ct+1   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
A
 1+
+
t+1
! 
rt+1
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or 2 equations
Ct +  At+1 =

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At
 
Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
A
 1+
+
t
! 
=   
 
Ct+1   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
A
 1+
+
t+1
!  


1  
#
 1 
+
A
  1
+
t+1 + (1  )
!
The only state is At
Construct grid on At : [Amin; Amax]
For each node (known) At apply the following algorithm
Solution algorithm 1:
Guess solution i
Cit = c
i (At)
Compute update
Ait+1 =

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Cit
Cit+1 = c
i
 
Ait+1

Use the last equation to update the guess
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Ci+1t =
#
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
(At)
 1+
+
+
 
Cit+1  
#
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+  
Ait+1
 1+
+
!

 
  
 


1  
#
 1 
+
A
i  1
+
t+1 + (1  )
!!  1

Now, we know Ci+1t and At; we can update function c
i+1 () by approximating Ci+1t by
a polynomial to get Ci+1t = c
i+1 (At)
We then compute
Ai+1t+1 =

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Ci+1t
Ci+1t+1 = c
i+1
 
Ai+1t+1

and so on.
Solution Algorithm 2:
Guess solution i:
Ait+1 = a
i (At)
Use it to nd
Ait+2 = a
i
 
Ait+1

Compute
Cit+1 =

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
i +1
+
t+1 + (1  )Ait+1    Ait+2
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compute
Cit =
#
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
A
 1+
+
t
+
 
Cit+1  
#
1 + 

(1  )
#
 1+
+
A
i 1+
+
t+1
!

 
  
 


1  
#
 1 
+
A
i  1
+
t+1 + (1  )
!!  1

Update assets:
Ai+1t+1 =
1
 
 
(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Cit
!
So we can update ai+1 () by a polynomial to
Ai+1t+1 = a
i+1 (At)
Figure 3.6 plots deterministic solutions as functions of assets.
3.E Appendix: Optimal State Contingent Tax on Sav-
ings
3.E.1 Trade
If the interbank market open then the decentralized equilibrium can be described by the
following system (t = 1):
Ct + At+1 t+1 = e
+1
+
zt

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At
197
0 2 4 6 8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
assets
0 2 4 6 8
0.5
1
1.5
2
consumption
0 2 4 6 8
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
bank rate r
0 2 4 6 8
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
corporate rate R
0 2 4 6 8
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
interbank rate,r
0 2 4 6 8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
efficiency, p
0 2 4 6 8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
volume of trade,f
0 2 4 6 8
-5
0
5
tax rate t
base line
45 degree l ine
efficient equilibrium
optimal tax
crisis threshold
Figure 3.6: Deterministic solution on a grid
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Rt = 

1  
#
 1 
+
A
  1
+
t e
1+
+
zt + (1  )
Ut = Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
eztAt
 1+
+
U t =  
 
t+1 (Ut+1)
  (1 + (rt+1   1) (1   t+1))
rt = Rt

(+ 1)
 
1  p+1t
 
1  pt

ptRt    = pt ( (   1) + ptRt)
t =
pt 
1  pt

t = ptRt
The central planner decides on  t+1, but because it only enters the consumption Euler
equation, we assume that the policymaker choose the optimal consumption plan, and then
the tax can be chosen consistent with the plan.
We, therefore, form the following Lagrangian:
1X
t=0
t
0@ 1
1  
 
Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt (At)

 1+
+
!1 
+1t
 
e
+1
+
zt

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Ct   At+1 
!!
other variables can be found as functions of Ct; At:
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The FOCs are:
@
@At+1
: 
 
Ct+1   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt+1 (At+1)
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+
! 
: 
 
 (1  )
 + 

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)
#
ezt+1 (At+1)
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+
 1
ezt+1 (At+1)
 1
!
:  1t + 1t+1
 

 + 1
+ 
e
+1
+
zt+1

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
 1
t+1 + (1  )
!
@
@Ct
:
 
Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt (At)

 1+
+
! 
  1t
@
@1t
: e
+1
+
zt

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Ct   At+1 
From where, substituting out Lagrange multipliers, we get the system which describes
the evolution of the economy under optimal taxation:
Ct   #
1 + 
h1+t
 
=   t+1

Ct+1   #
1 + 
h1+t+1
 
(3.34)

 


(1  )
#
 1 
+
e
+1
+
zt+1A
  1
+
t+1 + (1  )
!
ht =

(1  )
#
eztAt
 1
+
(3.35)
At+1 t+1 = e
+1
+
zt

(1  )
#
 1 
+
A
 +1
+
t + (1  )At   Ct (3.36)
We now nd the optimal tax rate, consistent with this dynamics of the economy.
Compare equation (3.34) with (3.28). They must be identical for consistency of the
model. This condition gives us the equation for optimal future taxes.
1+(Rt+1

(+ 1)
 
1  p+1t+1
 
1  pt+1
 1) (1   t+1) = (1  )
#
 1 
+
e
+1
+
zt+1A
  1
+
t+1 +(1  ) = Rt+1
200
from where the future tax is
 t+1 = 1  (Rt+1   1)
Rt+1

(+1)
(1 p+1t+1 )
(1 pt+1)
  1

= 1  (Rt+1   1)
 
1  pt+1

Rt+1

(+1)
 
1  p+1t+1
   1  pt+1
= Rt+1
 

 
1  p+1t+1
  (+ 1)  1  pt+1 
Rt+1
 
1  p+1t+1
  (+ 1)  1  pt+1
it depends on pt: Recall that pt =
Rtpt 
(+Rtpt ) so we can simplify
 t+1 = Rt+1



1  pt+1 Rt+1pt+1 (+Rt+1pt+1 )

  (+ 1)

1  Rt+1pt+1 
(+Rt+1pt+1 )


Rt+1

1  pt+1 Rt+1pt+1 (+Rt+1pt+1 )

  (+ 1)

1  Rt+1pt+1 
(+Rt+1pt+1 )

= Rt+1
 +  (1  pt+1) (  Rt+1pt+1)
 ( (1 Rt+1) + 1) +Rt+1 (1  pt+1) (  Rt+1pt+1)
At the boundary
 =
R
 
 +  (1  pmin)
 
   Rpmin


 

 
1  R+ 1+ R (1  pmin)     Rpmin
and the denominator is not zero, which can be checked numerically.
3.E.2 No Trade
If the interbank market is shut, the decentralized equilibrium can be described by the
following system (t = 1):
Ct +  t+1At+1 =
 
(1  )
#
 1 
+1
eztAt
 
1  pt
! +1+
+ (1     )At
 
1  pt

+ At
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Rt = 

1  
#
 1 
+  
At
 
1  pt
  1
+ e
1+
+
zt + (1  )
 
Ct   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt
 
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 
1  pt
 1++! 
(3.37)
=   t+1
 
Ct+1   #
1 + 

(1  )
#
ezt+1
 
At+1
 
1  pt+1
 1++! 
(3.38)
 (1 + (rt+1   1) (1   t+1))
rt = Rt

+ p+1t
+ 1

pt =

Rt
As before, the central planner decides on  t+1, but because it only enters the consump-
tion Euler equation, we assume that the policymaker choose the optimal consumption
plan, and then the tax can be chosen consistent with the plan.
We, therefore, form the following Lagrangian:
1X
t=0
t
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#
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e
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 
1  pt
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+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!
+4t (Rtpt   ))
where we do not include equation for rt as constraints, as it can be found as functions of
Ct; At; Rt; pt:
The FOCs are:
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From where, substituting out Lagrange multipliers, we get the system which describes the
evolution of the economy under optimal taxation:
ht =

(1  )
#
eztA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 1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1 + 
 
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
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#
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Rtpt =  (3.40)
We now nd the optimal tax rate, consistent with this dynamics of the economy.
Compare equation (3.24) with (3.28). They must be identical for consistency of the
model. This condition gives us the equation for optimal future taxes.
1 +

Rt+1

+ p+1t+1
+ 1

  1

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 t+1) =
 
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 + 
from where the future tax is
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
204
it depends on pt: Here pt =

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
: Simple algebra yields
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3.F Appendix: Approximation of functions by Cheby-
shev polynomials
3.F.1 Orthogonality
Denote M=nodes, N=degree.
Chebyshev polynomials Tp (xi) and Tq (xi) of di¤erent polynomial degrees p and q have
the following properties:
MxX
i=1
Tp (xi)Tq (xi) =
8<:
0 p 6= q
M
2
p = q 6= 0
M p = q = 0
3.F.2 One-dimensional
Suppose we want to nd coe¢ cients p in the following representation of function f (xi)
f (xi) =
NxX
p=0
pTp (xi)
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Note that
f (xi)Ts (xi) =
NxX
p=0
pTp (xi)Ts (xi)
take the sum
MxX
i=1
f (xi)Ts (xi) =
MxX
i=1
NxX
p=0
pTp (xi)Ts (xi)
use the orthogonality property
MxX
i=1
f (xi)Ts (xi) =
NxX
p=0
p
MxX
i=1
Tp (xi)Ts (xi) =
NxX
p=0
p
MxX
i=1
Tp (xi)Ts (xi)
=

Mx
2
s s 6= 0
Mx0 s = 0
we obtain
0 =
1
Mx
MxX
i=1
f (xi)T0 (xi) =
1
Mx
MxX
i=1
f (xi)
s =
2
Mx
MxX
i=1
f (xi)Ts (xi)
3.F.3 Two-dimensional
Similarly, for a two-dimensional function
f (xi; yj) =
NxX
p=0
NyX
q=0
pqTp (xi)Tq (yi)
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we can write
MyX
j=1
MxX
i=1
f (xi; yj)Ts (xi)Tu (yi) =
MyX
j=1
MxX
i=1
NxX
p=0
NyX
q=0
pqTp (xi)Tq (yi)Ts (xi)Tu (yi)
=
NxX
p=0
NyX
q=0
pq
MxX
i=1
Tp (xi)Ts (xi)
MyX
j=1
Tq (yi)Tu (yi)
=
NxX
p=0
NyX
q=0
pq
8<:
0 p 6= s
Mx
2
p = s 6= 0
Mx p = s = 0

8<:
0 q 6= u
My
2
q = u 6= 0
My q = u = 0
= su

Mx
2
s 6= 0
Mx s = 0


My
2
u 6= 0
My u = 0
from where
MyX
j=1
MxX
i=1
f (xi; yj)Ts (xi)Tu (yi) =
8>><>>:
00MxMy s = 0; u = 0
0u
MxMy
2
s = 0; u 6= 0
s0
MxMy
2
s 6= 0; u = 0
su
MxMy
4
s 6= 0; u 6= 0
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